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THE GREAT WAR
SECOND VOLUME THE MOBILIZATION OF THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL FORCES
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ALBERT LEOPOLD CLEMENT MARIE MEINRAD
ALBERT I
King of the Belgians.
THE
GREAT WAR
SECOND VOLUME THE MOBILIZATION OF THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL FORCES
BY
GEORGE H. ALLEN, Ph.D., of the University of Penn- sylvania, History Department; Fellow in Classical Archae- ology, American School of Classical Studies, Rome, Etc.,
HENRY C. WHITEHEAD, Captain in the United States Army, Served in Europe, by Official Assignment, for Observation, Etc.,
AND
Admiral F. E. CHADWICK, U. S. N.
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY
GEORGE BARRIE'S SONS
at PHILADELPHIA
Copyrighted, 1916, by GliORGE BARRIE'S SONS
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Among the Illustrations in this Volume are Reproductions of Photographs Copy- righted nv Underwood and Underwood, by Paul Thompson, and by the International News Service Company Entered at Stationers' Hall, London
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGES
List of Illustrations XI-XVI
Preface XVII-XXII
The Moral Forces in the Teutonic Em- pires 1-63
The archduke's recklessness and popular animosity. British opinion of Serbia. Mr. Trevelyan's testimony. Serbia's attitude after the Sarajevo outrage. Austrian opinion in July, 1914; Count Tisza, HerrvonTschirscky. The Viennese public and the rupture with Serbia. German discontent with the settlement of 1911. The contest in armaments. The alleged secret report of March 13, 1913. The attitude of various classes in Germany regarding foreign relations. " If I were Kaiser." The news of the Austro- Serbian rupture in Berlin. The great crisis in German policy ; the extraor- dinary council at Potsdam on the evening of July 29, 1914 ; the midnight interviews and communications. Warlike enthusiasm in Berlin. The historic session of the Reichstag, August 4th ; the Kaiser's and Chancel- lor's speeches and the Social Democratic response.
II The Moral Factors in Belgium, France,
and Italy 64-131
Condition of Belgium before the war. King Albert I. Relations with Germany. German plan of traversing Belgium not an improvisation. Belgian precautions. The Belgian government and the crisis; Luxem- burg; German ultimatum; Belgian deliberations and reply. German declaration of war. Vagaries of German apologists. Count Andrassy's opinion. France : the Alsace-Lorraine Question. Recent French politics. M. Jaures. Socialism in France and Germany. Military law for three years' service. Doumergue Cabinet. Caillaux Case. The elections of 1914, and ministerial crisis. Viviani Cabinet. Senator Humbert's dis- closure. Assassination of M. Jaures. The French people and the war- crisis. The declaration of war. The historic session of the Chamber. The coalition ministry. The moral forces in Italy.
VI The Great War
CHAPTER PAGES
III The Moral Impulses in the United
Kingdom 132-182
The British Cabinet in 1914; its leading personalities, Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Churchill. The cabinet's aversion to war. Various methods for preserving peace; the proposed "naval holiday." British attitude regarding the European crisis until August 1, 1914; views of the Labor party, the press, French anxiety as to British policy. Criticism of Sir Edward Grey's conversations on July 29th. M. Cambon presses Sir Edward Grey for assurances, July 30th and 31st. The "fateful days of the century," August 1st and 2d; conflicting im- pulses. First British promise to France. Memorable session of parlia- ment, August 3d. Sir Edward Grey's statement of foreign policy; the two cardinal factors, the security of the French coast and the neutrality of Belgium. Mr. Bonar Law responds for the opposition. Mr. John Red- mond for the Irish Nationalists, "the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons," the outburst of enthusiasm. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald for the Laborites. Criticism of Sir Edward Grey's speech. Formal statement of the German proposals for British neutrality. The Belgian appeal, August 5th. The resolution for extraordinary supply, involving a vote of £100,000,000. Prime Minister Asquith opens the dis- cussion, August 6th. Lord Kitchener as Minister of War, a non-political member of the cabinet. The debate on supply ; Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Dick- inson, and other speakers. Resolution for increasing the army. The prompt adoption of the necessary measures.
IV The Moral Forces and their Mani- festation in Russia 183-196
Arrival of the French President and Prime Minister at Peterhof, July 20, 1914. The festivities. Departure and hastened return of the presidential party to France. Serious labor troubles in St. Petersburg. Magic effect of news that Serbia had been threatened, July 24th. The grand council, July 25th. Demonstrations in St. Petersburg on August 1st. The solemn service in the Winter Palace, August, 2d. The session of the Duma on August 8th ; M. Sazonoff 's address ; expressions of loyalty ; the discordant note from the Social Democrats.
V The German Army 199-228
Unity of spirit of army and people. Traditional warlike spirit of the Germans. Origin of the German army. Emergence of principalities. Beginning of the Hohenzollern rule. The birthplace of the German mili- tary ideal. The Great Elector. Frederick William I and his military organization ; his regiment of giants ; art treasures trafficked for tall men. Military training of Frederick the Great; prowess of his army. Decline of military prestige under Frederick William II. Napoleon's supremacy over German states. Army reorganization in Prussia under Frederick William III; universal service. War of Liberation, 1813. Persistence of Frederick's system and its success in 1866 and 1870. Prussia's army the model of the army of the German Empire after 1871. Term of service and strength. Military increases in 1881, 1887, and 1890. Mobilization strength
Contents VII
CHAPTER PAGES
in 1893. Further modification, improvements, and increases in 1899, 1905, 1911, 1912, and 1913. Opposition to Bismarck's military program. Supremacy of the military party. Political divisions of the empire. Growth of population. Term of military service. Strength of the army in 1914. Military training schools. Education of officers for the line of the army. Technical schools. Reserve, Landwehr, and Landsturm offi- cers. Peace and war strength and equipment. Chief command. The General Staff. An army corps. The available reserve. Quality of the German soldier.
