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Commander H.Spencer-Cooper

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CLINTDEN LIBRARY

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Number . —..

'Date i^'XX

M&ldorf ASTOR Nancy

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THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2008 with funding from

Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/battleoffalklandOOspen

The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Before and After

By

Commander H. Spencer-Cooper

With Coloured Frontispiece and Ten Maps and Charts

CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD

London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne

1919

Zo tbc Aftemors

of the

Officers and Men

of the Royal Navy and the Royal Naval Reserve

who so gallantly gave their lives in the actions described in this book

CONTENTS

Part I.— Exploits off South America

MAPTEK

i. German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas

2. The Policy of Admiral Count von Spee

3. British Men-of-War off South America

4. Life at Sea in 1914 ....

5. The Sinking of the "Cap Trafalgar"

6. The Action off Coronel .

7. Concentration .....

8. Possibilities and Probabilities

3 13 19 28

35 45 60 67

Part II.— The Battle of the Falkland's

9. Away South .....

10. Enemy in Sight .....

11. The Battle-Cruiser Action

12. The End of the "Leipzig"

13. The Sinking of the "Nurnberg"

14. Aftermath ......

15. The Psychology of the Sailor in Action if). Vow Spee's Aims and Hot

17. The Parting of im. w \ .

18. THE Last of- ti i i "DRESDEN"

79

87 96

no 124

134 141

151

158

[63

viii Contents

Part III. — Official Dispatches

CHAPTER PAGE

i. The Action of H.M.S. "Carmania" . . 169

2. The Action off Coronel by H.M.S. "Glasgow" 172

3. Report by Vice-Admiral Count von Spee 174

4. The Battle of the Falkland Islands . 178

5. The Surrender of the " Dresden " . . 194

Appendix

A List of the Officers serving in the

Actions Recorded ..... 197

Index 221

MAPS AND CHARTS

The War Zone in Western Seas .

Chart of Course in " Carmania " — " Cap Trafalgar "

Duel ........

The Coronel Action : Position when Enemy

Sighted

The Coronel Action : Position at Sunset . Chart of " Cornwall " Action {Inset) . Chart of Battle-Cruiser Action {Inset) Stanley Harbour : Positions of Warships . Battle of the Falklands : Positions at 1.20 p.m Battle of the Falklands : Positions at 2.45 p.m Duel between " Kent " and " Nurnberg " .

PAGE

5

39

49 5i 79 79 83 94 112 127

INTRODUCTION

This plain, unvarnished account, so far as is known, is the first attempt that has been made to link with the description of the Falkland Islands battle, fought on December 8th, 1914, the events leading up to that engagement.

In order to preserve accuracy as far as possible, each phase presented has been read and approved by officers who participated. The personal views expressed on debatable subjects, such as strategy, are sure to give rise to criticism, but it must be remembered that at the time of writing the exact positions of the ships engaged in overseas operations were not fully known, even in the Service.

The subject falls naturally into three divisions :

Part I. deals briefly with the movements of British and German warships, and includes the duel fought by the Carmania, and the action that took place off Coronel.

PART EI. describes the Falkland Islands battle itself, and thu subsequent fate of the German cruiser Dresden.

Part III. contains the official dispatches bearing on these exploits.

The words of Alfred Noyes have been referred to frequently, because they arc in so many respects pro-

xii Introduction

phetic, and also because of their influence in showing that the spirit of Drake still inspires the British Navy of to-day.

The author takes this opportunity of expressing his warmest thanks to those who have helped him in collecting information and in the compilation of this book.

Part I EXPLOITS OFF SOUTH AMERICA

' Meekly content and tamely stay-at-home The sea-birds seemed that piped across the waves ; And Drake, bemused, leaned smiling to his friend Doughty and said, ' Is it not strange to know When we return, yon speckled herring-gulls Will still be wheeling, dipping, flashing there ? We shall not find a fairer land afar Than Ihose thyme-scented hills we leave behind ! Soon the young lambs will bleat across the combes, And breezes will bring puffs of hawthorn scent Down Devon lanes ; over the purple moors Lav'rocks will carol ; and on the village greens Around the maypole, while the moon hangs low, The boys and girls of England merrily swing In country footing through the flowery dance.' "

—ALFRED NOYES [Drake).

THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

CHAPTER I

GERMAN MEN-OF-WAR IN FOREIGN SEAS

" I, my Lords, have in different countries seen much of the miseries of war. I am, therefore, in my inmost soul, a man of peace. Yet I would not, for the sake of any peace, however fortunate, consent to sacrifice one jot of England's honour." — (Speech by Lord Nelson in the House of Lords, November i6lh, 1802.)

We are now approaching the end of the third year of this great war,* and most Englishmen, having had some of the experience that war inevitably brings with it, will agree that the words which Nelson spoke are as true to-day as when tiny were uttered just over a cen- tury ago. Furthermore, as time and the war go on, the spirit of the whole British nation — be it man or woman — is put to an ever-increasing test of endur- ance, which is sustained and upheld by those two simple words, " England's Honour." An old platitude, " Might is Right," is constantly being quoted; but the nation that reverses the order is bound to outlast the other win through to the desired goal. The justness of the cause, then, is the secret of our strength, which

• S'nie. — This book was completed in May, 1917. but was withheld from publication on account of the many omissions prescribed by the Naval Censor.

4 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

will not only endure but bring success to our arms in the end.

When Great Britain plunged into this Armageddon on August 4th, 1914, the only German squadron not in European waters was stationed in the Western Pacific, with its main base at Tsingtau. In addition there were a few German light cruisers isolated in various parts of the world, many of them being in proximity to British squadrons, which would point to the fact that Germany never really calculated on Great Britain throwing in her lot on the opposite side.

The recent troubles in Mexico accounted for the presence of both British and German cruisers in those waters, where they had been operating in conjunction with one another in the most complete harmony. As an instance, it might be mentioned that on August 2nd, 1914, one of our sloops was actually about to land a guard for one of our Consulates at a Mexican port in the boats belonging to a German light cruiser !

A short description of some of the movements of the German ships during the first few months of war will suffice to show that their primary object was to damage our overseas trade as much as possible. Further, since it is the fashion nowadays to overrate Germany's powers of organisation and skill, it will be interesting to observe that in spite of the vulnerability of our world- wide trade comparatively little was achieved.

The German squadron in China was under the com- mand of Vice-Admiral Count von Spee. The outbreak

German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas 5

of war found him on a cruise in the Pacific, which ulti- mately extended far beyond his expectations. The two armoured cruisers Scharnhorst — in which Admiral von Spee flew his flag — and Gneisenau left Nagasaki on

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THE WAR ZONE IN WBSTERN SEAS

June 28th, 1914. Their movements southward are of no particular interest until their arrival on July 7th at the Truk or Rug Islands, in the Caroline group, which then belonged to Germany. After a few days they leisurely continued their cruise amongst the

6 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

islands of Polynesia. About the middle of the month the light cruiser Number g was hastily recalled from San Francisco, and sailed on July 21st, joining von Spee's squadron at Ponape (also one of the Caroline Islands), where the three ships mobilised for war. On August 6th they sailed for an unknown destination, taking with them an auxiliary cruiser called the Titania.

Apparently they were somewhat short of provisions, particularly of fresh meat and potatoes, for it was said in an intercepted letter that their diet consisted mainly of " spun yarn " (preserved meat).

On August 22nd the Niimberg was sent to Honolulu to get papers and to send telegrams, rejoining the squadron shortly afterwards. A day or two later she was again detached, this time to Fanning Island, where she destroyed the British cable station, cut the cable, rejoining the squadron about September 7th, apparently at Christmas Island. Hearing that hostile forces were at Apia (Samoan Islands), von Spee sailed southward only to find, on his arrival, that it was empty of shipping.

The squadron now proceeded eastward to the French Society Islands to see what stores were to be found there. Completing supplies of coal at Bora Bora Island, it suddenly appeared off Papeete, the capital of Tahiti, on September 22nd. A French gunboat lying in the harbour was sunk by shell-fire, the town and forts were subjected to a heavy bombardment, whilst the coal stores were set on fire. Calling in later at the Marquesas Islands, the German Admiral shaped his course eastward toward Easter Island, which was reached on October 12th.

German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas 7

The light cruiser Leipzig sailed from Mazatlan, an important town on the west coast of Mexico, on August 2nd. Ten days later she was reported off the entrance to Juan de Fuca Straits, between Vancouver and the mainland, but never ventured inside to attack the naval dockyard of Esquimalt. When war broke out the Canadian Government with great promptitude purchased two submarines from an American firm at Seattle ; this was probably known to the Germans, and might account for their unwillingness to risk an attack on a port that was otherwise practically defenceless.

The Canadian light cruiser Rainbow, together with the British sloop Algerine, did excellent work on this coast. The former, in particular, showed much zeal in shadowing the Leipzig, though they never actually met.

The Leipzig achieved absolutely nothing worthy of note, although she remained on the west coast of America for a long time. It was not till the middle of October that she joined Admiral von Spee's squadron at Easter Island, without having caused any damage to the British Mercantile Marine.

The light cruiser Dresden was at St. Thomas, one of the larger of the Virgin Islands group, West Indies. She sailed on August ist and proceeded straight to Cape Horn, only staying her career to coal at various places en route where she was unlikely to be reported. Crossing and re-crossing the trade route, she arrived on September 5th at Orange Bay, which is a large un- inhabited Datura] harbour a few miles to the north- west of Cape Horn. Here she was met by a collier,

8 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

and stayed eleven days making adjustments to her engines. She evidently considered that she was now free from danger — we had no cruisers here at this period — for she continued her course into the Pacific, easing down to a speed of 8| knots, and keeping more in the track of shipping. She met the German gunboat Eber on September 19th, to the northward of Magellan, and continued her way, apparently on the look out for allied commerce, but only succeeded in sinking two steamers before joining the flag of Admiral von Spee at Easter Island on October 12th. Altogether she sank three steamers and four sailing vessels, representing a total value of just over £250,000.

The light cruiser Karlsruhe, the fastest and most modern of the German ships on foreign service, was in the Gulf of Mexico at the commencement of the war. On her way to her sphere of operations in the neighbour- hood of Pernambuco she was sighted on August 6th, whilst coaling at sea from the armed liner Kronprinz Wilhelm, by the British cruiser Suffolk. Admiral Cradock, who was then flying his flag in the Suffolk, immediately gave chase to the Karlsruhe, the Kronprinz Wilhelm bolt- ing in the opposite direction. During the forenoon Admiral Cradock called up by wireless the light cruiser Bristol, which was in the vicinity, and, giving her the position of the Karlsruhe, ordered her to intercept the enemy. The Karlsruhe was kept in sight by the Suffolk for several hours, but was never within gun-range, and finally escaped from her by superior speed. It was a beautiful moonlight evening when the Bristol sighted her

German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas 9

quarry at S p.m., and a quarter of an hour later opened fire, which was returned a few moments later by the Karlsruhe, but it was too dark for either ship to see the results of their shooting. All the enemy's shots fell short, so that the Bristol incurred no damage. Both ships went on firing for fifty-five minutes, by which time the German had drawn out of range. Admiral Cradock signalled during the action, " Stick to it — I am coming " ; all this time the Suffolk was doing her best to catch up, but never succeeded in reaching the scene of the first naval action in the world-war. The German disappeared in the darkness, and was never seen again by our warships.

In her subsequent raids on British commerce along the South Atlantic trade routes the Karlsruhe was, on the whole, successful, until she met a sudden and in- glorious end off Central America. Her fate was for a long time shrouded in mystery, the first clue being some of her wreckage, which was found washed up on the shores of the island of St. Vincent in the West Indies. Some of her survivors eventually found their way back to the Fatherland and reported that she had foundered with 260 officers and men — due to an internal explosion on November 4th, 1914, in latitude io° 07' N., longitude 55° 25' W. (See Map p. 5)

In all she sank seventeen ships, representing a value of £1,622,000.

There remain three German armed merchant cruisers that claim our attention on account of their operations off South America. The Cap Trafalgar only existed for

io The Battle of the Falkland Islands

a month before being sunk by the armed Cimard liner Carmania. A description of the fight is given in a subsequent chapter.

The Frinz Eitel Friedrich was more directly under the orders of Admiral von Spee, and acted in conjunction with his squadron in the Pacific until the battle of the Falkland Islands, when she operated on her own account against our trade with South America. She achieved some measure of success during the few months that she was free, and captured ten ships altogether, several of which, however, were sailing vessels. Early in March she arrived at Newport News in the United States with a number of prisoners on board, who had been taken from these prizes. She was badly in need of refit ; her engines required repairs, and the Germans fondly imag- ined that they might escape internment. On hearing that one of her victims was an American vessel, public indignation was hotly aroused and but little sympathy was shown for her wants. Her days of marauding were brought to an abrupt termination, for the Americans resolutely interned her.

Lastly, there was the Kronprinz Wilhelm, which, as we have seen, was in company with the Karlsruhe when the latter was sighted and chased by the Suffolk only two days after war was declared. She was commanded by one of the officers of the Karlsruhe, and worked under her orders in the Atlantic. In fact, the German cruiser transferred two of her Q.F. guns to the armed merchantman, and they were mounted on her forecastle. She was skilful in avoiding our cruisers and literally fed upon her captures, being fortunate in obtaining

German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas n

coal with fair frequency. In the course of eight months the Kronprinz WUhelm captured and destroyed fifteen British or French ships, four of which were sailing vessels. It will be realised how small was the toll of our ships sailing these seas, especially when it is recollected that the main object of the Ger- mans at this time was to make war on our maritime trade. Finalfy, sickness broke out on board and there were several cases of beriberi ; moreover, the ship leaked and was in want of repairs, so on April nth she also steamed into Newport News and was interned. That the Germans did not approach the results they hoped for in attacking our commerce was in a large measure due to the unceasing activity of our cruisers, who forced the German ships to be continually on the move to fresh hunting grounds. Thus, although many of them escaped capture or destruction for some time, they were perpetually being disturbed and hindered in their work of depredation.

The exploits of the light cruisers Emden and Konigs- berg are outside the scope of this book, but the following brief summary may be of interest.

Sailing from Tsingtau on August 5U1, with four colliers, the Emden apparently proceeded to cruise in the neighbourhood of Vladivostock, where she captured .a Russian auxiliary cruiser and one <>r two merchant -hi].- , before going south t<> make history in tin- r..i\ oi Bengal She was eventually brought i" book off

the I I land on November 9th, km 1. by the Aus

tralian light cruiser Sydney, in a very gallant action

12 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

which lasted over an hour and a half, when she ran herself ashore in a sinking condition on North Keeling Island. She sank seventeen ships all told, representing a total value of £2,211,000.

The Konigsberg, at the commencement of hostilities, was lying at Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of what was formerly German East Africa. She sank the Pegasus, a light cruiser only two-thirds of her size and of much inferior armament, at Zanzibar on September 20th, but only succeeded in sinking one or two steamers after- wards. She was eventually discovered hiding in the Rufiji Delta in German East Africa, towards the end of October, 1914, where she was kept blocked up by our ships for nearly nine months. Finally, on July nth, 1915, she was destroyed by gunfire by the monitors Severn and Mersey, who went up the river — the banks on both sides being entrenched — and reduced her to a hopeless wreck where she lay, some fourteen miles from the sea.

CHAPTER II

THE POLICY OF ADMIRAL COUNT VON SPEE

It is clearly impossible to state with any exactitude the motives which governed von Spee's policy ; but, in briefly reviewing the results, a shrewd idea of the reasons which led him to certain conclusions may be formed. Also, it will assist the reader to a conclusion on the merits and demerits of the strategy adopted, and will help him to follow more easily the reasons for some of the movements of our own ships described in the next chapter.

That Admiral von Spee did not return to Tsingtau at the outbreak of hostilities appears significant, since ho was by no means inferior to our squadron, and wished to mobilise his ships. He, however, sent the Emden there with dispatches and instructions to the colliers about meeting him after she had escorted them to sea. Japan, it will be remembered, did not declare war till August 2 jrd, 1914, and therefore could scarcely have come into his earlier calculations. His action in con- tinuing his cruise in the Southern Pacific, where he handy and ready to strike at the French colonies* at the psychological moment of the outbreak of hostilities, gives the impression that he did not consider England's intervention probable.

• The German Chancellor bad publicly declared the intention to c.ipturr the French colonies.

13

14 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Previous to the war, the Leipzig and Numberg had been detached to the West Coast of America, and it appears likely that von Spee was influenced in his decision to remain at large in the Pacific by this fact, as, before this dispersal of his squadron, he would have been dis- tinctly superior to the British Fleet in the China Station at that time. Great care was taken by him to keep all his movements secret, and he appears to have avoided making many wireless signals.

The decision of the British Government to proceed with operations against the German colonies in the Southern Pacific must have had a determining effect on German policy ; this decision was made at the very outset and allowed the enemy no time to make pre- parations to counter it. The value of the patriotism and loyal co-operation of the Dominions in building up their own Navy in peace time was now clearly demon- strated, Australia being the first of our Dominions to embark on this policy.

The German China squadron was inferior in strength to our ships in Australian waters, and could not afford to risk encountering the powerful battle-cruiser Aus- tralia with her eight 12-inch guns ; consequently, von Spee was compelled to abandon the many colonies in Polynesia to their fate. Finally, the advent of Japan into the conflict left him little choice but to make his way to the eastward, since not to do so was to court almost certain destruction, while to move west and conceal his whereabouts was an impossibility. That von Spee felt his position to be precarious, and had diffi- culty in making up his mind what to do, is shown by

Policy of Admiral Count von Spee 15

the slow and indecisive movement of his squadron at first.

The movements of the German light cruisers lead to the conclusion that they must have received orders to scatter so as to destroy our trade in various spheres. The Leipzig apparently patrolled the western side of North America, whilst the Karlsruhe took the South Atlantic, and so on.

Why the Dresden should have steamed over 6,000 miles to the Pacific instead of assisting the Karlsruhe is hard to explain, unless she had direct orders from the German Admiralty. She could always have joined von Spee later.

With the exception of the Emdcn, who operated with success in the Bay of Bengal, and the Karlsruhe, whose area of operations was along the junction of the South Atlantic and the West Indian trade routes, none of them succeeded in accomplishing a fraction of the damage that might reasonably have been expected at a time when our merchantmen were not organised for war and business was " as usual." It cannot be denied that the Emdcn s raid wholly disorganised the trade along the east coast of India. The local moneylenders — who are the bankers to the peasants — abandoned the coast com- pleted, trade nearly came to a standstill, and the damage >k months to recover. In this case the effects could by no means be measured by an armchair calcu- lation of the tonnage sunk by the Iimdcn in pounds, shilling- and pence.

The main anxiety of the German Admiral lay in the continuance of his supplies, which could only be assured

16 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

by careful organisation. This was rendered compara- tively easy in South America, where every port teemed with Germans ; the wheels of communication, through the agency of shore wireless stations, were well oiled by German money, and there were numerous German mer- chantmen, fitted with wireless, ready to hand to be used as supply ships or colliers.

It was thus of paramount importance that the Ger- man Squadron should be rounded up and annihilated before it could become a serious menace to our trade and that of our Allies. The other remaining light cruisers of the enemy, who were operating singly, could be dealt with more easily, since our ships could afford to separate in order to search for them, thus rendering it only a matter of time before they were destroyed.

What was the object, then, of the German Admiral ? This was the all-important question that occupied the thoughts of all our naval officers in foreign parts. On the assumption that he would come eastwards, there appeared to be few choices open to him beyond the following :

(i) To bombard the seaports of our colonies on the west coast of Africa and to attack weakly defended but by no means valueless naval stations (such as St. Helena), at the same time operating against British and French expeditions going by sea against German colonies.

(2) To go to South Africa, destroy the weak British squadron at the Cape, and hang up Botha's expedition by supporting a rising against us in the South African Dominions.

Policy of Admiral Count von Spee 17

(3) To endeavour to make his way home to Germany.