VI The Army of Austria-Hungary . . . 229-244
Decadency of the Holy Roman Empire. Mercenaries and feudal service. A permanent force. Momentary glory under Charles V. The Thirty Years' War. Passing of the imperial power. The Seven Years' War. Dissolution of the empire. Austria becomes a separate empire ; its many nationalities and languages. The Kingdom of Hungary. Austro-Prussian War, 1866. Universal military service ; a triple-headed army. Slow reor- ganization after 1870. Military force under law of 1889. The problem of nationalities. The Landwehr and the Landsturm. Exempted classes and period of military service. The Ersatz Reserve. Training. Military strength under law of 1912. Instruction of non-commissioned officers. Officers of the Active Army and the Reserve. Forces constituting the first and third line armies of 1914. The cavalry force and its equipment. The artillery and equipment. The high commands. Organization of the land forces on a war footing. Supplementary forces. Popularity of the army.
VII The Armies of Turkey and Bulgaria 245-266
Western migration of the Oghuz Turks ; they settle in Asia Minor ; adopt crescent as their device. Foundation of the Ottoman Empire by Osman. The first Vizier. Permanent military organization. The "Janissaries." Suleiman, the Magnificent ; his feudal forces ; his navy ; curbed power of the Janissaries. Decline of the Ottoman power. Destruction of the Janis- saries. Introduction of Western military and naval ideals. Foreign mili- tary advisers. Army reform by the German General von der Goltz. The German the army model ; the British the naval pattern. German officers in Turkish army service. Universal military service. Quota of non- Mohammedan troops. Peace and war strength. Training of non-com- missioned officers. The General Staff. Military Law of 1910. Military schools. General reorganization under a German commission, 1913. State of organization in 1914; first, second, and third lines ; equipment; aviation section ; the gendarmerie ; military council ; army inspection ; train troops ; sanitary service. German commission enlarged. Quality of the army. Bulgaria : Advent of the Bulgars. A mingled people. Original limits of the Bulgarian Kingdom. Periods of decline and recovery. First incur- sion of the Russians. Under the Byzantine Empire. A second Bulgarian empire. A Turkish province. Russia restores the nation. Under Russian influence. Eastern Roumelia incorporated in Bulgaria. The modern army : sendee, military schools and training, annual contingent of recruits ; organi- zation, strength, and equipment. Qualities of the forces and approximate strength in 1914.
VIII The Great War
CHAPTER PAGES
VIII The Armies of the British Empire . 267-294
Military retrospect: original defensive forces, — the fyrd, a general levy; personal troops; Norman system, military tenure ; scutage; contract ser- vice. Till- Honorable Artillery Company. Bowmen and archery. The first cavalry. Yeomen of the Guard. Sergeants-at-arms. The London Trained Bands. The militia. Dispute between Charles I and Parliament. Cromwell's army. Beginning of a Regular force. Historic background of famous regiments: Coldstream Guards; Grenadier Guards; Life Guards; Home Guards and others. First modern Standing Army. Standing Army under James II. Parliamentary control. Contract enlistment. Re- serve forces. Reforms after Franco-Prussian War. The Indian Army : origin, development, and strength. The Canadian Army: origin, organi- zation, service, and strength. Citizen armies of Australia and New Zea- land : service, training, and number. South African citizen army : service, training, and strength. The Expeditionary Force: Regulars, Special Re- serve, and Territorial Army, — organization, service, strength, officers' training, chief command, and equipment. General considerations.
IX The French Army 295-312
Napoleon's great army. Degenerated military state in 1870. Universal service, 1872. Frontier defenses: coast, eastern, central, and southern. State of fortifications in 1914. Universal compulsory service law of 1913 : classification of conscripts; volunteers; the colonial service; recruiting districts; remount service; officers of the active and reserve forces. Home and African establishments. First and second lines on war basis. Infantry arms and equipment. Care of the wounded. Organization and training of the infantry. Cavalry organization and equipment. The French cavalry officer. Saumur School of Equitation. Artillery equip- ment and strength. Supplementary equipment. Technical troops, En- gineers and Train. The Flying Corps The Gendarmerie. Forest and Customs forces. Peace and war strength. Chief command. The General Staff. A defensive force.
X The Russian Army 313-343
Racial elements in Russia. Rise of the Slavs. Early territorial extension. Tatar invasion : An autocracy established. Tatar dominion ends. The Strelitz, the first permanent military force. Conquest of Kazan. Ivan's army. Organization under Godunoff. The Cossacks. Reforms of Peter the Great. Revolt of the Strelitz. Cossack revolt. Defeat by the Swedes at Narva and victory over them at Poltava. Army reforms. Victories over Finland, Sweden, and Persia. The Seven Years' War. Victories over Turkey and Poland. Defeat by France. Reconstruction; military colo- nies. Campaign against Turkey, 1828-1829. Reorganization of 1833-1834. The Crimean War. Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878. The Russo-Japanese War. Organization under law of 1912: service; the Cossacks; annual enrollment of recruits; strength, officers, and training; infantry, cavalry and artillery, and equipment. Supreme command. General Staff. Army corps, peace and war strength. Infantry division, Avar strength. Cavalry division. Retrospect of ameliorations. Quality of the modern force.
Contents IX
CHAPTER PAGES
XI The Armies of Serbia, Belgium, and
Italy 344-369
Advent of the Serbs into Europe. Separation from the kindred Croats. Early subjection of the Serbians. Serbian victories and greatness in the fourteenth century. Annexed by Turkey in the fifteenth century. Cen- turies of unrest. Momentary independence, 1804. Again under Turkish rule. Independence reestablished. Four decades of turbulence. Assassi- nation of King Alexander and Queen Draga, 1903. Peter Karageorgevitch proclaimed king. Population and resources. Military inefficiency. Prog- ress under Peter. Military service, peace and war strength, training and organization. Territorial increase in 1913. Augmentation of military strength. Campaign of 1912, against Turkey, and 1913, against Bulgaria. Belgium : Union of Belgium and Holland. Revolution of 1830. The nucleus of a national army. Military conditions under Spanish rule and development of national ideal. Independence under guarantee of the Great Powers. Neglect of the army. Defensive measures after Franco- Prussian War. Military system and defenses before law of 1909. Compul- sory service and strength under 1909 law. Increased force enacted in 1913 ; organization and equipment. State of the army in 1914. Italy : State of army in 1815. The army of liberation. Causes operating against military efficiency. The army of 1914 ; service, strength, training of officers, quality of troops, the Carabinieri and Bersaglieri ; organization and equip- ment ; peace and war strength.
XII The Naval Forces of the Bellig-
erents 370-388
Place of the navy in international affairs. The modern war vessel and her armament. The Dreadnought. Maximum tonnage of constructions in 1914. Turrets and their armament. Typical heavy guns. Defensive armor. The submarine foe. Relative strength of the warring powers in completed "capital" ships. Battleships in construction in 1914. Great Britain's preponderance in battleships. Other naval constructions of the Entente and the Teutonic allies. Auxiliary cruisers. Wireless telegraphy and aeroplane service. Dockyards. Personnel. Torpedo boats and de- stroyers. Submarine development. Mines. The automobile torpedo. Air- ships and their equipment. Naval expenditures of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. Naval forces in the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Mediterranean. Review of British fleet off Portsmouth, July 18, 1914. Ships in Eastern waters. German raiders.
XIII The Mobilization of the Financial
Resources 391-427
The "sinews of war." Survey of the financial resources of the belliger- ents. The situation in the leading financial nations. United Kingdom : London as banking center ; the Bank of England ; bills of exchange ; Lon- don as the world's clearing-house. The crisis, Mr. Lloyd George and the government's measures; moratorium, £1 and 10-shilling notes, maritime insurance. France : the French as investors ; the French banking system ; the Bank of France and its currency ; moratorium. Germany : exceptional features of the German situation ; great development of credit ; financial
X The Great War
CHAPTER PAGES
preparation; Imperial Rank; the financial measures in 1913; the finan- cial war plan; the war-loan. Austria-Hungary: war-loan banks; supple- mentary currency. Russia : financial preparedness ; reserve and circulation of the Bank of Russia; treasury notes; prohibition of sale of vodka; taxes in lieu of the abandoned revenue from spirits. Italy : recent great com- mercial gain ; stability of the public credit ; banks of issue ; treasury notes ; expansion of bank currency in 1914 ; issues of government notes and loans.
XIV The Mobilization of the Military
Forces 428-457
Universal service, reserve, and mobilization. Political aspect of mobiliza- tion. Mobilizations: in Serbia; in Austria-Hungary, partial mobilization ordered on July 28th, extended to Galicia on the 30th, became general on August 1st ; in Russia, partial mobilization on July 29th, general mobiliza- tion on the 31st; in Germany, military preparations, general mobilization on August 1st ; in France, precautionary measures, general mobilization on August 1st; in Belgium, August 1st decreed first day of mobilization. Dispersal of British naval units postponed ; navy mobilization ordered August 2d ; concentration of the Expeditionary Force. Time required for mobilization. Assignment of reservists. Equipping the German reservist. Railway service in France. French army corps' headquarters. Trains required in France. Transporting the British Expeditionary Force. Head- quarters of the Germany army corps. Military administration of German railway service. Secrecy of military movements.
Appendix 459-467
Despatch from the British ambassador at Berlin respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German government.
Appendix 469-470
Official Text of the Treaties guaranteeing the independence and per- petual neutrality of Belgium.
(a) Treaty between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia of the one part and Belgium of the other. Concluded and signed at London, 19 April 1839.
Appendix 471-477
Official Copy made at Brussels conformable to the collated text, word by word, of the original instrument signed by the respective pleni- potentiaries.
(b) Treaty made and signed at London, 19 April 1839, between Bel- gium and Holland, relative to the separation of their respective territories.
Chronological Table 479-486
Index 487-494
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FACING PAGE
Albert I, King of the Belgians Title
Count Stephen Tisza 4
Count Julius Andrassy 4
The Hofburg, Vienna, offices of the Ministry of War . . . . 13
The French Embassy, Vienna 13
The Houses of Parliament, London 17
The Reichstag, Berlin 17
Sacking the house and destroying the furniture of a Serbian in
Sarajevo ■ 20
The younger generation's enthusiastic reception in Berlin of the
news of the war 20
Charts showing the precincts which returned Social Democrats to
the Reichstag in 1903, 1907, and 1912 29
Siegesallee, Avenue of Victory, Berlin 32
Emperor William speaking from the balcony of the palace in
Berlin 32
Count Helmuth von Moltke 36
The Session of the Reichstag, August 4, 19 14 45
Historical maps of Belgium 64
The Palace of Justice, Brussels 69
Disappearing armored gun turret sunk and raised for firing ... 76
Pentagonal Brialmont fort 76
Triangular Brialmont fort or fortin 76
William Ewart Gladstone 85
Bernhard Dernburg 85
XI
XII The Great War
FACING PAGE Exchanging the crepe draperv for flags and flowers on the Strass-
burg monument, Paris 92
The Prime Minister of Belgium speaking from the balcony of the
Parliament House 92
Plan showing forts on the Franco-German frontier 97
Cartoon which appeared in Punch, August 12, 1914 101
U embarquement des Pilots. Cartoon drawn by L. Sabattier, which
appeared in U Illustration, January, 1912 .101
Jean Leon Jaures 108
August Bebel 108
The Ribot Cabinet 112
The Caillaux Trial 112
Louis Barthou 116
Gaston Doumergue 116
The Palais Bourbon, Paris, where the French deputies sit . . .119
The Chamber of Deputies 119
Aristide Briand 125
Alexandre Millerand 125
Demonstration in Rome in favor of war 129
Italian Parliament 129
George V, King of Great Britain 132
Ulster volunteers, armed and drilling preparatory to forcibly reject- ing Home Rule 144
Lord Haldane, Lord Chancellor and former Minister of War, arriving
with Lord Kitchener at the War Office 144
Cheering crowd surrounding the car of Mr. Asquith, the British
Prime Minister 148
A crowd in Whitehall, opposite Downing Street, waiting for a glimpse
of ministers and other notables 148
Andrew Bonar Law 157
J. Keir Hardie 157
Lord Morley 160
John Burns 160
John Redmond 177
J. Ramsay MacDonald 177
Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, and the Tsarevitch, Grand Duke Alexis 183
List of Illustrations XIII
FACING PAGE
The Tsar of Russia tasting soldiers' soup 187
Russian cavalry in maneuvers 187
The winter palace, St. Petersburg . . . , 188
Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch 190
Ivan Longinovitch Goremykin 193
The Duma in session 196
The Tauris Palace, St. Petersburg 196
The Kaiser at trials of rapid-fire guns 205
The Death's-head Hussars 205
German Red Cross squad with dogs 208