(4) To operate in the North Atlantic

(5) To harass our trade with South America. Both the first and second appeared quite feasible,

but they had the twofold disadvantage of involving actions nearer England and of very possibly restrict- ing the enemy a good deal in his movements ; there are few harbours on this coast, and his every movement would become known in a region where we held the monopoly in methods of communication. Consequently, any success here was bound to be more or less short- lived. On the other hand, matters were undoubtedly very critical in these parts. De la Rey, when he was shot, was actually on his way to raise the Vierkleur at Potchefstroom, and any striking naval success which it would have taken us three weeks to deal with at the very least, might have just set the balance against us at this time in the minds of the waverers. Moreover, it would not have been difficult to ensure supplies from the German colonies.

The third may be dismissed as being extremely improbable at the outset, for it is difficult to run a blockade with a number of ships, and, for the enemy, it would too much have resembled thrusting his head into the lion's jaws. Besides, he could be of far greater service to his country in roaming the seas and in con- tinuing to be a thorn in our side as long as possible.

The fourth will scarcely bear examination ; cut off from all bases, he could hardly hope to escape early <h -truction.

Ih- fifth seemed by far the most favourable '«' Ins

18 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

hopes, as being likely to yield a richer harvest, and, if successful, might paralyse our enormous trade with South America, upon which we were so dependent.

German influence was predominant as well as un- scrupulous along the Brazilian coasts, which would render it easy to maintain supplies. To evoke sympathy amongst the smaller Republics would also come within his horizon. Finally, he could have had little idea of our strength in South Africa ; whereas information gleaned from Val- paraiso (which von Spee evidently considered reliable) as to the precise extent of our limited naval resources then on the east coast of South America, must have proved a deciding factor in determining his strategy.

Whichever course were adopted, it was practically certain that the German Admiral would move east- wards, either through the Straits of Magellan or, more probably, round the Horn to avoid having his where- abouts reported. That this occurred to the minds of our naval authorities before the action off Coronel took place is practically certain, but it is to be regretted that reinforcements to Admiral Cradock's squadron operating in South American waters were not sent there in time to prevent that disaster.

This, then, in brief, was the problem that presented itself to our commanders after the battle of Coronel took place, and no doubt influenced them in the choice of the Falkland Islands as a base, its geographical posi- tion making it almost ideal in the event of any move in that direction on the part of the Germans.

CHAPTER III

BRITISH MEN-OF-WAR OFF SOUTH AMERICA

" If England hold The sea, she holds the hundred thousand gates That open to futurity. She holds The highways of all ages. Argosies Of unknown glory set their sails this day For England out of ports beyond the stars. Ay, on the sacred seas we ne'er shall know They hoist their sails this day by peaceful quays, Great gleaming wharves i' the perfect City of God, If she but claims her heritage."

— Alfred Noyes (Drake).

Before attempting to give a description of the battle of the Falkland Islands, it is necessary to review very briefly the movements and dispositions of our ships, as well as the events preceding the battle, which include both the duel between the armed merchant cruiser Car- mania and Cap Trafalgar and the action fought off Coronel on the coast of Chili by Admiral Cradock.

Our naval forces were scattered in comparatively small units all over the world when war broke out. Ships in various squadrons were separated from one another by great distances, and, with the exception of our Mediterranean Fleet, we possessed no squadron in any part of the globe equal in strength to that of von Sj>'

Attention is directed to the positions of Eastei Island, where the Germans had last been reported,

19

20 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Valparaiso, Coronel, Magellan Straits, Staten Island, the Falkland Islands, Buenos Ayres, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, and the Island of Trinidad off the east coast of South America, since they occur con- tinually in the course of this narrative.*

In the early part of 1914 Rear-Admiral Sir Christo- pher Cradock, K.C.V.O., C.B., flying his flag in the Suffolk, was in command of the fourth cruiser squadron, which was then doing some very useful work in the Gulf of Mexico. On August 2nd he was at Kingston, Jamaica, and received information that the Good Hope was on her way out to become his flagship, so he sailed northwards to meet her. On the way he sighted and gave chase to the Karlsruhe on August 6th, as has been related. The Suffolk and the Good Hope met at sea ten days later, and the Admiral went on board the latter immediately and hoisted his flag.

Turning south, he went to Bermuda, called in at St. Lucia on August 23rd, and thence proceeded along the north coast of South America on his way to take up the command of a newly forming squadron of British ships patrolling the trade routes and protecting the merchant shipping in South American waters. At St. Lucia Admiral Cradock would probably have learned of the sailing of von Spee's squadron from Ponape on August 6th, and this accounts for his haste in making south in order to meet and form his ships together.

The squadron was gradually augmented as time went on, and in the months of September and October, 1914, consisted of the flagship Good Hope (Captain Philip

* See Map, p. 5.

British Men-of-War off S. America 21

Francklin), Canopus (Captain Heathcoat Grant), Mon- mouth (Captain Frank Brandt), Cornwall (Captain W. M. Ellerton), Glasgow (Captain John Luce), Bristol (Captain B. H. Fanshawe), and the armed merchant cruisers Otranto (Captain H. Mel. Edwards), Macedonia (Captain B. S. Evans), and Orama (Captain J. R. Segrave).

No news was obtainable as to the whereabouts of the German squadron stationed in the Pacific, which consisted of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Niirn- berg, and Leipzig, except that it was known that the two latter had been operating on the east side of the Pacific, and that the Emden was in the Bay of Bengal. The vaguest rumours, all contradicting one another, were continually being circulated, in which it is more than likely that German agents had a large share.

Admiral Cradock proceeded south in the middle of September to watch the Straits of Magellan, and to patrol between there and the River Plate, as he doubtless hoped to prevent the Karlsruhe and Dresden — which, when last heard of, were in South American waters — from attempting to effect a junction with their main squadron. With him were the Monmouth, Glasgow, and the armed Orient liner Otranto, in addition to his own ship the Good Hope, which, together with his colliers, had their first base in the Falkland Islands.

On hearing of the appearance of the Germans off Papei-t'- and of the bombardment of the French colony there on September 22nd, it was apparently considered expedient to proceed to the wesl coasl of South America in order to intercept the enemy. Accordingly, early

22 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

in October the Monmouth, Glasgow, and Otranto went round to the Pacific, diligently searching out the many inlets and harbours en route, and arrived at Valparaiso on October 15th, but only stayed a part of one day in order to get stores and provisions. They then went back southwards to meet the Good Hope and Canopus, vainly hoping to fall in with the Leipzig or Dresden on the way. The Good Hope reached the Chilian coast on October 29th, and all ships filled up with coal ; the Canopus was due very shortly, and actually sighted our ships steaming off as she arrived.

In order to carry out a thorough and effective exam- ination of the innumerable inlets that abound amongst the channels of Tierra del Fuego, in addition to the bays and harbours on both coasts of South America, it be- came necessary to divide up this squadron into separ- ate units. To expedite matters, colliers were sent to meet our ships, so that valuable time should not be lost in returning to the base at the Falkland Islands. The first fine day was seized to fill up with coal, care always being taken to keep outside the three-mile territorial limit.

It must have been a trying and anxious time for both officers and men, while pursuing their quest, never knowing what force might suddenly be disclosed in opening out one of these harbours. From the weather usually experienced in these parts some idea may be formed of the discomforts. An officer in the Glasgow, writing of this period, says : "It blew, snowed, rained, hailed, and sleeted as hard as it is possible to do these things. I thought the ship would dive under alto-

British Men-of-War off S. America 23

get her at times. It was a short sea, and very high, and doesn't suit this ship a bit. The Monmouth was rather worse, if anything, though not quite so wet. We were rolling 35 degrees, and quite useless for fight- ing purposes. The ship was practically a submarine."

Imagine, too, the position of the Otranto, searching these waters by herself, without the least hope of being able to fight on level terms with one of the enemy's light-cruisers. The words of one of her officers sum up the situation : "' We finally got past caring what might happen," he said ; " what with the strain, the weather, and the extreme cold, we longed to find something and to have it out, one way or the other."

When the depredations of the Karlsruhe became more numerous, the Admiralty dispatched ships — as could best be spared from watching other trade routes — to reinforce Admiral Cradock's command. Thus, what may be termed a second squadron was formed, consisting of the Canopus, Cornwall, Bristol, the armed P. & O. liner Macedonia, and the armed Orient liner Orama. This latter squadron carried out a fruitless search during September and October for the ever elusive Karlsruhe, but, so far as is known, did not suc- ceed in getting near her, for she was never actually sighted. In the absence of orders from Admiral Cradock, the «luli' of Senior Naval Officer of this northern squadron frequently involved the consideration of matters of no little consequence. These duties primarily Ived upon the houlders "i Captain Fanshawe of the Bristol, who was succeeded "ii tit*- arrival ol the Canopus by Captain Heathcoat Grant. As tin pool

24 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

state of the engines of the Canopus did not enable her to steam at any speed, she remained at the base and directed operations, forming a valuable link with her wireless. Orders, however, were received from Admiral Cradock which necessitated her sailing on October ioth in order to join his southern squadron, so that Captain Fanshawe was again left in command.

On October 24th the Carnarvon (Captain H. L. d'E. Skipwith) arrived, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart, who, though acting under the orders of Admiral Cradock, now took charge of the sweeping operations necessitated by our quest. Admiral Stoddart had pre- viously been in command of the ships operating along our trade routes near the Cape Verde Islands, where the Carnarvon had not long before made a valuable capture, the German storeship Professor Woermann, filled with coal and ammunition.

The comparatively large number of men-of-war mentioned is accounted for by the fact that at this time the Karlsruhe began to make her presence felt by sinking more merchant ships, which caused no little apprehension amongst the mercantile communities in all the ports on the north and east coasts of South America, Brazilian firms at this period refusing to ship their goods in British bottoms, although some British vessels were lying in harbour awaiting cargoes. The German ship's activities were mainly confined to the neighbourhood of St. Paul's Rocks, Pernambuco, and the Equator.

It is not easy to put clearly the disposition of the ships acting under Admiral Cradock at this time, nor

British Men-of-War off S. America 25

to give an adequate idea of the many disadvantages with which he had to contend. The difficulties of communication on the east coast of South America be- tween his two squadrons were very great, on account of the long distances between them (often some thou- sands of miles and always greater than the range of our wireless). The only method found feasible was to send messages in code by means of passing British merchant- men— usually the Royal Mail liners. The inevitable result of this was that it was frequently impossible for Admiral Cradock to keep in touch with his northern squadron, and important matters of policy had thus to be decided on the spot, the Admiral being informed later.

On the rare occasions that our ships visited Brazilian ports, which were crowded with German shipping, the crews of these ships, having nothing better to do, would come and pull round our cruisers — in all probability cursing us heartily the while — much to the interest and amusement of our men. These visits could only take place at the most once every three months, when the opportunity of getting a good square meal at a civ- ilised restaurant was hailed with delight by those officers who were off duty.

Our coaling base in these waters was admirably selected. There was sufficient anchorage for a large number of ships four or five miles from any land, but protected from anything but a heavy swell or sea by surrounding ledges of coral awash at low water. Some- times colliers got slightly damaged by bumping against our ships when there was a swell, but in other respects

26 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

it suited its purpose excellently. The Brazilians sent a destroyer to investigate once or twice, but could find nothing to arouse their susceptibilities, for our ships were always well outside the three-mile limit. Our sole amusement was fishing, frequently for sharks.

Towards the latter part of August, the armed mer- chant cruiser Carmania (Captain Noel Grant) was sent out to join Admiral Cradock's squadron with coal, pro- visions, and a large quantity of frozen meat, which was sadly needed. She was ordered by him to assist the Cornwall in watching Pernambuco on September nth, as it was thought that the German storeship Patagonia was going to put to sea on September nth to join the Karlsruhe. On her way south she got orders to search Trinidad Island in the South Atlantic to find out whether the Germans were making use of it as a coaling base, and there fell in with the German armed liner Cap Trafalgar, which she sank in a very gallant action that is described in a subsequent chapter.

The armed merchant cruiser Edinburgh Castle (Cap- tain W. R. Napier) was sent out from England with drafts of seamen and boys, as well as provisions and stores for our men-of-war in these waters. On her arrival at the base on October 12th, she was detained on service to assist in the sweep that had been organised to search for the Karlsruhe. Some of us have pleasant recollections of excellent games of deck hockey played on the spacious promenade deck during her all too short stay with us.

The Defence (Captain E. La T. Leatham) touched at

British Men-of-War off S. America 27

the base to coal on October 27th, being on her way south to join Admiral Cradock's southern command. She had to coal in bad weather, and perforated the collier's side in doing so, but succeeded in completing with coal in the minimum possible time under difficult conditions. Without loss of time she proceeded to Montevideo, but never got any farther, as it was there that the news of the Coronel disaster first reached her. Admiral Cradock hoped to find von Spee before the German light-cruisers Dresden and Leipzig joined the main squadron ; but he also was most anxious to wait for the Defence. She would have made a very powerful addition to his squadron, and it seems a thousand pities that it was not possible to effect this junction before he quitted the eastern shores of South America for the Pacific.

The Defence was very unlucky, and had a great deal of hard work without any kudos ; not till Admiral Sturdee's arrival did she leave to join the Minotaur on the Cape of Good Hope station, and the very day she arrived there got the news of the Falkland Islands battle ! Having covered 23,000 miles in two and a half months, the disappointment at having missed that fight was, of course, intense. It is sad to think that f« w of her gallant crew are alive to-day, as she was after- wards sunk in the battle of Jutland.

Hi' Invincible, flagship of Vice-Admiral F. C. Dove- ton Sturdee (Captain P. H. Beamish), the Inflexible

(tain R. F. Phiffimore, C.B., M.V.O.), and the Kent {( aptain J. I). Allen) enter the scene oi operations Liter.

CHAPTER IV

LIFE AT SEA IN I914

" A seaman, smiling, swaggered out of the inn, Swinging in one brown hand a gleaming cage Wherein a big green parrot chattered and clung Fluttering against the wires."

— ALFRED NOYES (Drake).

A short digression may perhaps be permitted, if it can portray the long days, when for months at a time little occurs to break the monotony of sea life. The reader may also experience the charitable feeling that, at the expense of his patience, the sailor is indulging in the " grouse " that proverbially is supposed to be so dear to him.

Of necessity, work on board ship in wartime must be largely a matter of routine ; and, though varied as much as possible, it tends to relapse into " the trivial round, the common task." All day and all night men man the guns ready to blaze off at any instant, extra look-outs are posted, and there are officers and men in the control positions. The ship's company is usually organised into three watches at night, which take turns in relieving one another every four hours.

After sunrise the increased visibility gives ample warning of any possible attack. The messdecks, guns, and ship generally are cleaned before breakfast, while the forenoon soon passes in perfecting the guns' crews

28

Life at Sea in 1914 29

and controls, and in physical drill. After dinner at noon and a smoke, everyone follows the old custom of the sea, and has a caulk (a sleep) — a custom origin- ated in the days of sailing ships who were at sea for long periods at a time, and watch and watch (i.e. one watch on and one off) had to be maintained both day and night. The men he about the decks, too tired to feel the want of either mattresses or pillows. The first dog watch (4-6 p.m.) is usually given up to recrea- tion until sunset, when it is time to go to night defence stations. Day in and day out, this programme is seldom varied except to stop and examine a merchant ship now and again.

Every ship met with on the high seas is boarded for the examination of its passengers and cargo, an undertaking often attended by some difficulty on a dark night. On approaching, it is customary to signal the ship to stop ; if this is not obeyed at once, a blank round is fired as a warning ; should this be disregarded a shotted round is fired across her bows, but it is seldom necessary to resort to this measure. At night these excursions have a strange, unreal effect, and our board- ing officer used to say that when climbing up a mer- chantman's side in rough weather he felt like some character in a pirate story. Getting out of a boat, as it is tossing alongside, on to a rope ladder, is by no means an easy job, especially if the officer is in- < lined to be portly. The searchlight, too, turned full on to the ship, blinding the scared passengers who come tumbling up, frequently imagining they have been torpedoed, adds to the mysterious effect produced, whilst

30 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the sudden appearance of the boarding officer in his night kit suggests a visit from Father Neptune. But any idea of comedy is soon shattered by the grumpy voice of the captain who has been turned out from his beauty sleep, or by the vehement objections of a lady or her husband to their cabin being searched. As a matter of fact, we were always met with the most un- failing courtesy, and the boat's crew was often loaded with presents of cigarettes or even chocolates, besides parcels of newspapers hastily made up and thrown down at the last moment.

Off a neutral coast the food problem is an everlast- ing difficulty, and as soon as the canteen runs out and tinned stores cannot be replenished, the menu resolves itself into a more or less fixed item of salt beef (" salt horse ") or salt pork with pea soup. The old saying, " Feed the brute, if a man is to be kept happy," has proved itself true, but is one which at sea is often extra- ordinarily hard to follow, especially when it is impossible to get such luxuries as eggs, potatoes, and fresh meat. If flour runs out, the ship's biscuit (" hard tack "), which often requires a heavy blow to break it, forms but a poor substitute for bread ; although it is quite good eating, a little goes a long way. The joy with which the advent of an armed liner is heralded by the officers cannot well be exaggerated ; the stewards from all ships lose no time in trying to get all they can, and the memory of the first excellent meal is not easily forgotten.

The ever-recurring delight of coaling ship is looked forward to directly anchorage is reached. Coal-dust

Life at Sea in 1914 31

then penetrates everywhere, even to the food, and after a couple of hours it seems impossible for the ship ever to be clean again. Nearly every officer and man on board, including the chaplain and paymasters, join in the work, which continues day and night, as a rule, until finished. If this takes more than twenty-four hours there is the awful trial of sleeping, clothes and all, covered in grime, for hammocks have to be foregone, else they would be quite unfit for further use. The men wear any clothes they like. In the tropics it is a warm job working in the holds, and clothes are some- what scanty. A very popular article is a bashed-in bowler hat, frequently worn with white shorts, and a football jersey ! There is, generally, a wag amongst the men who keeps them cheery and happy, even during a tropical rain storm. His powers of mimicking, often ranging from politicians to gunnery instructors, bring forth rounds of applause, and all the time he'll dig out like a Trojan.

The sailor is a cheery bird, and seldom lets an oppor- tunity of amusement escape. On one occasion, when lying at anchor in the tropics, someone suggested fishing ; after the first fish had been caught many rods and lines were soon going. A would-be wit enlivened matters by tying an empty soda-water bottle on to a rather excitable man's line while he was away, which met with r success on the owner crying out, " I've got a real big 'un here " as he carefully played it to the delight of everyone. Shark fishing was .1 favourite sport, and three were caught and landed in one afternoon; one of them had thn e mall shai I. inside it.

32 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The band (very few ships had the good fortune to possess one) plays from 4.30 to 5.30 p.m., when Jack disports himself in Mazurkas and d' Alberts, and dances uncommonly well before a very critical audience. Some men are always busy at their sewing machines when off duty, making clothes for their messmates ; this they call " jewing " ; others are barbers, or bootmakers, and they make quite a good thing out of it. Now that masts and sails are things of the past, substitutes in the way of exercise are very necessary, particularly when living on salt food. Boxing is greatly encouraged, and if competitions are organised, men go into strict training and the greatest keenness prevails. A canvas salt-water bath is usually rigged, and is in constant demand with the younger men. The officers congre- gate in flannels on the quarter-deck playing quoits, deck tennis, or cricket ; some go in for doing Swedish exercises, Miiller, or club swinging, and, to finish up with, a party is formed to run round the decks.

The Admiralty are extraordinarily good about dis- patching mails to our ships, but sudden and unexpected movements often make it impossible to receive them with any regularity. When war broke out everyone wondered how their folk at home would manage, whether money and food would be easily obtainable. In our own case we were moved from our original sphere of opera- tions, and did not get our first mail till October 19th, over eleven weeks after leaving England, and many other ships may have fared even worse. Again, our Christmas mail of 1914 was not received till six months afterwards, having followed us to the Falkland Islands,

Life at Sea in 1914 33

then back home, out again round the Cape of Good Hope, finally arriving at the Dardanelles. On this occasion one of the men had a pound of mutton and a plum pudding sent him by his wife ; it can easily be imagined with what delight he welcomed these delicacies, which had been through the tropics several times, as did those others whose parcels were any- where near his in the mail bag. It may appear a paltry thing to those who get their daily post regularly, but the arrival of a mail at sea is a very real joy, even to those who get but few letters. The newspapers arc eagerly devoured, and events, whose bare occurrence may have only become known through meagre wire- less communiques, are at length made comprehensible.

Darkening ship at sunset is uncomfortable, more par- ticularly in the tropics, when the heat on the mess- decks becomes unbearable from lack of air. However, this is now much improved by supplying wind-scoops for the scuttles, fitted with baffles to prevent the light from showing outboard. Everyone sleeps on deck who can, risking the pleasures of being trodden upon in the dark, or of being drenched by a sudden tropical shower, when the scrum of men hastily snatching up their ham- mocks and running for the hatches equals that of any crowd at a football match. On moonless nights little diversions are constantly occurring. A certain officer, perfectly sober, on one occasion walked over the edge of the boat-deck into space, and then was surprised to find that he was hurt.

The hardships and anxieties of the life are probably overrated by people ashore, The very^routine helps

D

34 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

to make the sailor accustomed to the strange and un- natural conditions, nearly all of which have their humor- ous side. As is the way of the world, we on the coast of South America all envied those in the Grand Fleet at this time, in modern ships fitted with refrigerating rooms and plenty of good fresh food ; and they, no doubt, willingly would have changed places with us, being sick to death of the uneventful life, cold, rough weather, and constant submarine strain from which we were fortunately immune. Events took such a shape a few months later that those of us who were fortunate enough to be in the battle of the Falkland Islands would not have been elsewhere for all the world.

CHAPTER V

THE SINKING OF THE " CAP TRAFALGAR "

When, with a roar that seemed to buffet the heavens

Ami rip the heart of the sea out, one red flame

Blackened with fragments, the great galleon burst

A Minder ! All the startled waves were strewn

With wreckage ; and Drake laughed : ' My lads, we have diced

With death to-day, and won ! ' "

— Alfred No yes (Drake).

It has already been mentioned that the Car mania was ordered to search the Brazilian island of Trinidad (not to be confused with the British Island of the same name), which lies in the South Atlantic about 600 miles to the eastward of South America, and in about the same latitude as Rio de Janeiro. It was uninhabited at this time, and seemed a likely place for the Germans to use as a temporary coaling base ; they have never had any compunction about breaking the laws of neutrality if it suited their purpose.

The following narrative is taken from the official report, supplemented by an account written by the author two days after the action from a description given him by the officers of H.M.S. Carmania.

Land was sighted on the morning of September i.jili, I'M .}. A moderate brce/.r was blowing from the north-

• l.ut it was a lovely day, with a clear sky and the sun shining. Shortly .itt< r 1 1 a.m. the masts of a vi 1 observed, and on approaching Dearer the Car* 35

36 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

mania made out three steamers, apparently at anchor in a small bay that lies to the south-west of the island. One of these was a large liner, but the others were clearly colliers and had their derricks topped ; they were probably working when they sighted us, and they imme- diately separated and made off in different directions before the whole of their hulls could be distinguished.

The large vessel was apparently a liner about equal in size,* having two funnels which were painted to resemble those of a Union Castle liner. After running away for a while, the larger steamer, which turned out to be the Cap Trafalgar (though this was not known for certain till weeks afterwards), altered course to starboard and headed more in our direction. She was then steering about south at what appeared to be full speed, while the Carmania was steaming 16 knots on a sou'-westerly course.

There could no longer be any doubt that she meant to fight, and the duel now ensued that has been so happily described by a gifted naval writer, the late Fred T. Jane, as " the Battle of the Haystacks." To my idea, it appears almost a replica of the frigate actions of bygone days, and will probably go down in history as a parallel to the engagement fought between the Chesapeake and Shannon. For gallantry, pluck and determination it certainly bears comparison with many of these actions of the past.

About noon she fired a single shot across the enemy's

* Carmania, Cunard S.S. Co. — 19,524 tons, 650 feet long, triple screw turbines.

Cap } Tw/aZga>-/Hamburg-Sud-Amerik S.S. Co. — 18,710 tons, 590 feet long, triple screw turbines.

The Sinking of the Cap Trafalgar 37

bows at a range of 8,500 yards, whereupon he immediately opened fire from his after-gun on the starboard side. This was quickly followed on both sides by salvoes (all guns firing nearly simultaneously as soon as their sights came on to the target), so matters at once became lively.

Curiously enough, the enemy's first few shots fell short, ricochetting over, and then, as the range decreased, they went clean over the hull, in consequence of which our rigging, masts, funnels, derricks, and ventilators all suffered, though the ship's side near the waterline — the principal anxiety — was so far intact. Some of the Carmania's first shots, which were lired at a range of 7,500 yards, were seen to take effect, and she continued to score hits afterwards with moderate frequency. The port battery was engaging his starboard guns at this period, so that he was on her port hand, and a refer- ence to the plan will show that she was ahead on bear- ing. The range was rapidly decreasing since they were both on converging courses, but unfortunately the German ship had the speed of her, for the Cunarder could only do 16 knots, due largely to a lack of vacuum in the condensers. As far as could be judged the Cap Trafalgar was steaming between 17 and 18 knots. (See Diagram, p. 39.)

At 4,500 yards, two of our broadsides were seen to hit all along the waterline. As the range decreased to 1 yards the shot from the enemy's pom-poms (ma- chine guns), lired with great rapidity, began to fall like hail on and all round the ship ; this induced Captain Grant to alter course away with promptitude, thus open-

38 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

ing out the range and bringing the starboard battery into play. The port 4.7-inch guns — they were all over twenty years old — were by this time wellnigh red-hot. That the enemy did not apprehend this manoeuvre was demon- strated by his erratic fire at this moment, when the Britisher was enabled to bring five guns into action to his four through being able to use both the stern guns. It was now that the German suffered most heavily, the havoc wrought in such a short time being very noticeable. He then turned away, which brought the two ships nearly stern on to one another ; two of his steam pipes were cut by shell, the steam rising into the sky, he was well on fire forward, and had a list to starboard.

One of his shells, however, had passed through the captain's cabin under the fore bridge, and although it did not burst it started a fire, which rapidly became worse ; unhappily no water was available to put it out, for the fire main was shot through, while the chemical fire extinguishers proved of little use. All water had to be carried by hand, but luckily the fire was prevented from spreading over the ship by a steel bulkhead, to- gether with an ordinary fire-proof swing door, which was afterwards found to be all charred on one side. Nevertheless it got a firm hold of the deck above, which broke into flame, so the fore-bridge had to be aban- doned. The ship had now to be steered from the stern, and all orders had to be shouted down by megaphone both to the engine rooms and to this new steering posi- tion in the bowels of the ship, which was connected up and in operation in fifty-seven seconds ! To reduce the effect of the fire the vessel was kept before the wind,

GAR'n .pNoon

UOpm 4000"

V.".V.V.35oqV."." ."."." ' ' "y^° '0pjn-

M/fnimnm Bmiff

40 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

which necessitated turning right round again, so that the fight resolved itself into a chase.

The action was continued by the gun-layers, the fire-control position being untenable due to the fire, so each gun had to be worked and fired independently under the direction of its own officer. Among the ammunition supply parties there had been several casualties and the officers, finding it impossible to " spot " the fall of the shell, owing to the flashes from the enemy's guns obscuring their view from so low an elevation, lent a hand in carrying the ammunition from the hoists to the guns. In these big liners the upper deck, where the guns are mounted, is approximately 70 feet above the holds, whence the ammunition has to be hoisted and then carried by hand to the guns — a particularly arduous task.

Crossing, as it were, the enemy was at this time well on the starboard bow, but firing was continued until the distance was over 9,000 yards, the maximum range of the Carmania's guns. Owing to his superior speed and a slight divergence between the courses, the distance was gradually increasing all the time, and at 1.30 he was out of range. His list had now visibly increased, and his speed began to diminish, probably on account of the inrush of water through his coaling ports. It was surmised that there had not been sufficient time to secure these properly, for he had evidently been coaling at the time she arrived upon the scene.

Towards the end the Cap Trafalgar's fire had begun to slacken, though one of her guns continued to fire to the last, in spite of the fact that she was out of range.

The Sinking of the Cap Trafalgar 41

It became patent that she was doomed, and her every movement was eagerly watched through field-glasses for some minutes by those not occupied in quenching the lire. Suddenly the great vessel heeled right over ; her funnels being almost parallel to the surface of the sea, looked just like two gigantic cannon as they pointed towards the Car mania ; an instant later she went down by the bows, the stern remaining poised in mid-air for a tew seconds, and then she abruptly disappeared out of sight at 1.50 p.m., the duel having lasted an hour and forty minutes.

There were no two opinions about the good fight she had put up, and all were loud in their praise of the gallant conduct of the Germans.

One of the enemy's colliers was observed approach- ing this scene of desolation in order to pick up survivors, some of whom had got away from the sinking ship in her boats. The collier had been flying the United States ensign, evidently as a ruse, in the hope that the Carmania might be induced to let her pass without stopping her for examination. It was, however, impossible to in- terfere with her owing to the fire that was still raging in the fore part of the ship. This kept our men at work trying to get it under, and necessitated keeping the ship running before the wind, the direction of which did not permit of approaching the spot in order to attempt to pick up survivors.

Smoke was now seen away to the northward, and the signalman reported that he thought he could make out th>- funnels "t a cruiser. As the Cap Trafalgar, before sinking, had been in wireless communication

42 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

with some German vessel, it was apprehended that one might be coming to her assistance. As the Carmania was totally unfit for further action, it was deemed ad- visable to avoid the risk of another engagement, so she steamed off at full speed in a southerly directidn.

As soon as the collier and all that remained of the wreckage of the Cap Trafalgar was lost to view the gallant Cunarder was turned to the north-westward in the direction of the anchorage. She was unseaworthy, nearly all her navigational instruments and all the com- munications to the engines were destroyed, making the steering and navigation of the ship difficult and uncer- tain. When wireless touch was established, the Corn- wall was called up and asked to meet and escort her in. But as she had only just started coaling she asked the Bristol to take her place. The next day the Bristol, which was in the vicinity, took the Carmania along until relieved the same night by the Cornwall, which escorted her on to the base, where temporary repairs were effected.

One of the enemy's shells was found to have passed through three thicknesses of steel plating without ex- ploding, but in spite of this it set fire to some bedding which caused the conflagration under the fore bridge. Where projectiles had struck solid iron, such as a winch, splinters of the latter were to be seen scattered in all directions. The ship was hit seventy-nine times, causing no fewer than 304 holes.

There were 38 casualties. Five men were killed out- right, 4 subsequently died from wounds, 5 were seriously wounded and 22 wounded — most of the latter were only slightly injured. All the casualties occurred on

The Sinking of the Cap Trafalgar 43

deck, chiefly among the guns' crews and ammunition supply parties. No one below was touched, but a third of those employed on deck were hit.

The following remarks may be of interest, and are taken from the author's letters, written on September 16th, after having been shown over the Carmania :

" When I went on board this morning, I was greatly struck by the few fatal casualties considering the number of holes here, there, and everywhere. Not a single part of the upper deck could be crossed without finding holes. A remarkable fact was that only one officer, Lieutenant Murray, R.N.R., was hurt or damaged in any way, although the officers were in the most exposed positions, and the enemy's point of aim appeared to be the fore bridge.

' They had only three active service ratings on board ; some of the gunlayers were old men, pensioners from the Navy.

" One of the senior officers told me that the first few rounds made him feel ' a bit dickey,' but that after that he took no notice of the bigger shells, though, curiously enough, he thoroughly objected to the smaller poms-poms which were ' most irritating.' He added that the men fought magnificently, and that the firemen worked ' like hell.' As flames and smoke from the fire on deck descended to the stokeholds by the ventilators instead of cool air, the states of things down below may easily be imagined.

"One chronomel found to be going in spite

of the wooden box which contained it having been burnt

44 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

" The deeds of heroism were many.

" I liked the story of the little bugler boy, who had no more to do once the action had commenced, so he stood by one of the guns refusing to go under cover. As the gun fired he shouted : ' That's one for the blighters ! ' And again : ' There's another for the beggars — go it ! ' smacking the gunshield the while with his hand.

" Again one of the gunlayers, who lost his hand and also one leg during the engagement, insisted upon being held up when the German ship sank, so as to be able to cheer. I talked to him, and he waggled his stump at me quite cheerily and said, ' It was well worth losing an arm for.'

" It is good to feel that the spirit of our forefathers is still active in time of need."

CHAPTER VI

THE ACTION OFF CORONEL

" Then let hini roll His galleons round the little Golden Hynde, Bring her to bay, if he can, on the high seas, Ring us about with thousands, we'll not yield I and my Golden Hynde, we will go down, With flag still flying on the last stump left us And all my cannon spitting the fires Of everlasting scorn into his face."

— ALFRED No YES (Drake).

The wanderings of the German squadron in the Pacific have been briefly traced as far as Easter Island, where it arrived on October 12th, 1914, and found the Dresden. The Leipzig, which had been chased from pillar to post by British and Japanese cruisers, and succeeded in eluding them, joined up shortly after to the relief of the German Admiral.

The contractor at Easter Island, an Englishman named Edwards, who supplied the Germans with fresh meat and vegetables, was a ranch-owner, and had no idea that war had even been declared. One of his men, in taking off provisions to the ships, discovered this amazing fact, which had carefully been kept secret, and informed his master. The account was not settled in cash, but by a bill made payable at Valparaiso. The 1 nan squadron sailed for Mas-a-fuera a week later,

the ranch-owner took the earliest opportunity of

45

46 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

sending in his bill to Valparaiso, where it was duly honoured, vastly to his astonishment and relief.

For the reasons already adduced, it seemed almost certain that Admiral von Spee would make his way round South America. That there was a possibility of his descending upon Vancouver and attacking the naval dockyard of Esquimalt is acknowledged, but it was so remote as to be scarcely worthy of serious con- sideration. The three Japanese cruisers, Idzuma, Hizen, and Asatna, were understood to be in the eastern Pacific at this time, and this was probably known to the German Admiral. The risk, too, that he must inevitably run in attacking a locality known to possess submarines was quite unjustifiable ; besides, he had little to gain and everything to lose through the delay that must ensue from adopting such a policy.

The vessels engaged in the action off Coronel, with their armament, etc., were : *

Names Tonnage	A vmament Speed	Completion
Good[Hope ... 1 4, 1 00	2-9.2" ... 23.5 16-6"	... 1902
Monmouth 9,800	... 14-6" ... 23.3	... 1903
Glasgow 4,800	... 2-6" ... 25.8 10-4"	... 1910
Otranto (armed ... 12,000	... 8-4.7" ••• 18	1909
liner) gross
Speed of :	squadron 18 knots.
Names Tonnage	A rmament Speed	Completion
Scharnhorst ... 11,420	... 8-8.2" ... 22.5 6-5-9" 20-3.4"	... 1908
* According to	" Brassey's Naval Annual."

The Action off Coronel 47

Names	Tonnage	Armament I	Speed 1	Completio
1 ...	... 11,420	8-8.2" ... 6-5-9" 20-3.4"	23.8	... 1908
Leipzig	... 3,200	... 10-4. 1" ...	23	... 1906
ien	••• 3.544	12-4.1° ... .,-2.1"	27	1908
X umber g ...	• •■ 3.396	10-4.1" ... 8 2.1"	^3-5	... 1908
	Speed of s	quadron 22.5 knots.

It will be noticed that our two armoured cruisers were respectively six and five years older than the Germans'. Our armament was much inferior in size, number, and quality on account of the later designs of the enemy's artillery. The range of the German 4.1-inch guns was nearly equal to that of our 6-inch guns. But perhaps the greatest point in favour of the enemy was the fact that Cradock's ships, with the exception of the Glasgow, only commissioned at the outbreak of war, and had had such continuous steaming that no really good opportunity for gunnery practices or for testing the organisation thoroughly had been possible, whilst von s ships had been in commission for over two years and had highly trained crews, accustomed to their ships.

The following account has been compiled from per- sonal information received from officers who took part, from letters that have appeared in the Press, from a translation that has been published of Admiral von I report, and from the official report made by Captain Luce of the Glasgow.

Admiral Cradock, as we have seen, joined the re- mainder <>f his little >quadron with the exception of

48 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the Canopus off the coast of Chile on October 29th. The latter was following at her best speed. The squadron proceeded northwards, whilst the Glasgow was detached to Coronel to send telegrams, a rendezvous being fixed for her to rejoin at 1 p.m. on November 1st.

No authentic news of the movements of the Germans was available at this time ; in fact, the last time that von Spee's squadron had been definitely heard of was when it appeared off Papeete and bombarded the town toward the end of September. That the enemy might be encountered at any moment was of course fully realised, but it was hoped that either the Dresden and Leipzig or the main squadron might be brought to action separately, before they were able to join forces. Time was everything if this was to be brought about, so Admiral Cradock pushed on without delay. The anxiety to obtain news of a reliable character may be imagined, but only the vaguest of rumours, one con- tradicting the other, were forthcoming. Reports showed that the German merchant shipping in the neighbour- hood were exhibiting unwonted signs of energy in load- ing coal and stores, but this gave no certain indication of the proximity of the entire squadron.

Rejoining the British squadron at sea on November 1st, the Glasgow communicated with the Good Hope. Our ships had recently been hearing Telefunken * signals on their wireless, which was proof that one or more enemy warships were close at hand. About 2 p.m., therefore, the Admiral signalled the squadron to spread on a line bearing N.E. by E. from the Good

* German wireless system.

The Action off Coronel 49

Hope, which steered N.W. by N. at 10 knots. Ships were ordered to open to a distance of fifteen miles apart at a speed of 15 knots, the Monmouth being nearest to the flagship, the Otranto next, and then the Glasgow, which was thus nearest the coast.

There was not sufficient time to execute this man ceuvre, and when smoke was suddenly sighted at 4.20

DIAGRAM 1. (Enemy sighted) 4. 20 p.m..

T t , t „ ^LEIPZIG"

lCn IS Jj OTRANTO 9~CNEISENAU

•GOOD HOPE" ' "MONMOUTH* GLASGOW" *f$CHA*NHORST'(Fiegt

I Flag) sights smoke and *

alters course to U 80 E Bay of COTonall

towards it

"OTRANTOY position was Lat.3B'23'S. Long.7340'W.

P.M. to the eastward of the Otranto and Glasgow, these two ships were still close together and about four miles from the Monmouth. The Glasgow went alien I to in- vestigate and made out three German warships, which at once turned towards her. The Admiral was over twenty miles distant and out of sight, and had to be informed a- possible, so the Glasgow r< turned at

full speed, warning him by wireless, which the Germans ired to jam, that tin.- enemy was in si Jit.

50 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The squadron reformed at full speed on the flag- ship, who had altered course to the southward, and by 5.47 p.m. had got into single line-ahead in the order : Good Hofie, Monmouth, Glasgow, and Otranto. The enemy, in similar formation, was about twelve miles off.

For the better understanding of the movements which follow, it may be stated that the ideal of a naval artillerist is a good target — that is, a clear and well defined object which is plainly visible through the telescopic gunsights ; the wind in the right direction, relative to the engaged side, so that smoke does not blow across the guns, and no sudden alterations of course, to throw out calculations. The tactics of a modern naval action are in a large measure based on these ideals, at any rate according to the view of the gunnery specialist.