German infantry on the march 208
German general (Alexander von Kluck) and staff at army maneu- vers 212
A German 21-centimeter siege mortar 221
The new Krupp aerial gun 221
Naval balloon carrier 224
Zeppelin Victoria Louise flying over the Sachsen, which is at rest on
the ground 224
Austrian infantry on dress parade . . . " 241
Portable cooking stoves used in the Austrian army 241
Russian armored train 244
Siege gun used in the Austrian army . . 244
Turkish artillery . 253
Turkish infantry 253
Bulgarian army: Field Artillery, Field gun unlimbered ready for action,
Machine guns, Infantry at drill 257
British Territorials: the London Scottish at bayonet charge prac- tice 272
British cavalry: the Scots Greys 272
Sudanese infantry 277
Sikh infantry of the Indian army . 277
British regular army : Coldstream Guards in field uniform. . . . 284
Interior of a British ambulance train 284
British warship with starting platform for aeroplane 288
British aviation camp 288
Indian cavalryman with campaign kit 290
XIV The Great War
PACING PAGE
Highlanders in service uniform 290
Canadians at bayonet practice 293
British marines at heliograph practice 293
Map of France, showing how the country is divided into districts for the purposes of command, administration, and recruiting of
the army 295
French tank motor-trucks for carrying pure water 298
French army pontoons 298
French infantry in field kit at army maneuvers 300
Turcos: French Colonial forces 300
French artillery : A 75 millimeter rapid-fire field gun with
caisson 3°3
French motor-trucks drawing heavy artillery and ammunition
wagons 3°5
French 200 millimeter (8-inch) howitzer mounted on specially con- structed railway carriage 305
Range finding with the telemeter as used in the French army . . . 309
Field telegraph as used by the French army 309
Troop of Cossacks 316
Russian infantry 316
Siberian infantry 341
Russian artillery 341
Heavy Serbian artillery 348
Serbian commissary train 348
Code message on wing of Belgium carrier pigeon 353
Collapsible observation tower as used by the German army . . . 353
Belgian rapid-fire guns in carts drawn by dogs 357
Belgian battery screened by woods 357
Italian cavalry in training 364
Italian Alpine Chasseurs 364
Italian armored automobile 368
Belgian armored automobile 368
British battleship Dreadnought 372
British battleship Iron Duke 372
British battleship Agincourt (ex Birinji Osman) 372
German battleship Thuringen 375
List of Illustrations XV
FACING PAGE
German battleship Nassau 375
German battle-cruiser Moltke 375
French battleship Paris 378
French battleship Bouvet 378
Italian battleship Dante Alighieri 378
Shipping a torpedo on board the French submarine Xiphia . . .381
Submarine running submerged, with periscope exposed 381
Destroyer Swift, the fastest vessel in the British navy 385
British mine-layer Iphigenia 385
British battle-cruiser Lion in a 32,000 ton floating dry dock . . . 385
French submarine Pa/afois 388
Type of English submarine 388
Sir George Paish 397
David Lloyd George 397
The British Foreign Office, London 400
The Bank of England 400
Line waiting in the courtyard of the Bank of England to change
notes into gold during the first week of August, 1914 . . . 404
Crowds in financial district, London, during the days of tension . . 404
Map of Europe 408
Crowd waiting to draw money from the Imperial Bank, Berlin . .413
An officer of infantry reading the announcement of war in Berlin . 413
P. L. Bark 417
Carl Helfferich 417
Reading the proclamation of a moratorium in front of the Royal
Exchange, London 421
Enthusiastic Frenchmen on the streets of Paris singing patriotic
songs after the declaration of war 421
Notice posted in London calling up Austro-Hungarian reservists . . 428 Placard posted August 1, 19 14, ordering general mobilization to be- gin the next day in France 428
Russian reservists leaving to join the colors 432
German army and navy reservists obeying the order of mobiliza- tion 432
Regiment of Canadian "Highlanders" on its way to mobilization
camp at Valcartier . 437
XVI The Great War
FACING PAGE
Troops marching through Vienna in July, 19 14 437
German warship in course of construction at the Krupp works,
Kiel 439
The French first class battleship Normandie in construction at
Saint-Nazaire 439
Map showing German army corps areas 442
German fleet anchored in Kiel Bay 444
British fleet anchored off Portsmouth 444
Map showing German advantage in strategic railways on the eastern
frontier 448
British Expeditionary Force: a regiment of Highlanders marching
through Boulogne 452
PREFACE
The subject with which this volume deals is twofold. The mention of material forces and their mobilization in the contents of a history of a mighty war conveys at once an approximately adequate notion of the intended treat- ment. An examination of the armament and military establishments of the belligerent powers, which forms a natural part of the history of any war, becomes an indis- pensable feature of a comprehensive account of the present conflict, by reason of the astounding progress in the methods and equipment of warfare accomplished in recent years, which very few persons outside the military profession have had the leisure or inclination to follow intelligently. This part of the subject requires neither apology nor explanation.
A few words of explanation are required, however, to indicate the character and scope of the treatment of the moral forces.
Our study of the motives and causes of the war does not alone afford a satisfactory picture of the intense, palpitating currents of human life and emotion during the memorable days before, and at the commencement of, the gigantic struggle. The subject-matter of the first volume may be regarded as the anatomy of history. It remains for us in this present volume to endeavor to invest the structure with the quality of life, by representing the reaction of human feeling in response to the impression of the
XVII
XVIII The Great War
momentous events, the nature and force of the opinion of different classes of the population in the countries to which the conflict spread, the spiritual forces which gave vigor and buoyancy to national effort, and the action of these factors in cabinet councils, the elaboration of policy, and parliamentary proceedings. The scope of the first volume was necessarily confined to the irreducible minimum re- quired for the treatment of the essential motives and of the causes and their operation. The present volume should expand our view to enable us to contemplate with deeper sympathy and broader intelligence the ineffaceable expe- rience through which the moral life, the social conscious- ness of the nations of Europe, passed in the midsummer days of 1914.