It is evident that it was Admiral Cradock's intention to close in and force action at short range as quickly as possible, in order that the enemy might be handi- capped by the rays of the lowering sun, which would have been behind our ships, rendering them a very poor target for the Germans as the squadrons drew abeam of one another. He therefore altered course inwards towards the enemy, but von Spee was either too wary or too wise, for he says in his report that he turned away to a southerly course after 5.35, thus declining action, which the superior speed of his squadron enabled him to do at his pleasure. The wind was south (right ahead), and it was blowing very fresh, so that a heavy head sea was encountered, which made all

The Action off Coronel

5i

ships — especially the light-cruisers— pitch and roll con- siderably. It seems very doubtful whether the Good Hope and Monmouth were able to use their main deck guns, and it is certain that they could not have been of any value. This would mean that these two ships could only fire two 9-2-inch and ten 6-inch guns on

tf OTRANTO'

Vglascow'

Q 'mc.vmouth'

<

aQ 'good hope"

DIAGRAM 11 6 40 p.m.

■ 14.800 yards-

Wit - 200O V.n!-.

f DRESDEN'

^LEIPZIG" I 'GNIISENMJ'

■mpnqgpsf

the broadside between them, instead of their whole armanii nt of two 92-inch and seventeen 6-inch guns.

There was little daylight lefl wh< n Admiral Cradock

tried to close the Germans, hoping thai they would

hallenge in view of their superior strength.

At 6.18 Admiral Cradock inert a >l speed I" 17 km making a wireless message to the Campus, " I am about to attack enemy now." Both squadrons were now on

parallel courses approximately, steering south, and

52 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

about 7| miles apart. A second light cruiser joined the German line about this period ; according to von Spee's report the Scharnhorst was leading, followed by the Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Dresden.

As the sun sank below the horizon (about 6.50 p.m.) the conditions of light became reversed to our com- plete disadvantage ; our ships were now lit up by the glow of the sunset, the enemy being gradually enshrouded in a misty haze as the light waned. Admiral Cradock's last hope of averting defeat must have vanished as he watched the enemy turning away ; at the best he could only expect to damage and thus delay the enemy, while it was impossible to withdraw. He had no choice but to hold on and do his best, trusting in Providence to aid him. In judging what follows it should be kept in mind that in the declining light even the outlines of the enemy's ships rapidly became obliterated, making it quite impossible to see the fall of our shots in order to correct the range on the gunsights ; on the other hand, our ships showed up sharply against the western horizon and still provided good targets for the German gunners. Von Spee in his report says his " guns' crews on the middle decks were never able to see the sterns of their opponents, and only occasion- ally their bows." This certainly implies that the upper deck gunners could see quite well, whilst we have in- formation from Captain Luce's report that our ships were unable to see the enemy early in the action, and were firing at the flashes of his guns.

Accordingly, as soon as the sun disappeared, von Spee lost no time in approaching our squadron, and

The Action off Coronel 53

opened tire at 7.4 at a range of 12,000 yards. Our ships at once followed suit with the exception of the Otranto, whose old guns did not admit of her competing against men-of-war at this distance. The German Admiral apparently endeavoured to maintain this range, so as to reap the full advantage of his newer and heavier armament, for the two 9/2-inch guns in the Good Hope wire the only ones in the whole of our squadron that were effective at this distance with the possible ex- ception of the two modern 6-inch guns in the Glasgow. Von Spec had, of course, calculated this out, and took care not to close until our armoured cruisers were hors de combat.

The Germans soon found the range, their fire proving very accurate, which was to be expected in view of the reputation of the Schamhorst and Gnciscnau for good shooting — the former had won the gold medal for the best average. These armoured cruisers concentrated their fire entirely on our two leading ships, doing con- sidi Table execution. In addition, they had a great stroke of luck, for in the lirst ten minutes of the en- gagement a shell struck the fore turret of the Good II pe, putting that 0/2-inch out of action. The Mon- muiith was apparently hit several times in rapid suc- ion, for she was forced to haul out of the line to the westward, and her forecastle was seen to be burn- ing furiously, but she continued to return the enemy's fire valiantly. This manoeuvre caused her to drop astern, and compelled the Glasgow, who now followed on after the Good Hope, to ea • peed to avoid getting into the intended foi the Monmouth.

54 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

It was now growing dark, but this did not deter both squadrons from continuing to blaze away as hard as they could ; in fact, the fight was at its height ; the German projectiles were falling all round and about our ships, causing several fires which lit them up with a ghostly hue. The heavy artillery of the enemy was doing great damage, and it was evident that both the Good Hope and Monmouth were in a bad way ; the former sheered over unsteadily towards the Germans, returning their fire spasmodically, whilst the latter had a slight list and from her erratic movements gave the impression that her steering arrangements had been damaged. The results of our shooting could not be distinguished with accuracy, though von Spee mentions that the Scharnhorst found a 6-inch shell in one of her storerooms, which had penetrated the side and caused a deal of havoc below but did not burst, and also that one funnel was hit. The Gneisenau had two men wounded, and sustained slight damage.

At 7.50 p.m. a sight of the most appalling splendour arrested everyone, as if spellbound, in his tussle with death. An enormous sheet of flame suddenly burst from the Good Hope, fighting up the whole heavens for miles around. This was accompanied by the noise of a terrific explosion, which hurled up wreckage and sparks at least a couple of hundred feet in the air from her after funnels. A lucky shot had penetrated one of her magazines. " It reminded me of Vesuvius in erup- tion," said a seaman in describing this spectacle. It was now pitch dark, making it impossible for the opposing vessels to distinguish one another. The Good Hope

The Action off Coronel 55

was never heard to fire her guns again, and could not have long survived such a terrible explosion, though no one saw her founder.

The moon had risen about 6.30 p.m. and was now well up, but it was too overcast to see much. Accord- ing to von Spee the squadrons had closed in to about 5,400 yards, which caused him to sheer off, fearing torpedo attack. It seems certain that although firing was continued it could not have been effective, for three minutes after the Good Hope blew up the Germans erased lire altogether. Shortly afterwards von Spee ordered the Leipzig, Dresden, and Niimberg — the last- named having joined the squadron during the action — to make a torpedo attack.

The Monmouth ceased firing just before the explo- sion on board the Good Hope, and was then steering roughly N.W. It was clear she was on her last legs, as her list had increased and she was down by the bows. She now suddenly altered course to the N.E. in the direction of the oncoming enemy. Captain Luce was senior naval officer, being senior to Captain Brandt, of the Monmouth. He saw the Germans approaching and signalled the Monmouth at 8.30, " Enemy following US," but received no reply. Clearly there was no alternative left him but to save his ship, if he was not to make a needless sacrifice of his men, as it was obvious th.it be could be of no further assistance to his doomed •it. In addition, it was essential that the Cuno/nts should be warned ID time to avert a further calamity, a task not so simple as it sounds, for the German- we jamming our wireless messages. It is said that when

56 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

last seen the gallant Monmouth turned and made straight for the enemy in a heroic attempt to ram one of their ships. Von Spee reports that the Niirnberg sank the Monmouth at 9.28 p.m. by bombardment at point- blank range ; this accounts for the seventy-five flashes of gunfire as well as the play of the beams of a search- light, which were observed by the Glasgow after leaving the scene of action. It must have been brutal work.

Thus perished Admiral Cradock together with 1,600 gallant officers and men. In fairness to the Germans it should be stated that our own officers considered it too rough for boats to be lowered with any safety.

The Glasgow had been subjected to the combined fire of the Leipzig and Dresden, whose gunnery was fortunately not very effective owing to the long range maintained between the two squadrons before the light failed. That she had withstood this combined onslaught for fifty-two minutes (von Spee's report) was remarkable, but that she had suffered no material damage was little short of a miracle. Her casualties amounted to four men slightly wounded. She was hit five times, on or near the water line, but not in vital places. The protection afforded by the coal in her bunkers saved her on three occasions, as otherwise in the nasty sea running at the time she would have found herself in a very pre- carious position. Of the remaining two hits, one pene- trated the deck but did not explode, while the other wrecked the captain's pantry and cabin. There was one large hole, which luckily did not prevent her eluding her pursuers at high speed by steering out to the W.N.W., and thence in a wide circle to the southward to the

The Action off Coronel 57

Magellan Strait?, finally arriving at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands.

At the outset of the engagement the Good Hope made a signal down the line to the Otranto, the only words received being, " Leaving Otranto." The latter, therefore, hauled out to endeavour to get this signal direct from the flagship, but as the Good Hope had been badly hit, nothing further was received. As projectiles were falling all round her, and it was realised that the Otranto, being a large ship, would be used by the enemy as a rangefinder to enable him to calculate the distance of the Glasgow, she hauled out still farther to upset the accuracy of his gun-fire. The enemy proceeded to carry this method of ranging into effect ; the first salvo passed over the Otranto' s bridge, the second missed the bows by 50 yards, the third fell 150 yards astern, while others which followed fell, some over, some short. By this time she had worked out of the line about 1,200 yards, so turned to the same course, as far as could be judged, as the remainder of the squadron. She was now out of range. The Otranto ran the gauntlet of the enemy's fire most successfully, since she emerged from this storm of shell quite unscathed, but it must have been touch and go. Moreover — and hardest of all — she had to submit to this treatment without being in a position to retaliate. After the flagship blew up, nothing was seen of the Monmouth ; subsequently the Glasgow was reported cro -u^a her stern. Seeing that she could be of no assistance, the Otranto dodged her opponents by steaming hill speed to the westward for 200 miles, and then e to the southward. Rounding ( ape Horn,

58 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

she passed between the Falklands and the mainland and arrived at Montevideo. Both she and the Glasgow must have accounted themselves most fortunate in escaping safely from this unequal contest.

The Canopus, which had been steaming northward with two colliers, intercepted a wireless message from the Glasgow to the Good Hope reporting the enemy in sight. She immediately increased to her full speed, dispatching the colliers to Juan Fernandez, and pro- ceeded on her course northward in the hope that she would arrive in time to engage the enemy. About 9 p.m. she received a signal from the Glasgow that it was feared the Good Hope and Monmouth had been sunk, and that the squadron was scattered. Seeing the hopelessness of continuing on her course, the Canopus turned round, picked up her colliers, and made for the Magellan Straits via Smyth's Channel, the successful navigation of which reflects great credit, since she was probably the first battleship ever to make use of it. By this means she succeeded in reaching Port Stanley without molestation, although the German ships were constantly in close proximity.

Admiral Cradock appears to have had definite orders to prevent the enemy coming round to the east coast of America. The Canopus was only 120 miles away when he met the enemy But had the Admiral waited for her the Germans might have slipped past him during the night, and, moreover, her slow speed would have seriously hampered the mobility of his squadron. Speak- ing of Admiral Cradock, Sir Henry Newbolt * says,

* " Tales of the Great War " (Longrnans).

The Action off Coronel 59

" He had asked for reinforcements, and the Admiralty had sent him what they thought sufficient. It was not for him to hold back."

The advantages of speed and modern guns of superior range were perhaps the outstanding features of the Coronel action. It was not the vain sacrifice which at first sight it might appear to be, as it probably saved our ships operating on the east coast of South America from a similar fate.

Admiral Cradock carried out unflinchingly his search

for a force which he knew would almost certainly be

superior to his own. His unhesitating acceptance of

the action and the gallantry of uie fight uphold the

finest traditions of the Royal Navy, and will always

be recalled by it with pride. Surely, before God and

man, such deeds of heroism go far to mitigate the infamy

of war.

" At set of sun, Even as below the sea-line the broad disc Sank like a red-hot cannon-ball through surf Of seething molten lead, the Santa Maria, Uttering one cry that split the heart of heaven, Went down with all hands, roaring into the dark."

Alfred Noyes {Drake).

CHAPTER VII

CONCENTRATION

" And Drake growled, . . .

. . . ' So, lest they are not too slow To catch us, clear the decks. God, I would like To fight them ! ' "

— Alfred NOYES (Drake).

Several disquieting wireless messages were received by the British warships on the east coast of South America, giving garbled and unreliable accounts of the Coronel action It was not till November 5th that a statement which appeared to be fairly authorita- tive, in spite of its German origin, was received from Valparaiso. It said that the Monmouth was sunk and that the Good Hope had probably shared her fate ; no mention was made of the Canopus, Glasgow, or Otranto. The command in these waters now devolved upon Rear Admiral Stoddart (flying his flag in the Carnarvon), who was still busily engaged in the search for the Karls- ruhe. His ships had been operating over a wide area extending from the neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro to the northward of St. Paul's Rocks and the Rocas, and thence to the westward along the north coast of South America. This otherwise fruitless search achieved one notable result in compelling the Karlsruhe to aban- don her system of obtaining supplies through German storeships coming from Pernambuco, as that port was

60

Concentration 61

kept under rigid observation. She was thus forced to leave the trade route between Great Britain and South America for longer periods in order to meet her con- sort, the armed liner Kronprinz Wilhclm, who now became a link between her and her sources of supply in Central America. There was, in consequence, a marked falling off at this period in the number of her captures.

Assuming that the worst had happened, and that the German squadron was now on its way round to the east coast, it became imperative to unite our re- maining ships into one squadron as quickly as possible. It was obvious that with the Australian and Japanese ships behind them, the Germans could not afford to linger where they were ; moreover, they had learned at Valparaiso that we had no naval force of any pre- ponderance with which to oppose them. Flushed with their recent victory, it seemed probable that if they were not much damaged they would most likely hasten their movements in the hope of meeting our ships before we had had time to unite or to gather reinforcements.

The German squadron would not be able to separate with any safety once we had succeeded in joining to- gethei our scattered forces, so that the damage they might do to our commerce would be thereby reduced to a minimum.

For tb us it will be seen that the River

Plate was admirably situated for the rendezvous of

our ships th.it had escaped from Coronel to the Falk-

, and ol the northern squadron. Again, it was

62 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

possible to coal there without infringing territorial rights, as there is an excellent anchorage well outside the three mile limit from the foreshore.

The following calculations, written on November 6th, 1914, were made by the author :

" The German Admiral will expect us to get rein- forcements out from England, so that it seems pro- bable that he will lose no time in coming round to the east coast.

" He arrived at Valparaiso on November 3rd. Sup- posing he coals there and leaves at earliest on Novem- ber 4th, the distance from Valparaiso to the Plate is roughly 2,600 miles, or nine days at 12 knots ; there- fore, allowing one day for coaling en route, the earliest that he could be off the Plate would be the 13th, more likely not before November 15th."

The strategical aspect in this sphere of operations was completely changed by the success of the German squadron off Cape Coronel, and necessitated not only a complete change of plans, but also an entire redis- tribution of our ships. These consisted of the Carnarvon, Cornwall, Bristol, Macedonia, and Edinburgh Castle, also the Defence and Orania, who were near Montevideo, and the Canopus, Glasgow, and Otranto.

Admiral Stoddart, therefore, decided to go south to Montevideo at once in order to meet the remainder of our scattered ships. The Bristol, Macedonia, and Edinburgh Castle were left to continue the search for the Karlsruhe, although as a matter of fact she had blown up on November 4th. Colliers were sent down south to Montevideo to be in readiness for our ships.

Concentration 63

and were ordered to sail at twelve-hour intervals to diminish the chance of capture.

The Carnarvon and Cornwall left the base on Novem- ber 6th, the former calling at Rio de Janeiro on the way for telegrams. Arriving at the Plate on the ioth, where we found the Defence and Orama, the Admiral immediately transferred his flag to the former ship, which was the newest and most powerful of our cruisers. All ships rilled up with coal and awaited the arrival of the Glas- and Otranto ; meanwhile, patrols were constantly maintained at the mouth of the river.

The following evening the Glasgow arrived amidst congratulations from us all ; she had put in to the Falkland Islands to coal, in which assistance was pro- vided by volunteers from amongst the inhabitants. After coaling, she was detached to Rio de Janeiro to go into dry dock, so that the damage to her side might be properly repaired. The same day the Orama, whilst patrolling, met and sank the German storeship Navarra which was set on fire by the Germans when escape ^,ecn to be impossible. We also got the cheering that the Emden had been sunk and that the Konigsberg had been bottled up, tidings winch augured well for the future.

The Admiralty seem to have had a premonition that the Germans intended to attack the Falklands for the Canopus, although on her way north to Montc- >, was ordered back to the Falkland Islands in ord' c to fortify and arm the harbour of Port Stanley in ( i»n with the local volunteers, converting

If ml'; a lloating fort.

64 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The possibility of our encountering and having to fight von Spee was the subject uppermost in all minds at this time, and led to a great deal of discussion. The outstanding feature in the situation was the extra- ordinary lack of homogeneity of the composition of our squadron. It consisted of three armoured cruisers of entirely different classes, each carrying a different arma- ment, one light cruiser and four armed merchantmen. The latter could not, of course, be pitted against warships even of the light-cruiser type, and therefore had to be left out of^the reckoning. Amongst the four fighting ships there were four descriptions of guns, viz. two 0/2-inch, fourteen 7 '5-inch, twenty-two 6-inch, and ten 4-inch, while the German squadron had only three descriptions, viz. sixteen 8 "2-inch, twelve 5*g-inch, and thirty-two 4"i-inch. A prominent question, therefore, was what range we should endeavour tojnaintain during an action ; the answer to which was very varied, preference being given to ranges from 14,000 yards downwards. From the gunnery point of view the enemy undoubtedly held an advantage, as not only was his squadron more homo- geneous, having only two classes of ships, but also the range of his guns was greater. As regards speed, there was nothing to choose between the two squadrons, who were evenly matched in this respect. Much would depend upon whether he would choose to keep his squadron together for the purpose of an action or to disperse them on reaching the east coast. Opinions on this and on many other points were divided. All were agreed, however, that we ought to give a good account of ourselves.

Concentration 65

The wildest reports about von Spee's movements were constantly received from Chilean and other sources. Whilst at Montevideo rumours were circulated that the German ships had been seen coming round Cape Horn.

The Admiralty now informed Admiral Stoddart that reinforcements were being sent out from England at once ; they had actually started just after our arrival at the Plate. The secret of this news was well kept, not an inkling leaking out at home or abroad — a fact which contributed very largely to our subsequent vic- tory. It was decided, therefore, to return northwards in order to effect a junction with the two battle-cruisers that were on their way out. The squadron sailed on November 12th, spread out in line abreast, and put in some useful exercises on the way. Arriving at the base five days later, we found the Kent, which was expected as we had heard that she was being sent out to reinforce us ; she had brought a mail, which made her doubly welcome. The Bristol and Edinburgh Castle rejoined, but the latter was ordered off northwards on other ser- vice, and sailed on November 19th, taking a mail for England. It was blazing hot, but the next few days passed quickly enough in carrying out gunnery prac- tices, patrolling, and coaling ship, during which the Glasgow returned from Rio, spick and span.

Most of November was a time of some suspense for our ships, as we were hourly expecting an encounter with the enemy, and it was with mixed feelings that we learned of the nature of the reinforcements that were coming out with such despatch. Our feelings of relief were also tempered with regret at not having been

66 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

afforded an opportunity to prove our mettle. Further, there was an awful and terrible thought that it might be considered necessary to leave one of us cruisers behind to guard the base.

Most of our ships had had steam on their main engines incessantly since war broke out, and a rest to let fires out so as to make necessary adjustments was badly needed, but was quite impossible near a neutral coast.

On November 26th our hearts were gladdened by the sight of the Invincible, bearing the flag of Vice- Admiral Sturdee, and the Inflexible ; these two formid- able-looking ships had come out from England at a mean speed of over 18 knots for fifteen days. Truly a fine performance !

CHAPTER VIII

POSSIBILITIES AND PROBABILITIES

The various possible courses open to Admiral Count von Spec, both before and after Coronel, have already been dis- eased, but the movements of his squadron have not been subjected to examination in the light that they bear on the policy which he adopted, nor have the results of that action been considered from his point of view.

The German squadron sailed from Mas-a-Fuera on October 27th, and three days later arrived about noon at a position some fifty miles to the westward of Val- paraiso, where it remained for upwards of twenty-four hours. On October 31st — the same day that the Glasgow wont into Coronel with telegrams and the day before that action was fought — the squadron steamed off south, leaving the Niimbcrg to wait off Valparaiso for a few hours and probably to get information of import- ance. The German Admiral undoubtedly went to the neighbourhood of Valparaiso with the express intention <>t obtaining news and was in communication with the shore, for he begins his official report on the action fought iron I by saying that his three light cruisers reached on November 1st a point about twenty " sea miles from the Chilean coast, in order to attack .1 British cruiser [Glasgow), which, according to trustworthy information, had reached the locality on the previous evening."