Since the beginning of the war the different belligerent governments have published collections, more or less in- clusive, of their official correspondence, containing nego- tiations, exchanges of views, and observations of all kinds which preceded the initial stage of hostilities. These col- lections have made their respective appearances in the British Blue Book, French Yellow Book, Belgian Gray Book, German White Book, Russian Orange Book, Austro- Hungarian Red Books, Serbian Blue Book, and Italian Green Book. These and other available contemporary documents have been employed in the investigation of the motives and causes of the war. These same sources must again be brought into requisition for the inquiry which we are about to undertake, and in addition we shall have frequent recourse to expressions and illustrations of opinion and feeling recorded in the press and the periodical litera- ture of the different countries.
It is obviously impossible to treat this branch of the sub- ject in an exhaustive sense, as its extent is almost boundless. Besides, no arbitrary line of demarcation can be drawn
Preface XIX
between the province of this volume and that of the first. It will be a constant aim to free the path from needless difficulties by discretion in the choice of evidence which is representative, characteristic, and suggestive, and by which consistent and enduring impressions will be most readily produced.
An insensible or indolent disposition may seek to gain a cheap reputation for critical sagacity by postponing indefi- nitely the examination of every question connected with the motives, impulses, and responsibility of the different nations with the specious excuse that the evidence at hand is inadequate, misleading, or part of a play intended to deceive the public. The same argument might just as appropriately be used in an attempt to prove that a deci- sion in any current question, such as the tariff or "pre- paredness," should be postponed until all temptation to dissimulation had disappeared with the disappearance of the practical importance of the question at issue. The war is the dominating fact of the present generation. Neutrality cannot escape its far-reaching consequences. But to understand the problems which it has created and to appreciate its enduring effect upon the life of humanity, we must exert ourselves at once to form an estimate of the human forces by which it was generated and carried on. That the evidence is partly obscure should stimulate us to greater effort and acuteness of method, not drive us to discouragement.
Although it is perfectly obvious that much of the possi- ble data for the inquiry undertaken in this present volume must remain hidden for a long time, and that many of the documents which we do possess are misleading, the cir- cumstances have, by way of compensation, rendered much of the available evidence unusually trustworthy. If the critical period had continued as many months as its actual
XX The Great War
duration in days, much of the evidence would probably have been less transparent. As it was, diplomacy and the organs of public opinion were caught off their guard. The compression of such a tremendous storm of mental or spiritual anguish into a few short days, when the strain was almost too great for human endurance, hardly allowed time to adjust the mask of composure and dissimulation. Such incidents as the midnight interviews of the German Chancellor and Sir Edward Goschen and of Count Pourtales and M. Sazonoff, and the final interviews of Sir Edward Goschen and Baron Beyens with the German Chancellor and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs respectively are a peculiar product of the frenzied precipitation of events. We are informed that it was customary for the ancient Germans to debate when intoxicated and vote when they had become sober. Thus they deliberated when conceal- ment and misrepresentation were impossible, and decided when error was improbable. In the more urgent delibera- tions before the Great War intense mental anguish pro- duced the effect of physical stimulants. In some of those terrific moments the delirium of eagerness and anxiety laid bare the heart of diplomacy and drew forth impulsive utter- ances, formed without premeditation, which are faithful indications of the innermost hopes and fears, thoughts and impressions. Few and transitory as these occasions were, they furnish us some historical documents of unimpeach- able authenticity.
Despite the terrible bloodshed and appalling destruction of the Great War, the present age is not without some compensating advantages which reflection will from time to time reveal. Prominent among them is the insight which it gives us into the souls of nations. With ordinary condi- tions the study of national, or racial, psychology has been a rather futile, unsatisfactory pursuit, in which the investigator
Preface XXI
too often lost himself in a jungle of trivial, inconclusive facts, or rose into the rarer atmosphere of visionary, un- critical generalities. Serious scholars hesitated to regard such performances as scientific. The strikingly faulty pre- dictions made by several of the nations about the effect of the war on their opponents are an example of the difficulty of penetrating to the hidden springs of national character.
The great crisis suddenly illuminated the whole field of national temperament with brilliant, scrutinizing flashes of light. In the instinctive reaction of national feeling under the mighty forces released by the explosion, a reliable basis for empiric observation has been created. By living the experience of a few supremely fateful days with the nations involved, we are admitted to their intimacy. Characteristics of which the nations themselves were unconscious are revealed to us. Our imagination, sensibility, and recep- tivity are stimulated. Our spirits are purified, as in tragedy, through a vicarious experience, by the great feelings, ela- tion, pity, and terror, aroused by the contemplation of the stupendous forces, their blind, ungovernable violence and fearful collisions.
It is a purpose of the present work to avoid two failings into one or the other of which many narratives of military occurrences are allowed to drift. Some authors are so en- grossed in the political significance of the events that their account of military operations is hopelessly general, abstract, indefinite; deprived of vitalizing contact with the actual facts and movements by which the results were produced. Other writers, yielding to a personal inclination of a differ- ent sort, conduct the bewildered reader into such a maze of mostly unintelligible and unexplained detail, that he loses breadth of vision for the larger reality.
As a timely precaution against such unfortunate devi- ations we shall set out on our course with the steadying
XXII The Great War
ballast of clear, concise accounts of military and naval mat- ters. Captain Henry C. Whitehead, U.S.A., and Admiral F. E. Chadwick, U. S. N., are authorities in their respective subjects, and the value of their succinct, well-balanced descriptions of the military and naval establishments of Europe will be appreciated at once by anyone who has not been content with the barest framework of informa- tion on these fundamental topics. With the literature available for the non-professional reader in even our lead- ing libraries it is easier to obtain a comprehensive store of knowledge about the ancient Roman army of Trajan than about the contemporary army, let us say, of William II. A definite survey of the actual military and naval establish- ments of Europe gains in importance by the probability that they will be the basis, in consequence of the expe- rience of the present war, for an evolution no less far- reaching than that which we anticipate in the field of political and social organization.
George H. Allen, Ph.D.
THE MORAL FORCES
CHAPTER I
The Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires
The archduke's recklessness and popular animosity. British opinion of Serbia. Mr. Trevelyan's testimony. Serbia's attitude after the Sarajevo outrage. Austrian opinion in July, 1914 ; Count Tisza, Herr von Tschirscky. The Viennese public and the rupture with Serbia. German discontent with the settlement of 1911. The contest in armaments. The alleged secret report of March 13, 1913. The attitude of various classes in Germany regarding foreign relations. "If I were Kaiser." The news of the Austro- Serbian rupture in Berlin. The great crisis in German policy ; the extraor- dinary council at Potsdam on the evening of July 29, 1914; the midnight interviews and communications. Warlike enthusiasm in Berlin. The historic session of the Reichstag, August 4th ; the Kaiser's and Chancel- lor's speeches and the Social Democratic response.
An act of temerity furnished the occasion for the fatal event that set in motion the train of occurrences, which, releasing stores of accumulated enmity in their impulsive course, pressed quickly forward to Armageddon. In reck- less defiance of the Serbian nationalist sentiment, the Arch- duke Francis Ferdinand persisted, in spite of the warning that a plot had been formed against his life, in visiting Sarajevo with his gifted consort, the Duchess of Hohen- berg, on the fateful Sunday, June 28th, which was the anniversary of the Battle of Kossovo, when the old Serbian Empire was shattered by the Turkish host in 1389. This occasion is celebrated by the Serbs as a commemoration of national tradition and solidarity. The rashness of the archduke tempted him to pass through the streets of the metropolis of a province where an element of the popu- lation regarded itself as subjugated and oppressed and
looked upon him as the embodiment and support of the
l
2 The Great War
tyranny which it endured, on a day which recalled the actual Greater Serbia of a long distant past, emphasized by contrast the injustice and humiliation of the present situa- tion and visualized the national unity of the future to which the Serbian stock so earnestly aspires. His presence in Sarajevo on that day was a challenge; and to credit subse- quent official investigation, it would appear that the Heir Presumptive of the Hapsburg dominions was a doomed victim of his own audacity from the time that he entered Bosnia. It is related that a bomb was found near the scene of the assassination, that two others were discovered under the table at which the archduke was to have taken his luncheon, and that another was brought to light from the chimney of the apartment assigned to the duchess. The railway, moreover, had been mined with dynamite.
We have considered the consequences of this abominable crime in so far as they have a directly causative relation with the subsequent orgy of slaughter by which atonement for it was sought. It is our present purpose to examine the ensuing occurrences as they relate more intimately to the lives and feelings of the different peoples. It is a curious coincidence that England's greatest authority on the history of her common law once alluded to two of Great Britain's present allies as "the despised Russia and the contemptible Serbia," voicing, it is true, with a trace of irony a popular prejudice of thirty years ago. Nations change in the course of a generation, but opinions about them may change with far greater rapidity. A distin- guished writer, Mr. George Macaulay Trevelyan, the author of well-known works on Garibaldi and the struggle for Italian unity, actuated by the supposed analogy between the Serbia of to-day and the Piedmont of yesterday in their relation with Austria, made a first-hand investigation of conditions in Serbia during the winter and early spring
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 3
of 1915. He describes the Serbian nation as a "rare exam- ple of a purely democratic society," and depicts for us a country peopled with independent peasant proprietors, free from the extremes of pauperism and wealth, without social questions and their attendant discord, with "no politics except patriotism, no loyalty except to their country." Serbia's only deficiency, as it would seem, is a natural consequence of her essential element of social soundness. For in this primitive, democratic community political lead- ership is necessarily improvised. The administration suffers from the lack of a class who are equipped by their tradi- tions and environment for the public service.
The public ceremonies for the anniversary of Kossovo, which was being celebrated with unusual pomp in the principal Serbian towns, were officially suspended on the evening of June 28th, when news of the outrage in Sara- jevo had been received. But the Austro-Hungarian consuls reported that the people made no effort to conceal their satisfaction. In some places, as it appears, the crime was discussed in public, on the streets and in the cafes, with such undisguised expressions of delight as violated every consideration of decency. It is not surprising, in view of the exasperation engendered by friction between the two countries, and the repeated thwarting of Serbian ambitions, that among a people of rather primitive, unsophisticated ways of thought and expression, a foul murder even, with the political significance of the archduke's assassination, should have transformed a national festival into a carnival of popular hatred.
But whatever may have been the attitude of the Serbian people, the government seems to have been apprehensive of serious consequences from the awful crime, and to have taken special pains for maintaining an irreproachable attitude. Thus on June 30th, M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
4 The Great War
{Minister at Vienna, informed Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, that the Serbian government condemned most vigorously the out- rage committed at Sarajevo, and that they were prepared to do all in their power to prove that they would not per- mit this hostile agitation in Serbia. An anxious interchange of communications followed between the Serbian minister in Vienna and his home government, in which M. Yovano- vitch reported the hostile demonstrations in Vienna and the threatening tone of the greater part of the press, which immediately connected the Sarajevo atrocity with promi- nent circles in Serbia. But the Austro-Hungarian govern- ment, for its part, protested against the violent sentiments displayed in the Belgrade papers. A press war, we may conclude, preceded the outbreak of actual hostilities be- tween the two countries by about a month. The Serbian minister reported on July 3d that the Austrian press gener- ally represented the conspirators as Serbs, although before this they had scrupulously employed the distinctive terms die Bosniaken and die bosnische Sprache for the Bosnians and their language.
The funeral ceremonies of the Russian Ambassador Hart- wig, who died suddenly while at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Belgrade, were celebrated on July 14th. He had been regarded as the very soul of the Panslavist prop- aganda in the Balkan States, and the Austrian press dis- seminated the report that excesses were committed at the time of the funeral against Austro-Hungarian subjects; but the Serbian Prime Minister denied absolutely the truth of this rumor.