It 1-, of course, impossible to know what were von

67

68 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Spee's intentions at this moment ; they can only be surmised from a general survey of the situation and the means that he had of obtaining information. The latter was acquired by an organised system, for there were German agents in every South American port. It may be taken as certain that any ship calling at or passing Punta Arenas (Magellan Straits) would be reported to him, and that the names of the ships and certain of their movements on the south-east coast would also be known to him.

Easter Island — which was von Spee's original base — is approximately 2,300 miles from Valparaiso, and therefore out of range of wireless communication, although it is possible he might occasionally be able to take in a message under favourable conditions. How- ever, it is known from an officer survivor of the Gneisenau that on October 19th the German Admiral received a message — possibly through a German supply ship — stating that a British Squadron consisting of " Good Hope, Monmouth, and Glasgow was to the south." Now we know that this squadron was at Punta Arenas on September 28th, and leaving on that date was employed searching inlets and bays round Tierra del Fuego for some days. The Good Hope then returned to the Falk- lands, finally leaving them on October 22nd, whilst the others went on to the coast of Chile and were there from October nth onwards, making use of a sequestered spot as a base. The Glasgow was at Coronel on October 14th and at Valparaiso the day following, so the fact of a British Squadron being " south " was well known, though the information did not reach von Spee till the 19th.

Possibilities and Probabilities 69

On receiving this news von Spee sailed immediately. He knew he was in superior force to Cradock's squadron, and the presumption is that he went over to prospect and. if possible, to force an action. He went straight to Mas-a-Fuera, only remained two days to coal, and then on to a position off Valparaiso to pick up further information.

Immediately on hearing that the Glasgow was at Coronel on the 31st, he proceeded south to cut her off, and, as was likely to be the case, to meet Cradock. He must have judged that the rest of the squadron could not be far behind the Glasgow. The probability was that he received information of the Good Hope passing through the Straits about the 24th or 25th, and he might also have heard of the Canopus doing so a day or two later, in which case he would have calculated that the latter could scarcely be so far north by this time.

There is no indication that by this date von Spee had made up his mind to quit the South Pacific. He had hardly had time to make his arrangements for so doing, and there is no doubt that they were not then completed.

V< n Spee was at his full strength, having recently

added the Dresden and Leipzig to the squadron while

I land, he possessed the advantage of homo-

:' -.', and his squadron was far more modern. The

result we know, our ships were out-gunned and com-

1. Fate played right into the hands

of \ on this occasion.

1 .1 undoubtedly blow to British pn

in these parts, and the Germans in all the large town.

70 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

were not slow in making the most of this temporary success in order to advance their own interests. The rumours that were circulated caused no little perturba- tion amongst the neutral shipping agents, who feared that von Spee would lose no time in attacking British trade, and that those cargoes which were consigned to Great Britain would be in jeopardy. Insurance rates rose with a bound, and it is said that the Germans went about openly deriding the British and causing the most fantastic articles to be inserted in the local Press. The exaggerated reports that were published, both of the action and of its effects, certainly lends colour to this source of information.

It will be interesting to consider what von Spee would have done if he had missed Admiral Cradock and the action off Coronel had not been fought. In view of his superior speed, von Spee would in all probability have continued on his southerly course and rounded Cape Horn, leaving Admiral Cradock behind him. There seem to be grounds for supposing that he might go to the Cape of Good Hope, but the campaign in German South West Africa could scarcely be said to be progressing favour- ably for the Germans, and it is not unreasonable to suppose he would have preferred to go north along the eastern side of South America to harass our trade. It is legitimate to suppose that in this case he would not have delayed to attack the Falkland Islands, with Cradock's squadron on his heels and Stoddart's ships converging on him from the north ; in fact, it would have been suicidal, for the wireless station there would have given our ships warning of his approach, and the

Possibilities and Probabilities 71

delay might have enabled our two forces to unite. From Stoddart's squadron alone he had nothing to fear, and most likely would have welcomed an opportunity of bringing it to action. The presence of the Defence at Montevideo would certainly have been known to him at that time, and he would probably have hoped to intercept her before she joined Cradock. Had all this come to pass, the Germans might then have separated, and when it was found that the theatre of operations in the South Atlantic became too hot for them, they might have endeavoured to make their way home after doing as much damage as possible to our commerce.

As events turned out, however, von Spee waited about at sea for a day or two after the action, appar- ently in the hope of either hearing news of the Good Hope or rinding her. Writing at sea on November 2nd, ays, in a letter that afterwards appeared in the German Press : "If Good Hope escaped, she must, in my opinion, make for a Chilean port on account of her damages. To make sure of this, I intend going to Val- paraiso to-morrow with Gneisenau and Niirnberg, and to see whether Good Hope could not be disarmed by the I lnKans." Writing under date of November 5th, he adds : " We arrived at Valparaiso this morning. . . . The new> of our victory had not yet reached here, but d very quickly." The squadron split up, it seems, arriving at different dates at Mas-a-Fuera, which be- « ame the temporary headquarters of the * rei man squadron for the next fortnight. Here all ships coaled in turn.

imunical maintained by sending the German

light cruisers into Valparaiso one after the other to

72 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

get the latest information. The Leipzig was there somewhere about November 13th. This would show a proper caution on his part, as belligerent vessels cannot use neutral ports except at extended intervals.

At Valparaiso von Spee must have obtained in- formation concerning the movements of our squadron under Admiral Stoddart, who had then just sailed north from Montevideo. He would also have probably been aware of the presence of the Japanese squadron operating in the Northern Pacific.

In order to make the position clear, it must be apprehended that a squadron consisting of the British light cruiser Newcastle, together with the Japanese cruiser Idzuma, and the small battleship Hizen, was con- centrated in the North Pacific. The battle-cruiser Australia left Suva, Fiji, on November 8th to strengthen this squadron, so that it may be deduced that this was a direct result of the Coronel action which took place just a week before. She joined these ships on November 26th at Chamela Bay on the west coast of Mexico. The object of this squadron was to prevent von Spee from coming north, and to close on him should he remain on the western coast of South America. Sailing southwards, these ships visited the Galapagos Islands and then pro- ceeded on their quest for the enemy, the Newcastle searching the Cocos Islands en route. When nearing the coast of Colombia, the splendid news of the Falkland Islands battle was received, after which these ships split up and separated.

In view of these various courses of action open to von Spee, the reader will appreciate how our minds were

Possibilities and Probabilities 73

occupied with the question of his future movements. Would he, in the hope of adding further to his laurels, attempt to repeat his success by going into the North Pacific to engage the Allied squadron there, which might have been inferior to him in strength ? Or would he go south and follow up his advantage in a direction where there was nothing to oppose him for the moment, except the Canopus and Glasgow ? He could not hope success- fully to combat all the different squadrons looking for him, nor, for that matter, did he wish to risk his ships, for there were no others to replace them. It was not his role to adopt such an offensive. He therefore chose to give the impression that he was remaining off Chile, and then suddenly vanished into complete oblivion. Leaving no trace of his movements, he was careful to forgo using all wireless ; and, having completed arrange- ments as to future supplies, he determined to appear suddenly where he was least expected. History repeats itself, and he evidently decided that the boldest plan was what would be least anticipated, and therefore most likely to be productive of success.

Taking another point of view, it was obviously to von Spec's advantage to hasten round to the east coast of South America as quickly as possible after the action off Coronel took place, and thus to reap the full benefil of the success that he had already gained. He could QOl possibly have shut In I 1 the fad thai the immediate

following up of his victory was the mosl promising policy for any scheme oi operations in the South At l.i nth . He would then have been able to strike before rein- ments could come out from England, which be

74 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

must have been aware would be sent out to hunt him down. Why, then, did he delay a whole month ? On his own showing the repairs necessary to render his ships fit for further service only took a few days, and it would not take long to arrange for his future supplies on the east coast of South America with all the German shipping cooped up in this part of the world waiting to be put to any useful purpose. Is it, therefore, unreasonable to suppose that he waited in order to collect German reservists from Chile, either to garrison the Falkland Islands once they had been captured, or to take or escort them home to Germany ? He knew that he was really superior to the force under Admiral Stoddart, yet he delayed leaving till November 26th, a period of nearly four weeks. The inference of which is that he was not ready, and further that a seizure of the Falkland Islands was deliberately contemplated and prepared for, and was to be his first step. An additional possible explanation lies in the deduction that he could not have estimated that he would have defeated Cradock so completely, and therefore took time to consider the altered situation before committing himself to a definite move, hoping in the interval to get more information which might lead to a further stroke of good fortune. The threat of the Australia and the Japanese squadron to the north was not suffi- ciently pronounced to force him to hurry.

We have seen that it was almost out of the question for von Spee to maintain his ships in the Northern Pacific, but the conditions were entirely different on the west coast of South America. Here there were a

Possibilities and Probabilities 75

number of uninhabited anchorages where he could shelter, and he had a large German population to help him on the coast of Chile. In fact, he did maintain himself here until he knew that hostile forces were con- centrating and would move south to drive him out. Meanwhile, he had effected repairs to his ships, and had completed arrangements in advance for the supplies of his ships on the east coast of South America. Thus the conclusion appeared to be that there was no alterna- tive open to von Spee but to leave the Pacific, where he had already shot his bolt.

Whatever the true explanation of his policy may be, the movements of his squadron point to his having

i quite at a loss what to do next. His position was so hazardous and uncertain, so full of future difficulties, that he could not see his way clear for any length of time in order to work out any concerted plan. He was a fugitive pure and simple, and felt that whatever he did was in the nature of a venture.

It was not till Cradock was defeated that he appears to have formulated his plan for attacking the Falkland 1 -hmds. He then seems to have been carried away by the effect that the temporary capture of a British colony and the hoisting of the German Hag would have on our prestige throughout the world. He would have destroyed the • station, S< ized the coal and provisions lying

there, and would then have had to abandon the colony llbsequent recapture. Had he originally contem- plated SUCh a dramatic coup, he would never have delayed

Lomenl Longer than was m < essary.

Keeping well away from the UbUal trade routes,

76 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the German ships sailed south, and on the way were lucky enough to meet the North Wales, one of Cradock's colliers. They arrived at San Quintin Sound on Novem- ber 21st, coaled, and stayed five days. Thence von Spee kept out for 200 miles from the land before turning south, and got into very rough weather.

An officer in the Gneisenau states :

" November 27th — Force of wind up to 12. Later the weather moderated a little so that we could proceed at 8 knots.

" November 2gth — Impossible to lay the tables. Broken up furniture thrown overboard. All crockery was smashed. Impossible to be on deck. Necessary to secure oneself with ropes. We are about off the entrance to the Magellan Straits.

" December 2nd — Sighted two icebergs, appear to be 50 metres high.

" December 3rd— We are lying at the eastern exit of the Beagle Channel close to Picton Island.

" December 6th — We are going to Port Stanley."

In judging von Spee's motives, it is as well to bear in mind that he attained no success whatsoever after Coronel except for the capture of two sailing ships and a collier. That our squadron under Admiral Sturdee, having only arrived the day previously, met him on his arrival off Port Stanley, was the turn of Fortune's wheel in our favour.

As all the world now knows, the battle of Coronel, the greatest naval disaster that had befallen our arms in the war, was to be avenged five weeks afterwards, when the German squadron in its turn drank to the dregs the bitter cup of despair.

Part II THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS

Plan of Action between the Battle Cruisers "WVINCIBLE"&'lNFL£XIBLE and the German Armoured Cruisers i h M.s" invincible" "scharnhorst'&'gneisenau" December 8W1914.

"inmncible's Course Enemy's Course

J Full Rigged Sailing Ship

yl 2500 « x

XNEISENAU&, foremost '•j5 {Tunnel, shot, away -ffZatttfrr*3^> i0000x_

'■?» between 3ro&4"> 'Hiitdnng or 0f6 2 . funnels

■■cNEiSENAii "CNEISENAW'Sank

tCHARNHORSTS"

V? Tunnel shot away

yj '30

Enemy a/co in succession to Starboard U 4 "SCHARNHORSTlistmg to Port

SCHARNHORST "Sank "GNEISENAU "still firing all guns

(jLat.52°4o'S.f |Long.5G°20 W. j

CHAPTER IX

AWAY SOUTH

" Into the golden West, across the broad Atlantic once again. ' For I will show,' Said Drake, ' that Englishmen henceforth will sail Old ocean where they will.'

— Alfred Noyes {Drakt).

The two battle-cruisers looked very businesslike as they steamed up to the anchorage ; t|ieir trip out had taken off a good deal of paint, and they presented some- thing of the appearance of hardened warriors returning from a spell in the trenches, as has been so well por- trayed by Captain Bruce Bairnsfather. To our joy they brought a small mail only three weeks old.

No sooner had the rattle of their cables ceased than preparations for coaling were seen to be in progress.

The same day, November 26th, the Defence sailed for Cape Town via St. Helena to join the flag of Rear- Admiral H. G. King-Hall. The Macedonia and Otranto had been sent to Sierra Leone some time previously to let out fires and examine boilers.

British Squadron was now under the command

of Vice-Admiral 1\ C. D. Sturdee, who held the title of

1 mander-in-Chief, South Atlantic and Pacific. The

Admiral's plan of operations possessed the distinctive

good invention ; it was extremely simple

. e understood. Roughly pinking, it was this.

7v

80 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The squadron was to sail south to the Falklands, spread- ing out to extreme visual signalling distance and search- ing for the enemy's ships. All signals were to be made by searchlight, and wireless was not to be used unless it was absolutely necessary. The battle-cruisers were placed in the centre of the squadron, comparatively close together, with the double object of being able to concentrate quickly in any direction and of keeping secret their presence in these waters. Orders were sub- sequently given that, after coaling at the Falklands, the squadron would leave on December 9th, " in order to get round the Horn before the enemy comes East." The enemy was sure to be reported if he used the Straits of Magellan ; but it is believed that, to make doubly sure of not missing him, the Admiral intended to divide our squadron. Some of the cruisers would then have gone through the Straits, meeting him with the battle-cruisers somewhere in the Pacific ; by this means the presence of the latter would not become known.

Sailing on November 28th, on a lovely calm morning, Admiral Sturdee must have indeed felt a proud man ; after years of labour in his profession, he had his ambi- tion realised by the command of a powerful squadron in war with a definite task before him. It consisted of Invincible (flag), Inflexible, Carnarvon (flag), Cornwall, Kent, Glasgow, and Bristol. The Macedonia, now on her way back from Sierra Leone, was to join us on the voyage south.

On December 1st a report was received that " the German fleet was 400 miles off Montevideo " the pre-

Away South 81

vious evening, but no one believed it. The next day we left dinner hurriedly ; a signal was received, " Alter course together " to starboard 60 degrees. We altered and stood by for action, but it only turned out to be a British vessel — a false alarm which, however, was excellent practice. Information came through on the 3rd that the German tender Patagonia left Montevideo during the night with stores for the German warships ; therefore presumably they were not far off.

We arrived off Port Stanley on the morning of December 7th, and were piloted into harbour through a channel in the line of mines, which had been hastily constructed from empty oil-drums, and laid across the entrance by the Canopus. As there were only three colliers here, the ships were ordered to coal in turn ; the remainder, under convoy of the Orama, were following us down from the base.

The Falkland Islands number about two hundred only two of which, East and West Falkland, are of any size. The coast line of both these islands is deeply indented and much resembles one of the Outer Hebrides. Devoid of all trees, the dark brown and green moors, relieved here and there by patches of granite quartz, look uninviting, but abound in pen- guins, hares, and sheep. Some of us, being unable to coal ship, landed on the day of our arrival and shot some hares and geese — a welcome change for the larder. It was the breeding season, and the penguin camps or rookeries were a striking sight ; on approaching them hundred-, would stand up and waddli: forward in a threatening attitude, making a terrible din in order to

G

82 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

protect their eggs. So numerous are they compared with the inhabitants that the Governor is locally called the " King of the Penguins."

The little town of Port Stanley, the capital, lies on the south side of the inner portion of a harbour on the east coast of East Falkland, and consists of two streets of houses, almost all, except Government House and the cathedral, constructed of timber and corru- gated iron. It is very much like one of the new small towns of Canada. The principal fuel is peat, which may be seen stacked as in Ireland. The population numbers about a thousand, and another thousand — mostly farmers and shepherds of Scottish origin — live out on the moors of the islands.

During the summer the temperature averages about 480 Fahr., and it is nearly always blowing hard, rain- ing, hailing, or snowing. Situated in a cold current from the Antarctic, the temperature only falls eleven degrees in the winter ; as a result, scarcely any of the inhabitants can swim, it being too cold to bathe. Owing to the absence of sun and summer heat, wheat, oats, and English vegetables do not thrive, but the colony is none the less remarkably healthy.

When the news of the Coronel disaster reached them, the islanders were naturally much concerned for their safety. They had a volunteer corps of a few hundred men, which took to training most assiduously and quickly improved in efficiency. Every man was a good horseman and proficient with the rifle, but the corps were not sufficiently numerous to prevent a landing. A council of war was held by the Governor, at which the

84 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

position was fully discussed. It seemed only too prob- able that the Germans would attack the Islands, and arrangements were made to send away from Stanley the few women and children. Stores of provisions were secreted within easy reach of the town, and the public money, official documents, confidential books, and valuables were either removed to a place of safety or buried.

This was the position when the Canopus and the Glasgow arrived on November 8th. Sailing the same evening, the Canopus, when half-way to Montevideo, was ordered by the Admiralty to return and guard the colony.

On November 13th a warship was sighted from the signal station at Port Stanley making straight to- wards the harbour from the eastward, an unusual direc- tion from which to approach. The volunteers were called out by the church bells sounding the alarm, and every preparation was made to resist a landing ; the Canopus on her part could get no reply from the wire- less station, so was only able to conclude that Port Stanley had fallen into the enemy's hands. When it was seen that the visitor was none other than the Canopus, the feelings of joy and relief were universal and knew no bounds.

Most of the inhabitants buried all their worldly goods of any value, some using their back gardens, which are lightly fenced off from one another, whilst others even carried furniture some distance inland. Several amusing stories resulted. One of these Scots, from the window of his house, had watched his neighbour

Away South 85

burying a tin box, and had carefully noted its exact position. Being hard up, he scaled the fence that night and dug up and forced the box. Finding it contained sovereigns, he helped himself to a portion, replaced the box, and covered it over carefully with earth. A few days later, temptation getting the better of him, he paid his neighbour's garden another visit ; on the third occasion, however, he was caught red-handed. When brought to book his defence was that as they were such friends he had not taken the whole lot the first time, which would have been quite easy to do, but only a little just when it was needed to tide him over his difficulties.

The Bristol, Glasgow, and Inflexible were ordered to coal as soon as we arrived, the remainder awaiting their turn. The Carnarvon, Cornwall, and Bristol were allowed to put fires out to clean boilers and make adjust- ments to the valves and machinery of the main engines, in preparation for a protracted sea voyage. The Mace- donia patrolled the entrance to the harbour, the Kent being ordered to relieve her at 8 o'clock the follow- morning. The Bristol and Glasgow, being of light draught, proceeded into the inner harbour, but the rest of the squadron anchored in the outer harbour, Port William, as will be seen from the plan.

1 here is no telegraph cable to the Falklands, so that it was obvious the first point of attack by the iv would be the wireless station. To protect this ili' Canopus entered the inner harbour, forced hei i it aground on the muddy bottom, ,m<l moored taut head and stern in a position that would enable her to com-

86 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

mand the southern approach. Here she was able to fire over the narrow neck of low-lying land, that at the same time served partially to conceal her. An observation station, connected with the ship by tele- phone, was set up ashore, with an elaborate plan for obtaining the bearing and elevation for the guns. Top- masts were housed, and the ship, masts, and funnels were painted all the colours of the rainbow in great big splodges to render her less visible. A look-out station was set up in Sparrow Cove, and three 12-pounder batteries were hastily constructed to dominate the approaches. The landing and placing of these guns, together with the digging of the emplacements, called for a great deal of hard work. Every credit is due to the Canopus for the admirable manner in which she dealt with the situation.

Major Turner, who was in command of the Falkland Island Volunteers, was indefatigable in his efforts to prepare efficient land defences. This corps gave valu- able assistance to the Canopus, co-operating in the work of preparing the coast defences. Prior to the arrival of the Canopus, their only guns were a 12-pounder 8-cwt. field gun which had been lent by the Glasgow, and a few very antique muzzle-loading field guns.

CHAPTER X

ENEMY IN SIGHT

' And from the crow's iiest of the Golden Ilyude A aoaraan cried, ' By God, the ..hunt is up ! "

— Au'RED NOYES {Drake).

December Sth, 1914, was apparently to prove an ex- ception to the general rule in the Falklands, where it usually rains for twenty-one days during the last month of the year, for a perfect mid-summer's morning g ive every promise of a fine day to follow. The prospect of a busy day coaling, and taking in stores, brought with it thoughts of the morrow when we were to set forth on our quest after the enemy. The colliers went their round from ship to ship, and the rattling of the winches hoisting the coal inboard never ceased.

At 7.56 a.m. the Glasgow fired a gun to attract the attention of the Invincible, who was busy coaling, to the signal of the Canopies reporting smoke in sight to the south.

Shortly after 8 a.m. the officers in the Cornwall were all fitting at breakfast when the Chief Yeoman of Signals entered with a beaming face, full of news, to report that cruisers were in sight to the southward. The general opinion was that some Japanese cruisers were probably coming to join 11-, and attention was again turned to \>i< .1!;!.

About 8.15 a.m. came a signal from the flag ship:

Rai l for full speed, report when ready." Rumour

had been so rife oi late that we still remained c< ptical

88 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

until a few minutes later news came from the signal station on Sapper Hill that two hostile men-of-war were approaching from the southward, and shortly after that smoke was visible beyond these vessels.

It afterwards transpired that a lady named Mrs. Felton, the wife of a sheep farmer living near Point Pleasant, in the south of the Island, sent her maid and house-boy to the top of a ridge to report everything they saw whilst she telephoned the sighting of the enemy's ships to the nearest signal station, from which it was passed to Port Stanley. She continued to send messages reporting every subsequent movement of the German ships. The three German colliers, two of which were sunk, were also first sighted by her and duly re- ported. She afterwards received a silver salver from the Admiralty in recognition of her prompt action, and her maid a silver teapot, whilst the signalman at Sapper Hill, Port Stanley, received £5 from Admiral Sturdee — a fact we had cause to remember later on, when fre- quent reports of " hearing distant firing," " sighting smoke," resulted in one or two wild-goose chases !

" Enemy in sight." What a thrilling message for us all ! We could scarcely believe our ears. " What a stroke of luck ! " was the general comment. But this was no time for ruminating ; deeds, not words, were required. At last " the Day " for which we had pre- pared had dawned. In very truth the hunt was up. The magic news travelled round the ship's company like lightning, and they fell in in record time — in spite of having to forgo some of their breakfast. The Invincible, Inflexible, and Carnarvon were in the middle of coaling.

Enemy in Sight 89

Colliers were cast off, and all ships prepared for action in case the enemy appeared off the entrance to Port William.

As several of our ships had one engine down at six hours' notice, the bustle and activity in the engine rooms may well be imagined. We on deck naturally enough were soon ready, and chafed at the delay.

The Kent wont out of harbour to reconnoitre, to report on the movements of the enemy, and to relieve the Macedonia. The enemy's two leading ships — the Gneiscnau and Nurnberg — were in sight and were approaching the wireless station, intending to wreck it. When near the Wolf Rocks they stopped engines and turned to the north-eastward. The bearing and elevation of the enemy ships having been telephoned from the ob- servation station, the Canopus, finding that the}T could get no closer, opened fire over the low neck of land at 9.20 a.m. with her 12-inch guns, firing five rounds at a range of 12,000 yards {see page 83). It was the first time that most of us had heard a shot fired in a naval action, and it brought home very forcibly the fact that we should soon be tackling the job to which we had looked forward for so long. Hoisting their colours, the enemy turned away S.E. to join the main squadron, which headed out to the eastward. It afterwards transpired that the ' icrmans had seen the tripod masts of our hit tie-cruisers over the land, which probably decided von Spee in turning away from his objective. In one moment all his hopes "I destroying our Fleet -supp to consisl <»f Carnarvon, Cornwall and Bristol, ami pos- sibly the Canopus and Glasgow the wireless station, and then capturing the (<>l<>ny, were dashed to the

go The Battle of the Falkland Islands

ground. From survivors it appears that one of the Canopus's shells had ricochetted, striking the Gneisenau at the base of her after funnel ; it was also claimed that a piece of another hit the Niirnberg — good shooting by indirect fire at such a range, with guns of an old type and improvised fire-control arrangements.

Officers of the Canopus, who were in the observation station ashore, saw through the telescope of their theo- dolite the men on board the Gneisenau fallen in on deck ; they could be distinguished, quite plainly, dressed ready for landing, in order to capture the wireless station under cover of their ship's guns. But when the Canopus opened fire with her first two projectiles they lost no time in scuttling away to their action stations.

An amusing incident occurred on board the Canopus when the enemy first hove in sight. The stokers off watch climbed up inside the foremost funnel to see what was going on and sat round the edge, feeling quite secure as they knew the ship was ashore — hard and fast. They very soon came down, however, when they were informed that the boilers of that funnel were being lit up and the ship going to sea.

At 9.40 a.m. the Glasgow went out to join the Kent in observing the enemy's movements. Five minutes later the squadron weighed, with the exception of the Bristol, who had all her fires out to clean boilers. She was ready three-quarters of an hour later, however, which must have constituted a record for ships of her class. The Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Corn- wall proceeded out in the order named, the Inflexible ramming a sailing pinnace belonging to the Cornwall,

Enemy in Sight 91

half full of stores, on her way through the line of mines ; fortunately a barrel of beer belonging to the wardroom officers had previously been rescued ! The Macedonia was ordered to remain behind in Port William. It was wry clear with a slight north-westerly breeze — ideal conditions for a long-range action.

The last of our line cleared the harbour about 10.30 a.m., when the five enemy ships could be seen hull down on the horizon to the S.E., 12 to 13 miles off, steaming off in the hopeless attempt to escape. The signal " General chase " was flying from the Invincible, and the magnificent spectacle of our ships, each with four or five white ensigns fluttering in the breeze, all working up to full spued, will always live in the memory of those who witnessed it on that eventful day.

The surprise and horror of the Germans at seeing our two battle-cruisers for the first time was testified by the survivors, who said, " They tried not to believe it." It must have been an awful moment finding them- selves suddenly face to face with almost certain de- struction. First of our ships came the little Glasgow, dashing along like an express train, then the two huge battle-cruisers going about 25 knots, belching forth volumes of dense black smoke as they made use of their oil fuel to quicken their fires, followed by the Kent, Carnarvon, and Cornwall doing about 22 knots.

The Admiral reduced speed for an hour to 20 knots at 11. 15 a.m., to allow the " County" cruisers to catch up, for it wa.-, evident that we were rapidly gaining on the enemy, as we sped along on ;ui easterly eour.se. The

Glasgow dered to keep three miles ahead of the

92 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Invincible. There was now an opportunity to get out of coaling kit and have a hasty wash. The ship's com- panies were consequently sent to dinner early, acting on the good old maxim that a man always fights better on a full stomach ; but the excitement was too intense for most men to have more than a bite, and they were mostly to be seen crowding about the ship's decks munching a hastily made sandwich.

At 11.27 A-M- tne Bristol reported that the smoke of three steamers, enemy transports, had been sighted from the signal station at Point Pleasant to the south- ward of the Island, whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the Bristol and Macedonia to destroy them. They arrived to find only two, both big colliers, the Baden and Santa Isabel ; the Bristol took off the crews and then sank the vessels. Half an hour later the Bristol learnt the news of the result of the action, and that the sacrifice of their valuable cargoes had been unnecessary. The Macedonia, who was first upon the scene, sighted smoke on the horizon, but could see no ship. Rumour had it that this third ship was the Seidlitz, and that she had a landing party of armed men and field guns on board, but this has never been substantiated in any way.

The Glasgow was ordered back, and at 12.20 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief decided to attack the enemy with the battle-cruisers, whose speed was increased to 25 knots. The enemy were steaming in two divisions in quarter-line, first the Gneisenau and Niirnberg on the left of the line, then the Schamhorst (flag), Dresden, and Leipzig ; the latter being astern of the remain- der of their ships, who were on the starboard bow of

Enemy in Sight 93

our squadron, became the first target. " Action " was sounded, and at once not a soul was to be seen about the decks, each man being busy at his appointed station. The Admiral hoisted the signal " Open fire " at 12.47, an<3 eight minutes later the Inflexible fired at the Leipzig the first round of the action ; the In- vincible followed almost immediately afterwards. Both ships were now going their full speed, nearly 27 knots, and firing slowly and deliberately at the great range of 16,000 yards (over nine land miles). The huge columns of water, over 150 feet high, thrown up by our 12-inch projectiles, which weigh 840 lb., some- times completely blotted out the enemy target at this distance. Owing to the German ships being end-on, it was difficult to get the direction, but our shots were falling very close to them at times, and soon produced a drastic change in their movements.

Admiral von Spee is said to have now made this signal to his ships : ' The armoured cruisers will engage the enemy as long as possible, the light cruisers are to use every endeavour to escape." Acting on this, at 1.20 p.m. the Dresden, the Niimberg — which one of our battle-cruisers claimed to have hit — and the Leipzig turned away to the southward, the posi- tion- of the -hips being roughly as shown in the plan (p. 94 . The Schamhorst and Gncisenau will be seen turning to port to engage the battle-cruisers, which iinultaneously on to a parallel course, whilsl the remainder of our squadron, except the Carnarvon, which presumably had orders to proceed with the Com- mander-in-4 hief, tnrn< d and gave chase to the Dresden,

94 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Leipzig, and Numberg. The Carvarvon was, of course, unable to keep up with the big ships, and did not get into action until later ; she was now 10 miles astern, and altered course to port to cut a corner and join the Flag. All this while the " County " cruisers were coming along with all possible speed. The Glasgow was stationed clear of the battle-cruisers, which were

ROUGH DIAGRAM OF ACTION OIF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

8T? DECEMBER, 1914.

"CARNARVON*

"Ni/RNBERGl,,.c\$^

Diagram showing <?*.. ^w

position at 120p.m. "jjtf*1 ii :Vg^ weather conditions excellent v t *%,»

Wind N.W

followed by the Kent, Cornwall, and Carnarvon. When the action commenced the crews of these ships had the most perfect view of a modern naval engage- ment fought at long range. As an officer in the Kent described it : "We were spectators in the front row of the stalls, as it were, so close that we could almost touch the actors on the stage, yet so far that no stray missile disturbed the comfort of our view. The best

Enemy in Sight 95

in the house at a performance of one of the few remaining spectacles which cannot be bought for money."

Imagine a calm, smooth sea, the sun shining and not a cloud in the sky, the ship steaming at something owr 23 knots, and the men crowded on the turrets and in every available corner, tier upon tier, for all the world as if looking on at a cup tie at the Crystal Palace. ... It was a wonderful sight. The big ships buried their sterns in the sea, throwing up the seething water in their wakes as they dashed onwards. The bright flashes of their guns showed up strikingly, fol- lowed successively by the dark brown puffs of cordite smoke ; the seconds were counted until the reports were heard and huge columns of water thrown up by the splashes were seen. Many of the men had had friends in the Good Hope and Monmouth whose fate was fresh in their minds. " Give 'em one for the Mon- mouth ! " and " Go on, boys, give 'em hell — let the blighters feel what it's like ! " were shouted quite un- consciously, punctuated by loud cheers when a salvo pitched perilously close to the enemy ships. Of course, the majority realised our superiority, but those in authority must have felt a pride in such men who gave the impression they would face odds with intrepidity.

The battle now divided itself into two separate engagements, the battle-cruisers and the Carnarvon, which were engaging the two enemy armoured enn and the Cornwall, Kent, and Glasgow, which gave chase to the light cruisers. Later, a third action developed when the Kent wenl after the NUrnberg. Each <>f the e will be taken in turn and described separately.

CHAPTER XI

THE BATTLE-CRUISER ACTION

" Are hell-gates burst at last ? For the black deep To windward burns with streaming crimson fires ! Over the wild strange waves, they shudder and creep Nearer — strange smoke-wreathed masts and spare, red spires And blazing hulks."

— Alfred Noyes {Drake).

A few minutes after the German light-cruisers turned away to the S.S.E. in accordance with his orders, Admiral Count von Spee, apparently deciding to accept the in- evitable, determined to try and close so as to get into the effective range of his 8.2-inch guns. With this in- tention, his two armoured cruisers turned in succession about 80 degrees to port, which brought them into line-ahead with the Gneisenau leading, and then opened fire at 1.30 p.m. But he had reckoned without his host, as this very obvious manoeuvre did not at all suit Admiral Sturdee's book, who was acting on the principle that ammunition is cheaper than human life, and was resolved to fight at his own chosen range. Our ships, therefore, eased speed to 24 knots, and turned together away from the enemy to port, which brought them at the same time into line ahead with the flag ship Invincible in the van.

The two squadrons were on nearly parallel courses {see facing page 79) . The Inflexible had checked fire for

96

The Battle-Cruiser Action 97

a while, but now reopened on the Schamhorst at a range of 14,500 yards. Both the enemy ships concen- trated their fire on the Invincible at this time, whilst ours fired each at his opponent. The respective arma- ments are seen from the following:

Name Tonn	Armament		Completion	Armour Belt
:ble ) Inflexible i " " 7'"5 ' "	I2*l	26	f 1909 • " (1908 .	. 7 to 4 in.
I16-4* 1		. 7 to 4 in.
10,850 . ,	4-7-5* • 6-6*	--	. . 1903 . .	7 to 4 in.
r$t ) > . . 11,420	f 8~S~" )	(23.5	1908	6 to 3 in.
• • &-5.9'[-	1 U3.8
Gneitenau )	[ 20-3.4* )	.. 1908 ..	6 to 3 in.

Compiled from " Brasscy's Naval Annual."

As Admiral Sturdee edged away and did not allow the range to get below 13,500 yards, the fire of the Germans was not effective. A gunnery officer stated that their fire control was efficient, and that their salvoes, fired frequently, fell well together, the spread being about 200 yards. They had been firing about ten minutes when the Schamhorst went ahead and took the lead, so our ships changed targets. For a short time both German ships now fired at the Inflexible, but without result ; soon afterwards they again honoured the Invincible with their attentions, and, getting the range, scored their first hit about 1.45 P.M. The range was now increased, spotting the fall of -hot became more and more difficult, and finally smoke interfered with our gunfire. At 2 p.m. the of the enemy was 16,450 yards. Ten min- later von turned right away and made a

id • mpt to escape, a he had been unable 1 to cl quarters. We turned gradually after

98 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

him, but as he continued to turn away, in the words of Admiral Sturdee, " A second chase ensued." All firing ceased, and there was an appreciable lull in the proceedings.

Of the damage to the Schamhorst at this time no estimate can be formed, but survivors from the Gneisenau stated that they had three direct hits, re- sulting in fifty men being killed and wounded. To the uninitiated this may seem to be poor shooting ; but the difficulty of seeing clearly enough to make accurate corrections to the gunsights, the extreme range, and the disturbing effect of the enemy's fire must all be taken into account. Doubtless, too, there were several hits of an insignificant nature on the upper works and rigging that were not taken into account. It was impossible to tell at such a long range whether we scored a hit unless a fire resulted.

The efficiency of the engine-room staff was now put to the test ; they nobly responded, with the result that our big ships attained a greater speed than they had ever done before.

At this juncture a full-rigged sailing ship appeared on the port hand of our battle-cruisers ; she was painted white, and her sails were shining as if bleached in the bright sunlight ; with stunsails and every stitch of canvas spread she sailed majestically along, looking a perfect picture. So close was she that the Admiral was forced to alter his course to pass a couple of miles clear of her, so that the enemy's shell ricochetting should not hit her. Truly it must have been a thrilling and dramatic moment for her to find herself an involuntary witness

The Battle-Cruiser Action 99

of such a wonderful spectacle ! Imagine her consterna- tion at being plunged suddenly into the middle of a red-hot naval action between powerfully armed modern men-of-war, with shell falling in the water quite close alongside.

The distance of the retreating enemy was rapidly decreasing, until at 2.45 p.m. Admiral Sturdee gave the order to open fire at a range of about 15,000 yards. Von Spec held on his course in the vain hope, apparently, of drawing us on, so that by a sudden turn made later he might " get to grips." Eight minutes afterwards the Germans were forced to turn to port towards us, forming into line-ahead and opening fire as soon as they came round. We hauled out once again on to an almost parallel course. The range had appreciably dropped, and was at one time under 12,000 yards. Things now became fasl and furious, shot and bursting shell were every- where- in the air, and our 12-inch guns were doing terrible ution. " It was like hell let loose," said a petty officer in the flagship, which was hit several times. The German gunnery was not nearly as good as it had been in the first phase of the engagement, whilst we had settled down to business and were, on the whole, more accurate than before. An officer in the Inflexible remarked that at tin time several of the enemy's shell fell between our

hips, and that as his ship approached these yellow- green patches, he wondered whether the debatable

a that do two projectiles ever hit the same spot would prove a< curate.

'I!i rnhorst was badly hit al ; P.M., starting

a hie forward, but she Continued to blaze away; the

ioo The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Gneisenau also bore signs of the severe treatment she had received from the Inflexible. The Invincible now met with some damage, and suffered by far the most as the enemy's fire was naturally concentrated on her. The wind had increased, and was blowing the smoke across the guns, impeding our gunners, and the Carnarvon was coming up astern, so at 3.18 Admiral Sturdee executed a sudden manoeuvre by putting his helm over to starboard, turning completely around, and crossing his own track so as to steer roughly S.W. ; this put the enemy completely off the range, and also forced him five minutes later on to a parallel course, in order to avoid the alternative of being raked fore and aft. As both our ships had altered course together, their respective positions became reversed — the In- flexible leading — and they presented their port sides to the enemy {see facing p. 79). The Carnarvon cut the corner and came up on the off side of the battle- cruisers, in accordance with Admiral Sturdee's orders, as her guns were useless at ranges exceeding 12,000 yards. The Scharnhorst, who had already had a bad hammering from the flagship, was now subjected to the concentrated fire of our two big ships for a very short time, during which the Gneisenau was lost sight of in her consort's smoke. At 3.30 p.m. the Scharn- horst's fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel.

The Invincible now engaged the Gneisenau, who was not nearly so badly damaged and was firing all her guns. In fact, all ships were at it as hard as they could go, but the Inflexible came off lightly on account of

The Battle-Cruiser Action 101

the plight of her opponent. The noise was indescrib- able, shell were hurtling through the rigging; when one actually struck and burst, the whole ship quivered and staggered, while the crash of steel plates falling, and splinters of shell striking the upper works, sounded like hundreds of empty tins being hurled against one another.

The Scharnhorst was clearly in a very bad way, and looked, as she was, a perfect wreck. Masses of steel twisted and torn as if growing out in all directions like the roots of a tree, clouds of steam were going up sky High, and she was blazing fore and aft. The Admiral says, " At times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame." She was 14,000 yards distant. Up till quite near the end, however, she continued to fire in salvos, her starboard guns having only been in action since the last turn was made. At 3.56 p.m. the Com- mander-in-Chief decided to close in and give her the coup dc grace, which enabled the Carnarvon to get into action and open fire for the first time. By 4 p.m. both the Scharnhorst' s masts, as well as her three funnels, shot away, and she was listing heavily to port. She struggled on hopelessly and went over more and more, until at 4.10 p.m. she was on her beam ends. ! seven minutes she remained in this position, her •ill going round, and then suddenly sank like

tone, with her Hag still Hying.