The ominous silence of the Austro-Hungarian govern- ment naturally excited speculation as to its policy with regard to the Sarajevo crime. M. Yovanovitch reported that the choice lay between two courses, either to regard
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 5
the outrage as a domestic incident and invite the friendly cooperation of Serbia in discovering and punishing the guilty, or to treat it as justification for a vigorous hostile action against Serbia. In fact the Serbian minister in Vienna practically forecast the course of Austria-Hungary as early as July 15th.
In consequence, probably, of the premonitions proceed- ing from M. Yovanovitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, M. Pashitch, sent identical instructions to the Serbian diplo- matic representatives in the different capitals providing them with evidence of Serbia's correct attitude, citing, for instance, the condolences of the Serbian royal family, the offer of the Serbian government to surrender to the Austro- Hungarian authorities any Serbian subjects who might be implicated in guilt, Serbia's manifest desire to maintain friendly relations with her neighbor, and the failure of the Austro-Hungarian government to apply for Serbian assistance.
There was probably a conflict of views in influential circles in Vienna as to the proper course to be followed, and at first a period of indecision resulted. The former associates of the murdered archduke, the leaders of the clerical and military groups, above all those who were not resigned to allowing Serbia to keep the place which she had won in the Balkan Wars, regarded an energetic foreign policy as indispensable for the healthy existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. They dreamed of cleansing the state of its domestic impurities through the generous agency of the currents of patriotic enthusiasm which would be set in motion by a brilliant progress of expansion. They believed that national honor and considerations of expedi- ency alike required the adoption of drastic measures against Serbia. A very large popular element, and very likely the majority of the middle classes, who had suffered loss and
6 The Great War
annoyance through two partial mobilizations occasioned by Serbia's turbulent pretensions, were prepared to wel- come the idea of radical measures. They regarded a final squaring of accounts with the troublesome neighbor with a feeling of anticipated relief.
The program of forcible action found a powerful advo- cate in Count Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary. Some even believe that he was the decisive factor in bringing about the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Count Stephen Tisza is the head of a Calvinistic minority in Roman Catholic Hungary. He was born in 1864 and entered parliament in 1886, where he rapidly won the influ- ence which intense conviction and indomitable energy invariably command. We find him leader of the Liberal party and prime minister in 1903. He was overthrown by a coalition and passed the years 1906-1910 in retirement.
Count Tisza is the champion of uncompromising Mag- yarism, of the historic rights of Hungarian national supremacy within the historic boundaries of the territory of the Hungarian Crown. When he became prime min- ister again, after the crisis on the question of the suffrage in 1912, a new opposition party committed to a democratic franchise reform was organized under Count Andrassy. Count Tisza is an all-round redoubtable combatant — in the parliament, where he acts with brutal determination, eject- ing by force, on one occasion, the entire opposition, who had brought matters to an absolute deadlock by their persistent obstructionist methods, and on the field of honor, where he is the hero of many sabre duels. Count Tisza, the most conspicuous individual in Austria-Hungary, is a character who will not permit himself to be slighted in our narrative. There is every reason to believe that the aged emperor desired to maintain the peaceful tradition of his reign, unbroken since 1866, and end his days in tranquillity. His
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 7
proclamation to his people issued after the Sarajevo out- rage, ascribing the crime to a misguided fanatic, contained no reference to a hostile conspiracy, no implication of Serbian complicity. The unobtrusive character of the murdered archduke's obsequies is probably due to the emperor's refusal to sanction a pompous ceremony which might have occasioned a formidable hostile demonstration. It was at first reported that the Kaiser and the King of Spain would both be present at the funeral; but these plans were quietly dropped.
We learn of a council of ministers in Vienna on July 13th, when the consequences of the Sarajevo outrage were discussed at great length. The fact that the Foreign Min- ister, Count Berchtold, went at once to Ischl, the emperor's summer residence, to report the results of these delibera- tions, is an indication of their importance, and some of the circumstances suggest the conjecture that this meeting was a turning point, that from this time the party advocating forcible measures was in the ascendancy.
A report by M. Yovanovitch a day or two later furnishes a significant hint. The minister said: "Rumors from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse (location of German Foreign Office, as well as Chancellor's Palace) did not approve of Austria's policy on this question (Austro- Serbian relations) and that Herr von Tschirscky (German ambassador in Vienna) has exceeded the instructions given to him." The existence of convincing evidence to prove Herr von Tschirscky's extreme views and violent Slavo- phobia raises this statement above the level of mere political gossip. The French ambassador in Vienna, for example, reported that the German ambassador showed himself to be a partisan of violent resolutions, while will- ingly allowing it to be understood that the German imperial
8 The Great War
chancellery might not be in complete agreement with him on this point.
We may assume that Herr von Tschirscky from the first animated and encouraged the group in Austria-Hungary which demanded vigorous measures, and this leads to the further conjecture that this group shared the opinion, which he is known to have held, that Russia would not go to war in defense of Serbia, and that a vigorous program respecting the latter could be put into execution by sudden action before the powers had recovered from their surprise. This explains the quite evident endeavor to dispel the apprehension and suspicion of the other powers and their diplomatic representatives at Vienna.
As early as July 11th, Count Tisza replying to an inter- pellation of the opposition in the Hungarian parliament expressed himself in a deliberately obscure manner. The press, in so far as it was amenable to official inspiration, became more moderate in tone.
The Russian ambassador left for his vacation in the country on July 21st in consequence of reassuring declara- tions made to him at the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
But the undercurrent of half-suppressed excitement and anxiety was not diminished. It required no unusual acuteness to perceive that the political atmosphere was electric. The apparent tranquillity was the oppressive, disquieting stillness of the sultry day that precedes the storm. The Bourse reflected the prevailing spirit of uneasiness. As early as July 10th, Hungarian four per cent public securities reached the lowest price ever quoted on the Buda-Pesth stock exchange since they were first issued.