Shortly before the German flagship sank, our ships

( h> ' ked lire and then opened on the Gneisenau. It will

en from the plan of the action that at the time the

Invincible turned two complete circles in a sort of figure

102 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

of eight, the Gneisenau hesitated for a minute or two as to whether she should stand by her consort to save life. Under the impression, apparently, that our flagship, which had turned towards the Scharnhorst, was about to pick up survivors, the Gneisenau passed on the far side of the sinking ship and opened a heavy and well-directed fire on the Inflexible. We were now three against one, who was, nevertheless, determined to sell herself as dearly as possible. It was a gallant attempt.

The distance was fortunately too great to see clearly the wretched survivors of the Scharnhorst left struggling hopelessly against their fate, but it brought the dark side of war very vividly into notice for the first time. A quarter of an hour after she sank the Carnarvon passed over the exact spot, but neither survivors nor wreckage were to be seen.

The weather now changed, a light drizzling mist obscuring the former visibility. It was obvious that there could be only one end to the fight now in pro- gress, and that it could not long be delayed. At 4.15 p.m. the Invincible opened fire on the Gneisenau, which shifted her target from the Inflexible and fired at the flagship with creditable precision. She was " strad- dling " the Invincible at 4.25, the range being about 10,000 yards, so this was increased. During the next quarter of an hour our flagship was hit three times, but the German was taking terrible punishment. At 4.47 she ceased firing ; her colours had been shot away several times, but she had hoisted them again and again. Now, however, no colours were to be seen, so it was only natural to conclude she had struck, though

The Battle-Cruiser Action 103

it was afterwards ascertained that she had no more left to hoist. Our ships turned to avoid getting too far off, when, to the surprise of all, she suddenly fired off a solitary gun, showing that she was still game. Unlike her late consort, which looked a perfect wreck for some time before actually sinking, she had to all appearances suffered very little. At 5.8 p.m., however, her foremost funnel went by the board.

The carnage and destruction wrought in the Gnciscnau by our three ships were terrible, and it was astonishing what a deal of hammering she was still able to bear. That her casualties at this time were very heavy was ad doubt, as shell were to be seen tearing up her decks as they burst, while the upper works became a veritable shambles. It was not till 5.15 that the doomed ship, being badly hit between the third and foirth funnels, showed real signs of being in extremis. She was still firing, however, and even scored an effec- tive hit — the last one she was to get — about this )d.

At 5.30 she was obviously dead beat and turned towards our squadron with a heavy list to starboard, afire fore and aft, and steam issuing in dense clouds from all directions. Admiral Sturdee now ordered " Cea=e fire," but before the signal could be hoisted enau opened fire again, and continued to keep it up with her one remaining undamaged gun. This 1 until it was silenced, when our ships clo

in on her. The ensign Hying at her foremast head was hauled d >C'. bul the one at her peak was left

Hying. Five minutes later she again hied, but only

104 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

one solitary round, after which she maintained silence. The signal was made to cease firing immediately after- wards, when it was evident that her gallant struggle was at an end.

She now heeled over quite slowly, giving her men plenty of time to get up on deck. At 6 p.m. our ships were perhaps 4,000 yards off, and the Germans could be seen gathering together on her " forecastle quarter deck." Remaining on her beam ends for a few seconds, during which the men were seen clambering about on her side, she quite gently subsided and disappeared without any explosion, although a film of steamy haze hovered over the spot where she sank. The bow re- mained poised for a second or two, after which she foundered at 6.2 in latitude 520 40' S., longitude 560 20' W., having withstood the combined fire of our ships for an hour and forty-five minutes.

The sea was no longer quite calm, and a misty, drizzling rain was falling. Closing in hastily, every effort was made to save life, and boats were got out and lowered. This is no easy job after an action, as the boats are turned inboard, resting on their crutches, and are kept partially filled with water in case a shell might strike them and cause a fire. This water must first be drained out, then the weight of the boat is hoisted on to the slips to enable it to be swung outboard, which is not easy if the ship has been hit near the water-line, causing a list. Finally, several of the boats are certain to be riddled with shell splinters.

A midshipman, describing the scene that followed, writes, " We cast overboard every rope's end we can

The Battle-Cruiser Action 105

and try our hands at casting to some poor wretch feebly struggling within a few yards of the ship's side. Missed him ! Another shot. He's further off now ! Ah ! the rope isn't long enough. No good ; try someone else. He's sunk now ! "

The men, however, had not yet heard of the rough weather during the Coronel action, and still thought that the Germans might have saved our poor fellows there. Lines were thrown over with shouts of, " Here, Sausage, put this round your bell}-," and the like. Taking into consideration that it was estimated some 600 men had been killed or wounded, and that the temperature of the water was 400, it was fortunate that as many as 170 officers and men were rescued. The gallant Admiral Count von Spee, whose conduct bears out the best traditions of naval history, and his two sons, all lost their lives in the course of the day.

A curious feature of this action was the terrific damage done by 12-inch lyddite shell. One of the (jneisenaus turrets was severed from its trunk and blown bodily overboard. Nearly every projectile that hit caused a fire, which was often promptly extinguished by the splash of the next one falling short. Indeed, it stated by the prisoners that the guns' crews in the German ships were frequently working their guns up to their knees in water, and towards the latter pari of the engagements wire unable to lire on account of the volume of water thrown up by shori shot .

I be //.- incible had been hit about twenty-two times, but the lighting efficiency of the ship was not affected.

106 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Eighteen of these were direct hits, two being below the water-line on the port side, one of which flooded a bunker and gave her a list to port. There were no casualties, however, amongst her complement of 950, The Inflexible was only hit directly twice ; she had one man killed and three slightly wounded. Her main derrick was cut in two, so that she was unable to use her steam boats. The few casualties speak more elo- quently than any words of the tactics adopted by Admiral Sturdee in putting to the greatest possible use the heavier armament at his disposal.

The Invincible had some interesting damage. One 8.2-inch shell burst and completely wrecked her ward- room, making a gigantic hole in her side. Two others hit the stalk of her after conning tower and burst, but did no damage to the inmates, who only complained of the fumes being sweet and sickly, leaving an unpleasant taste which, however, soon wore off. Another interesting case was the extraordinary damage done by a spent projectile falling at an angle of fifty degrees. Passing close under her forebridge, it cut the muzzle of one of her 4-inch guns clean off, after which it passed through the steel deck, through a ventilating trunk, through the deck below, and finished up in the Admiral's storeroom — side by side with the cheese, which put the finishing touch to its career. Another shell caused a nasty hole on the water-line, seven feet by three, which was found to be beyond the capa- bilities of the ship's staff to repair temporarily. The bunker had to be left flooded, all the surrounding bulk- heads being carefully shored up and strengthened until

The Battle-Cruiser Action 107

she returned to England. In "A Naval Digression"* " G. F." says : " On a part of the main deck one might have imagined for a second that a philanthropist had been at work, for there, strewn about, were a thousand odd golden sovereigns ; a shell had come through the upper deck, and, visiting the Fleet-Paymaster's cabin, had ' upset ' the money chest. It had then gone through the bulkhead into the chaplain's cabin next door, and finally passed out through the ship's side, taking with it a large part of the reverend gentleman's wardrobe, and reducing to rags and tatters most of what it had the decency to leave behind."

The Commander of the Gneisenau was picked up by the Inflexible, and gave some interesting details. De- scribing the time when the Canopus fired at the Gneisenau and NUrnberg on their first approach to Port Stanley, he told us that he said to his Captain, " Captain, we must either fight or go faster," adding that in his opinion the day would have ended very differently had they come up boldly off the mouth of the harbour and bom- barded our ships at anchor before they were able to get out. There can be no doubt that the issue would have been the same, but the Germans might have been able to inllict some serious damage, especially to those ihips Lying nearest the mouth of the harbour, who would have masked the battle-cruisers' fire. However, his Captain elected to run, so they went " faster."

During the action he had to go round the ship with the Ore-master, putting out any fires that were dis- re& Whilst going his rounds during the engage- • " E l'i Magaxin

108 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

ment he found a stoker near one of the drinking tanks on the mess deck, who said he had come up to get a drink of water. The Hun Commander told him that he had no business to leave his post, and, drawing his revolver, shot him dead where he stood.

A curious yarn is connected with Admiral Stoddart, who was in the Carnarvon. He had a distant cousin in the German Navy whom he had never met and about whose career he had frequently been asked in years gone by. This cousin of his was one of those saved by the Carnarvon, and when he got aboard he said, " I believe I have a cousin in one of the British ships. His name is Stoddart." To rind he was the Admiral on board that very ship must have indeed given him what the sailor terms " a fair knock out." He stated that practically every man on the upper deck of the Gneisenau was either killed or wounded, and that it was a feat of the greatest difficulty to climb across the deck, so great was the havoc wrought in all directions.

Another officer, who was stationed in one of the 8.2-inch turrets, had a remarkable experience. The turret was hit by a 12-inch shell, and he emerged the sole survivor. He then went on to a casemate, which was also knocked out and most of the crew killed. Try- ing a third gun, he was perhaps even more fortunate, as it was also hit by a 12-inch shell, and the same thing happened, but shortly after the ship sank and he was saved ! This hero was a fat, young lieutenant, who appar- ently drowned his sorrows the evening before he quitted the Carnarvon. Before retiring to bed he stood up in the mess, drink in hand, bowed blandly to everyone

The Battle-Cruiser Action 109

and said, with a broad smile on his fat face, " Gentle- men, I thank you very much — you have been very kind to me, and I wish you all in Hell ! "

The wisdom of Admiral Sturdee's orders to the Carnarvon to keep out of range of the Germans was brought home by an officer survivor of the Gnciscnau, who said that they knew they were done and had orders " to concentrate on the little ship and sink her if she came within range ! "

Upwards of 600 men had been killed or wounded when the Gnciscnau s ammunition was finally expended. The German captain " fell-in " the remainder and told them to provide themselves with hammocks or any woodwork they could find, in order to support them- selves in the water.

A certain number of the German sailors that were rescued from the icy ocean succumbed to exposure and shock, though the proportion was very small. They were given a naval funeral with full military honours and were buried at sea the day after the battle. When the funeral service was about to take place on the quarter- deck of one of our warships, the German prisoners were told to come aft to attend it. On rounding the supcr- ture, however, the leading men suddenly halted 1, brought up aghast with fright at the sight of guard of armed marines falling in across the deck, who were about to pay the last tributes of military honours to the dead. When ordered on, these terrified Hun- point blank refused to move, being convinced thai the Marine Guard was there in ord< 1 »1 them !

CHAPTER XII

THE END OF THE " LEIPZIG "

" War raged in heaven that day. . . . . . Light against darkness, Liberty Against all dark old despotism, unsheathed The sword in that great hour."

— ALFRED No YES (Drake).

It will be recollected that during the chase the battle- cruisers were firing at the Leipzig before the main battle with Admiral von Spee took place. This compelled the Germans to divide into two separate squadrons, since a direct hit from a 12-inch gun might easily prove fatal to one of their light-cruisers. Foreseeing that this manoeuvre was likely to occur, Admiral Sturdee had directed the Cornwall, Kent, and Glasgow to follow in pursuit. No time was lost, therefore, in giving chase to the enemy light-cruisers when they turned off to the S.S.E. at 1.20 p.m., the Glasgow leading the way at 26 knots, followed by the Kent and the Cornwall keeping neck and neck and going about 23! knots. The Dresden led the enemy light-cruisers with the Leipzig and N umber g on her starboard and port quarter re- spectively.

In the ever-increasing distance between our two squadrons, the main battle could still be seen through field glasses, which made the necessity for turning away from a spectacle of such absorbing and compelling

no

The End of the Leipzig in

interest all the more tantalising. But there was solid work to be done, requiring concentration, thought, and cool judgment.

A stern chase is proverbially a long one, and the difference in speed between our ships and the Germans' was not sufficient to justify any hope of getting to business for at least two hours, as the slowest enemy ship was probably doing 23 knots at this time. Every effort was now made to go as fast as possible, and the Cornwall and Kent had quite an exciting race as they worked up to 24 knots or slightly more — a speed actually exceeding that realised along the measured mile when • ships were new. The engine-room staffs on both ships " dug out for all they were worth," and the keenest rivalry prevailed.

It was very evident that a long chase lay before us, for the Glasgow was the only ship of the three that had a marked superiority in speed to the enemy. The Cornwall and Kent were gaining very slowly but surely on the Leipzig and Niimbcrg, but were losing on the Dresden.

The <ncmy kept edging away to port continually, and about 2.15 we passed over the spot where later in thi day the Gneisenatt was sunk by our battle-crui

About 2.45 p.m. the positions of the ships were as plan [see page 112). The Leipzig was the centre and rearmost ship, with the Dresden some four to five miles on her starboard bow, while the Niimbcrg was about a mile on her port bow. Both these ships were diverging slightly from the Leipzig, spreading out in I .1 f.ui to e cape being br< »ugh1 to action.

ii2 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The Cornwall and Kent were some eleven miles astern of the Leipzig, and the Glasgow was four miles distant on the starboard bow.

As the Glasgow drew ahead she edged over to star- board in the direction of the Dresden. About 3 p.m. she opened fire with her two 6-inch guns on the Leipzig

r

CARNARVON O (nag)

ast Falkland Id. jf "INFLEXIBLE'^ &

' OpePemtnta \ "CNEISENATffr &SW£§ajr

«,, C-in-C

"SCHARNHORST (Flag)

Diagram showing position at 2.45 p.m. . weather conditions not so good wind and rain from N. W.

1 Sea mile=2 000 yards.

"CORNWALL^ y'kENT"

"glasgoWq in , opened tire < , 8

■■^LEIPZIG

L_

at 12,000 yards, in the hope of outranging her and reducing her speed, so that the Cornwall and Kent might come into action. The Leipzig, however, held on her course, and replied to the Glasgow's fire, though it was evident that she was at the limit of her gun range. The firing was spasmodic and not very effective.

The Glasgow's speed was so much superior to that of the enemy that she soon closed the range very appre- ciably, and^ the Leipzig was seen t& straddle her with

The End of the Leipzig 113

her salvoes on more than one occasion. The Glasgow therefore altered course outwards,- at the same time tiring her after 6-inch gun, and then, having opened the range, turned up on to a roughly parallel course with the German. The duel between these ships continued intermittently.

The Cornwall and Kent were still keeping fairly level, and had closed in to a distance of about half a mile from one another. The chase continued, each minute seeming an age, as the range-finders registered the slowly diminishing distance of the enemy. The crews watched the proceedings from the forecastles with the greatest interest ; now and again a half-smothered cheer would break out when the Glasgow's shots fell perilously near the mark. When the bugle sounded " Action," the men responded with a spontaneous cheer as they rushed off at the double to their appointed stations. Their spirit was fine.

Captain J. Luce, of the Glasgow, was the senior naval officer of our three ships, and at 3.20 p.m. signalled the Cornwall to ask, " Are you gaining on the enemy ? ' To which a reply was made, " Yes — range now 16,000 Is." A quarter of an hour later the Glasgow ceased [or a while. Captain W. M. Ellerton, of the Corn- wall, now made a signal to the Kent: " I will take the

tre target (Leipzig) if you will take the left-hand Siimberg), as we appear to be gaining on both of them." The Glasgow again opened lire on the Leipzig a1 ;. 45, bul her shots falling short, she very soon after- wards ceased fire. At 4.6 the Glasgow and I. a'/'

I at one- another, and shortly afterwards the former 1

ii4 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

was hit twice ; an unlucky shot, descending at a steep angle, killed one man and wounded four others.

Captain Luce now found himself face to face with a difficult decision, which had to be made promptly- Was he to use his superior speed and endeavour to cut off the Dresden or not ? He decided to assist the Corn- wall and Kent in order to make sure of the destruction of the Leipzig and Numberg. At 4.25 p.m. the Glasgow turned to starboard away from the action and took station on the port quarter of the Cornwall, who had by that time come into action with the Leipzig.

During this period the Cornwall and Kent had been gaining fairly rapidly on the Leipzig and slowly on the Numberg, though losing on the Dresden, who was easily the fastest of the three German light-cruisers. The latter kept edging away gradually to starboard, out- distancing her pursuers, and finally made good her escape without firing a single shot.

At a quarter past four the Cornwall and the Kent opened fire on the Leipzig almost simultaneously at a range of 10,900 yards. The effect of this was that the German altered course slightly to starboard and was followed by the Cornwall, while the Kent went after the Niirnberg, as had been arranged.

The Leipzig now directed her fire on to the Cornwall. At the outset we were astounded to find that her pro- jectiles were falling over us at this distance, but she soon found this out, and most of her splashes were well short for some minutes. As the range diminished the firing became more accurate, and it was possible to judge of its effect. It was not till 4.22 that the Corn-

The End of the Leipzig 115

wall scored her first visible hit, which carried away the enemy's fore-topmast, killing the gunnery lieutenant and disabling the lire control. The enemy thereupon altered course away slightly to starboard, at which we made a bigger turn in the same direction, so as to cut him off, as well as to cross his course the more rapidly in the event of his dropping mines overboard. This manoeuvre brought the range down to 8,275 yards at 4.56, when he scored some hits. Captain Ellerton then turned away to starboard to give the enemy a broad- side, at the same time opening the range, which com- pletely upset the accuracy of the Leipzig's fire.

The Glasgow took up her self-appointed station on the port quarter of the Cornwall (see Plan, p. 112), and the action developed into a running fight between our two ships and the Leipzig, who concentrated her fire on the Cornwall, which, however, had superior armament:

Name Tonnage Armament Speed Completion

9,800 .. 14-6" .. 23.68 .. 1904

Glasgow 4,800 . . 2-6"

10-4* •■ 25.8 .. I900

3,200 .. 10-4. 1" .. 23.5 .. 1906

I rom " Brassi y's N.t\ .il Annual."

Misl and a light drizzling rain now set in, so we broke into independent firing on account of the difficulty of spotting the fall of shot. The range opened to 9,800 yards, and still we were being hit, which clearly showed the efficiency of the German 4.1-mch gun. Our course soon took us out of range, so we again turned towards the enemy, ceasing fire from 5.12 to 5-29 '' M- ''n was analogous to the in- I that occurred in the battle-cruisers' action, and

n6 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

is significant ; both took place on the same day, and both were due to the same cause — namely, the idea of making full use of the heavier armament in our ships, and thus eliminating the risk of incurring unnecessary casualties.

Shortly after 5.30 p.m. the Cornwall was hit no fewer than nine times in as many minutes at a range of over 9,000 yards, so course was again altered to starboard, a broadside being fired as the ship turned. We con- tinued these tactics, closing in and firing the foremost group of guns and then turning out again as soon as we had got in too close, at the same time getting in broadside fire, by which we managed to score a number of hits with common shell.

Fire was checked at 5.46, slow salvoes being resorted to on account of the difficulties of spotting. At this time a heavy thud was felt forward, which made the whole ship quiver ; a shell had landed in the paint room, where it burst and made rather a mess of things. No material damage resulted, and there was fortunately no fire. At 6.15 we started using lyddite instead of common shell, having again decreased the range. The result was stupendous, the dark smoke and flash caused by those projectiles as they struck could be plainly seen, and not long afterwards the enemy was on fire. His return fire began to slacken appreciably, though he still managed to get a hit every now and again. Cap- tain Ellerton decided to close and went in to nearly 7,000 yards, turning and letting the German have it from the port broadside.

It was now 6.35, and the news came through by wire-

The End of the Leipzig 117

less from the flagship that the Scharnhorst and Gneiscnau had been sunk. It passed round the ship like lightning, even penetrating the watertight bulkheads in some miraculous manner, and cheered up all hands tremend- ously.

Keeping the range between 7,000 and 8,000 yards, our ships continued to do great damage, and at 6.51 the enemy was seen to be badly on fire forward. In spite of this he continued to fire with great spirit, and even registered a few hits between 6.55 and 7.45 p.m. Then his firing stopped completely, and it was observed that he was on fire the whole length of the ship. The scuttles showed up like a series of blood-red dots gleam- ing from the ship's side, the whole of the foremost funnel and part of the centre one had disappeared, the upper works were severely damaged, while smoke was issuing here and there. The ship, indeed, presented a sorry spectacle.

All this time the Glasgow, which was still on the quarter of the Cornwall, had also been busily engaged with the Leipzig, but at a greater range.

We ceased firing at 7.10, thinking that the enemy would strike his colours ; but not a bit of it, so three minutes later we reopened fire with reluctance, though only for a couple of minutes. We closed in to 4,700 yards, turning 16 points in order to keep well out of tor- pedo range, and gave him a few more salvoes of lyddite with our starboard guns. The light was beginning to wane, and though twilight is very prolonged in flux- ions during the summi i", it would soon have been too dark to sec through the telescopic sights. At

n8 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

7.43 an explosion took place on board the Leipzig ; three minutes later the mainmast went slowly over, and finally collapsed with a crash. We waited to give her an opportunity to haul down her colours and surrender, and then opened fire again just before 8 p.m. At last, at 8.12, the Germans sent up two green lights as signals of distress, at which we both imme- diately closed in, stopped, and proceeded to get out boats. Darkness fell rapidly, and searchlights were turned on to the enemy, lighting up the ghastly scene where men could be seen jumping clear of the ship into the icy-cold water. The Leipzig was heeled over to port, almost on her beam ends ; she only had a bit of one funnel left, and all the after part of the ship was in flames. The fire on her forecastle had also burst into flame. Thick clouds of white steam escaping, showed up against the dense black smoke, and increased the dramatic effect. Our little boats became visible in the beams of the searchlights, as they rowed round to pick up survivors. At 9.21 p.m. a shower of sparks suddenly announced an explosion, directly after which the Leipzig foundered. Several of our boats were holed, and we only succeeded in saving six officers and nine men between the two of us, all of whom, however, survived the extreme cold. They told us that before the ship was abandoned the Kings- ton valves had been opened.

No further casualties had occurred on board the Glasgow since those already mentioned, as after joining the Cornwall she had not come under direct fire, although some projectiles intended for the latter did hit her.

The End of the Leipzig 119

The Cornwall was even more fortunate in having no casualties at all except, for a solitary pet canary, in spite of having eighteen direct hits not counting splinter holes, of which there were forty-two in one funnel alone. This absence of casualties, which was also a feature of the battle-cruiser action, speaks for the efficient handling of the ship by Captain Ellerton.

Survivors stated that von Spee was originally going direct to the Plate to coal, but that having captured a sailing vessel full of coal at Cape Horn, he changed his plans and decided to attack the Falkland Islands. It was also stated that the Leipzig had a large amount of gold on board.

One of the survivors rescued by the Cornwall was a naval reservist, who in time of peace had occupied the post of German interpreter to the Law Courts at Sydney, in Australia. When hauled into the boat the first words he used as soon as he had recovered his breath were : " It's bloody cold " in a perfect English accent. It is a well-known fact that sailors rarely make use of bad language, and the bowman who had hauled him out of the water is said to have fainted ! Evidently the language of the Law leaves much to be desired.

The torpedo lieutenant of the Leipzig was amongst

■ saved by the Cornwall. When brought along-

shausted to clamber up the ship's side

unaided, but when he reached the upper deck be pulled

him ther and stood to attention, saluting our

When he came into the ward-

. cplained thai lie had been on board

before a.-> a guest at dinner at the tunc that the ship

120 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

paid a visit to Kiel for the regatta in 1909, adding that he little expected then that his next visit would take place under such tragic circumstances.

This officer surprised us all by suddenly asking when the Cornwall had had bigger guns put into her, and went on to say that when we fired our " big guns " — meaning when we started to use lyddite shell — the damage was appalling, arms and legs were to be seen all along the decks, and each shell that burst started a fire. He went on to say that the Cornwall's firing was very effective and accurate, but doubtless most of the prisoners told their captors the same thing. We explained that the armament had not been changed since the ship was originally built. He also told us that the German captain had assembled all the ship's company when their 1,800 rounds of ammunition were expended, and said, " There is the ensign, and any man who wishes may go and haul it down, but I will not do so." Not a soul moved to carry out the suggestion, but about fifty men, having obtained permission, jumped overboard and must have perished from the cold. There were only eighteen left alive on board at the end, so far as he could judge, and of these sixteen were saved. All the officers carried whistles, which accounted for their being located in the water so easily.

The prisoners naturally wished to glorify themselves, their captain, and their shipmates in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, before whom they knew that these stories would eventually be repeated. Therefore these yarns about the ensign, the men jumping overboard,

The End of the Leipzig 121

and the opening of the Kingston valves must be taken with a grain of salt.

The Cornwall had one or two interesting examples of the damage done to a ship by modern high-explosive shell. The most serious was a shell that must have exploded on the water-line, as the ship was rolling, for the side was afterwards found to be indented 5 inches at a position 5 to 6 feet below the water-line, and consequently below the armoured belt, a cross bulkhead being at the precise point of impact. Curious as it may appear, even the paint was untouched, and there was no sign of a direct hit from outboard, except for the bulge that remained and the starting of a good many rivets from their sockets. The cross bulkhead behind was buckled up like corrugated iron, and the coal bunkers, which had been empty, were flooded, giving the ship a heavy list. When we got into Port William we managed to keel the ship sufficiently to enable our carpenters to get at the leak, and they suc- ceeded in completely stopping it in two days, working day and night — a line performance, for which Mr. •rd, the carpenter, received the D.S.C., whilst his staff were personally congratulated by the Commander- in-Chief.

Another shell passed through the steel depression rail of the after 6-inch turret, by which it was deflected through the deck at the junction of two cabin bulk- Is; it next penetrated the deck below and finally burst on the ship's side, causing a large hole. An amus- ing incident was connected with this. The projectile cut a fire-hose in half, the business end of which was

i22 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

carried down the hole into one of the officer's cabins, where it continued to pump in water for the remainder of the action. At the end of the day this officer found all his belongings, including his full dress and cocked hat, floating about in two or three feet of water.

Another officer was seated on a box in the ammuni- tion passage waiting for the wounded, when a shell struck the ship's side close by him, the concussion knocking him off. Getting up, he saw the doctor near by, and thought he had kicked him, so asked him angrily what the blazes he thought he was doing. It was not until after a long and heated argument that he could be persuaded to believe that he had not been the victim of a practical joke.

In another case a shell shot away the fire main imme- diately above one of the stokeholds, which was flooded. Stoker Petty Officer W. A. Townsend and Stoker John Smith were afterwards both decorated with the D.S.M. for " keeping the boiler fires going under very trying circumstances."

It was mentioned before that some ships had leave to open up their machinery for repairs. The Cornwall was to have steam at six hours' notice, and had the low- pressure cylinder of the port engine opened up and in pieces for repairs when the signal to raise steam was made. Chief Engine Room Artificer J. G. Hill was awarded the D.S.M. "for his smart performance in getting the port engine, which was disconnected, into working order." It will have been noticed that the ship was steaming 20 knots two and a half hours after the signal to raise steam. This was a remark-

The End of the Leipzig 123

able performance, and reflected great credit on her entire engineering staff.

A signalman, Frank Glover, was given the D.S.M. for " carrying out his duties of range-taker in a very cool manner during the whole of the action." He was in an entirely exposed position on the fore upper bridge.

More has been said about the part taken by the Cornwall, as the writer was on board her, and most of the incidents described came under his personal observa- tion. They are, however, typical of the conduct of the officers and men in the other ships that took part.*

* The ScyJliiz — the German auxiliary that escaped — took in the wireless signal announcing the victory and actually heard the firing of the Cornwall and the Glasgow on her beam about four miles off. She managed to escape under cover of the fog by steering to the south, but it was a near thing.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SINKING OF THE " NURNBERG "

" While England, England rose, Her white cliffs laughing out across the waves, Victorious over all her enemies."

— Alfred No yes (Drake).

We must now go back to the commencement of the action with the Leipzig. At 4.30 p.m., in accordance with a signal made by the Cornwall, the Kent branched off in pursuit of the N umber g and was soon out of sight. Thus a third fight developed through the high speed attained by the Kent, which enabled her to catch up and force action on the Nurnberg. The following description has been largely compiled from a narrative written by an officer in the Kent, while from the particulars undernoted concerning the ships two important features stand out : the speed of the two ships was nearly equal, and the German was built five years later than her opponent, and therefore should have been able to maintain her speed with less difficulty.

Name Tonnage

Kent 9,800

Nurnberg 3,396

" Brassey's Naval Annual."

In the course of the afternoon the weather became misty, so that it seemed imperative to get to

124

A rmament	Speed	Completion
14-6"	23.7	1903
10-4. 1"	23.5	1908
8-2.1"

The Sinking of the Nurnberg 125

close quarters as rapidly as possible. That this was fully realised and acted upon is shown by what was written by an officer in the Kent : " In the last hour of the chase, helped by a light ship and a clean bottom, by the most determined stoking, by unremitting at- tention to her no longer youthful boilers — in short, by the devotion of every officer and man in the engine and boiler rooms, the Kent achieved the remarkable speed of 25 knots."

Both ships were steering a south-easterly course at 5 p.m. when the Kent got within range of the Nurn- berg, which opened fire with her stern guns. The chase had in all lasted nearly seven hours, so the sound of the enemy's guns proved doubly welcome, since it brought home the fact that the German was now trapped. The fall of the enemy's shot was awaited with that eagerness combined with anxiety which only those who have undergone the experience can fully realise. Accurate ranges were hard to take on account of the abnormal vibration caused by the speed at which the ship was travelling, but it was expected that the enemy's first salvoes would fall short. But not a sign was to be seen anywhere of these projectiles. Where, then, had they gone ?

Officers glanced round the horizon to make quite certain that the enemy was not firing at another ship, but nothing else was in sight. A light, drizzling rain falling, so that it was not till the third salvo thai the splashes were discovered astern of the ship. This bore out the experience of the Cornwall and din which had al 0 been astonished at the Long range of the

126 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

German 4.1" gun, which is said to be sighted up to 12 kilometres (13,120 yards).

Nine minutes after (5.9) the Kent opened fire at 11,000 yards with her fore turret, but the shots fell short. Altering course slightly to port, she was able to bring her two foremost 6-inch on the starboard side to bear, making four guns in all. The light was poor, and both ships had difficulty in seeing well enough to correct the gun range at this distance. Thus this open- ing stage of the combat was not very fruitful of results as far as could be judged, though survivors subsequently stated that the Kent scored two effective hits, one of which penetrated the after steering flat below the water- line and killed all the men in it with one exception. On the other hand, the enemy (missing mainly for de- flection) only got in one hit during the same period.

About 5.35 two boilers of the N umber g burst in quick succession, apparently from excess of pressure due to her strenuous efforts to escape. This reduced her speed to 19 knots, when all hope of averting disaster, even with the aid of several lucky shots, was shattered at one fell swoop. The Kent now gained very rapidly on her opponent, and all anxiety as to the chase being prolonged until dark was dispelled.

Realising the hopelessness of continuing the attempt to escape, the German decided to fight it out, and altered course ten minutes later 90 degrees to port (see Plan). The Kent turned about 70 degrees to port, so that both ships were on converging courses, and able to bring every gun on the broadside to bear. The running fight was over, and the action developed during

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128 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the ensuing quarter of an hour into as fierce a duel as it is possible to imagine, with the range rapidly de- creasing from 6,000 to 3,000 yards and all guns firing in succession, keeping up one continuous thunder. The Kent now started using her lyddite shell. As was only to be expected, a good deal of damage resulted. In a very short time a fire broke out near the German's mainmast, followed a little later by the fall of her main-topmast, which bent gracefully forward like a sapling, and then fell with a crash. Both ships were firing their guns independently, not in salvoes, and in consequence the sequence of the discharges was almost unbroken. A fearful din resulted, which was as loud as it was penetrating, and soon began to have an irritating effect on the nerves. The incessant clang- ing and clashing jarred horribly and gave the impression that the ship was being continually hit ; in fact, those below began to think that matters were not going too well from the constant concussions and severe jolts that were felt, until they were reassured by the optimistic and cheering bits of news passed down through the voice-pipes. The Kent's fore-topgallant-mast now sud- denly fell over, fortunately remaining suspended in mid- air by the stays ; a chance shot had cut right through the heel.

From the rate of fire maintained at such a short range it was patent that matters would soon be brought to a finish so far as the Niirnberg was concerned. By 6.5 p.m. her fore-topmast had disappeared, she was on fire in two or three places, and her speed was still further reduced. She turned away, as if to escape such heavy

The Sinking of the Nurnberg 129

punishment, the details of which could be plainly ob- served at this short distance. Her upper deck was a veritable shambles, and most of the guns' crews, only protected by gun shields, had been killed. In the words of one of the Kent's officers, " her foretop and foremost funnel were so riddled that they appeared to be covered with men " ; the torn and twisted steel sticking out in every direction caused this paradoxical illusion. Only two of her guns on the port side remained in action.

On the other hand, the Kent herself had by no means come out unscathed. In addition to the hits already mentioned, there were many more that had struck the ship's side and boat deck on the starboard side, but no fires of consequence had taken place, nor had there been any hits on the water-line of a vital character. One of the enemy's shells burst just outside the midship casemate situated on the main deck. Only fragments entered, but there were ten casualties, most of them burns ; one man was killed instantly, and he remained in the same position after death with arms bent for holding a cordite charge. A small fire was caused, and the flames passed down the ammunition hoist to the passage below, igniting a charge which was hooked on • be hoisted. Had it not been for the prompt ;n tion of Sergeant Charles Mayes, of the Royal Marines, complete destruction might easily have followed. With the greatest presence of mind, he immediately isolated the cordite charges in the vicinity, closed the sliding scuttle in the hoist, and at the same time ordered his men to run for the nearest hoses to flood the compart-

J

130 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

ment. The fire was extinguished before it could get a hold, and for this brave deed he was awarded the Con- spicuous Gallantry Medal and an annuity of £20.

The Niirnberg executed a sudden and unexpected manoeuvre at 6.10 by turning inwards as if about to ram her opponent. Continuing the turn, however, she eventually passed astern of the Kent and brought her starboard guns into play for the first time. During this manoeuvre, and while in an end-on position, two of our shells burst almost simultaneously on her forecastle, causing a fire and putting the guns there out of action.

In reply to this manoeuvre the Kent turned to a nearly opposite course. It will be realised from the plan that the Kent was travelling well over twice as fast as her opponent at this time, and that her port guns were now brought into action. The courses of both ships were again roughly parallel, the Kent taking care to avoid getting on the beam of the Niirnberg, which would have afforded the latter an opportunity of using her torpedoes.

From now on the distance between the two ships gradually increased.

The German's fire was very spasmodic, and it was evident that she could not last much longer. By 6.25 her engines were apparently stopped, for she was barely moving through the water. She was now badly bat- tered and scarcely recognisable as the ship of an hour and a half before. The Kent had to turn right round again to keep somewhere near her, and continued to fire at her with devastating effect.

At 6.36 the enemy ceased fire altogether, the Kent followed suit, and for a short while awaited develop-

The Sinking of the Niirnberg 131

mcnts. Being now on tiro all along her fore part, the German ship looked a complete wreck, and showed not a vestige of life as she lay helpless on the water. She had a list, and was at a dead standstill. In vain the Kent waited for her to strike her colours, and so, as she showed no signs of sinking, opened fire once more, slowly closing and keeping well before her beam, firing at her with all guns that would bear. Not till 6.57 did she haul down her colours, whereupon all firing ceased.

On examination it was found that nearly all the Kent's boats were splintered or smashed up by the enemy's fire, and there were only two that could be temporarily patched up in a short space of time. While the necessary repairs were in progress, the Niirnberg, which had been heeling over more and more, turned over on her starboard side, and in a deathlike silence dis- appeared beneath the surface at 7.27 p.m. Captain J. D. Allen, in writing of his men, says, " No sooner had she sunk than the Kent's men displayed the same zeal and activity in endeavouring to save life as they had done in fighting the ship. Boats were hastily repaired and lowered, manned by men eagerly volunteering to help. Unfortunately, the sea was rough and the water very cold, so we only succeeded in picking up twelve men, of whom five subsequently died." The search for the survivors was continued till 9 a.m. It is said that even the living were attacked by albatrosses.

\\'hil<- the ship was sinking a few German seamen gathered at the stern and waved their ensign to and fro before going down with the ship.

Kent was hit thirty- seven times altogether, but

132 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

suffered no damage affecting her seaworthiness. Her wireless telegraphy transmitting instruments were smashed to pieces by a shell, which passed through the wireless office. She was thus unable to report the result of her action, and caused the Commander-in- Chief some anxiety regarding her fate. The receiving instruments, however, were intact, so all the wireless signals made by the Commander-in-Chief inquiring as to her whereabouts were taken in and read, though she was powerless to reply. The upper works on the starboard side presented a sorry spectacle, but the armour, though hit, was unpierced. Only two shots burst against the unarmoured part of the ship's side, one making a hole about four feet square just before the foremost starboard 6-inch gun on the main deck, and the other a hole of about equal size on the same side immediately below the after shelter deck.

A German officer who was saved said that they had heard by wireless that the British had " blown up the harbour " at the Falklands, and had fled to the west coast of Africa ! He also stated that the Niirnberg had not been refitted for three years, and that her boilers were in a very bad state, which was borne out by some of them having burst during the chase.

Each seaman 6-inch gun's crew had five Royal Naval Reservemen in it, and their conduct speaks volumes for the all-round efficiency of the men that the Navy has drawn from the Reserve during the War.

The total casualties in the Kent amounted to 16 men, 5 of whom were killed, whilst 3 of the wounded after- wards died of their wounds.

The Sinking of the Nurnberg 133

Commander Wharton, of the Kent, gives a remark ably realistic description of the closing scenes : "It was strange and weird all this aftermath, the wind rapidly arising from the westward, darkness closing in, one ship heaving to the swell, well battered, the foretop-gallant-mast gone. Of the other, nothing to be seen but floating wreckage, with here and there a man clinging, and the ' molly-hawks ' swooping by. The wind moaned, and death was in the air. Then, see ! Out of the mist loomed a great four-masted barque under full canvas. A great ghost-ship she seemed. Slowly, majestically, she sailed by and vanished in the night." This was the same ghost-ship that had appeared in the middle of the action fought by the battle-cruisers — a very fitting apparition, which up- holds the legend that one always appears at a British naval engagement. Meeting one of the officers of this sailing vessel later on in the Dardanelles, it was revealed that she had been out at sea so long that she was un- aware that war had even been declared, until she sud- denly found herself a spectator of two naval actions on the same day.

A silk ensign, presented to the ship by the ladies of Kent, was torn to ribbons in the course of the day. Th<- pieces, however, were carefully collected by Cap- tain J. D. Allen, and returned to the donors, who sewed them together. This ensign now hangs in Canterbury Cathedral. A new silk ensign was given to the ship by the ladies of the county of Kent, and was hoisted on the first anniversary of the battle, December 8th, *9*5

CHAPTER XIV

AFTERMATH

..." England Grasped with sure hands the sceptre of the sea, That untamed realm of liberty which none Had looked upon as aught but wilderness Ere this, or even dreamed of as the seat Of power and judgment and high sovereignty Whereby all nations at the last should make One brotherhood, and war should be no more."

— ALFRED NOVES (Drake).

The battle of the Falkland Islands was, perhaps, more like the old-time naval engagements fought by sailing ships of the line than any other naval battle that is likely to take place nowadays. There were no sub- marines, no destroyers, no aeroplanes or Zeppelins, nor any other of the manifold death-dealing devices that tend to make war so much more hideous than in days gone by. In a word, it was open fighting. Not a torpedo was fired. Not even a mine was dropped, if the survivors who stated that the German ships did not carry them can be believed. There were a few anxious moments when zinc cases were seen floating on the surface ahead, glistening in the sunlight, but