A French consular report on general conditions in Austria-Hungary predicted on July 20th many of the most
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 9
conspicuous features of the note to Serbia. It added the observation:
"There is here, as in Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict on a general scale — in other words, a conflagration. The governing idea probably is that it is necessary to start before Russia can have finished the great improvement of her army and of her railways, and before France has overhauled her military organization.
" But here there is not agreement in high circles. Count Berchtold and the diplomats want at most a localized opera- tion against Serbia, but everything has to be considered possible — everything. I have been struck by a curious fact. Generally, the official telegraph agency, in its sum- maries of the views of the foreign press, disregards all but the official newspapers and the more important organs; it omits all quotations and all mention of the others0 This is a rule and a tradition. For the last ten days the official agency has daily supplied to the press of Austria-Hungary a complete review of the whole Serbian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest and most insignificant newspapers, which, owning to their very insig- nificance, use language which is freer, more daring, more aggressive, and frequently insulting. The object of this work of the official agency is evidently to arouse opin- ion, to create an opinion favorable to war. The fact is significant." '
This allusion to the activity of the press bureau has been quoted because it has created considerable comment. While significant, its importance as proof of a deliberate plan of inflaming animosity by employing such effective agencies for exercising popular influence as the press has perhaps been exaggerated. The impending crisis might naturally lend an interest to the opinions of many Serbian papers whose contents would ordinarily be an object of
10 The Great War
absolute indifference to Austrian readers. On the eve of a possible intervention of the United States in Mexico we are supplied with a selection of quotations from the col- umns of newspapers in Latin America of whose very existence we have hitherto been entirely ignorant.
Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Ser- bia, reported from Belgrade on the 21st that contempt had been added to hatred, since the Serbian press encour- aged the belief that in its political evolution the Austro- Hungarian monarchy had reached an advanced stage of impotence and disintegration.
Observations, he said, led him to the inevitable conclu- sion that "a settlement with Serbia, involving a war not only for the preservation of Austria-Hungary's position as a great power, but even for her very existence, cannot be permanently avoided.
" In the view of an official representative of the Austro- Hungarian government, who is observing events on the spot, the realization is inevitable that we cannot afford to permit any further diminution of our prestige.
"Should we decide to make far-reaching demands, with effective control of their execution (and such measures alone could clean the Augean Stable of Greater Serbian intrigues), we would have to consider all possible conse- quences. From the very outset we must be firmly resolved to persevere in our attitude.
"Half measures, demands, endless debating, and finally a foul compromise, would be the hardest blow to Austria- Hungary's authority in Serbia and her standing as a great power in Europe."
It is said the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia was mainly the work of Count Forgach, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, who had formerly been am- bassador at Belgrade, when he is credited with having
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 11
procured forged documents which formed the basis of the charges against the Croatian deputies that led to the famous Friedjung Trial described in Volume I, page 198. It is reported, moreover, that the German ambassador in Vienna collaborated with Count Forgach in drawing up the momentous message to Serbia. The excessive haste with which measures implying hostilities were put into execution by the Austro-Hungarian authorities as soon as the time-limit granted to Serbia had expired, on July 25th, has been interpreted as showing that Austria-Hungary was determined in any case upon a rupture with Serbia, and that the presentation of the note was a merely specious indication of a disposition to settle the matter by peaceful negotiation.
On the same evening, for instance, the Chief of the Serbian General Staff, General Putnik, was arrested at Kelenfold, a junction point near Buda-Pesth, as he was returning to Belgrade with his daughter after a sojourn at Gleichenberg, an Austrian watering-place. He was placed in custody and examined, but released after a day or two.
A more striking indication of inordinate haste was the expeditious departure of Baron Giesl from Belgrade after the receipt of the Serbian reply. He had doubtless been instructed to sever diplomatic relations with Serbia straight- way, if the response to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum should not be satisfactory. The response was placed in his hands at 5.58 in the afternoon of the 25th and he dis- covered its unsatisfactory character, notified the Serbian Foreign Office accordingly, and left with his suite by the 6.30 train for Buda-Pesth. His instructions prescribed that any but an absolute, literal acceptance of the Austro- Hungarian note as a whole, should be rejected. All the preparations for departure at the Austro-Hungarian Em- bassy must have been already executed in anticipation of an
12 The Great War
unsatisfactory answer. There had been unmistakable indi- cations during the course of the day, it is true, that the Serbians themselves did not expect that their reply would be accepted and lead to a peaceful settlement. Baron Giesl had learned that the court train was being made ready, and that the money of the national bank and of the railways and the archives of the foreign office were being removed to the interior of the country. The garrison left town in field equipment, and many sanitary convoys were sent off in a southerly direction. Above all, general mobi- lization was ordered at three in the afternoon, and a few hours later the government removed to Nish, where the Skupschtina was summoned to meet the next day.
The news that the Serbian reply was not acceptable and that diplomatic relations had been broken off was received with an unparalleled outburst of patriotic enthusiasm in Vienna. Crowds paraded the principal avenues during the evening of the 25th singing patriotic songs, and congre- gated in front of the War Office and the Foreign Office. Attempted hostile demonstrations before the Russian Em- bassy and the Serbian Legation were prevented by the police. The temper displayed by the people in the capitals and other large cities showed the popularity of the idea of a war with Serbia.
In obtaining a comprehensive perception of the more important threads in the web of diplomatic intercourse which preceded the war, it is necessary to examine some conspicuous incidents bearing upon the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia. It may be recalled that the German Foreign Office favored a direct exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg as an alternative for Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation by four powers, with which the German government was not willing to concur. The friendly conversation between M. Sazonoff
The Hofburg, Vienna, offices of the Ministry of War.
The French Embassy, Vienna.
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 13
and Count Szapary, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, on July 26th, will serve as a convenient start- ing point.
M. Sazonoff agreed that Austria-Hungary's professed goal was legitimate, but he feared that her path was not the surest. Four of the ten demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note were either impractical or incom- patible with the independent sovereignty of Serbia; as for the others, with some minor changes in form, it would not be difficult to find a basis of agreement. Consequently, M. Sazonoff instructed the Russian ambassador in Vienna to request that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg "should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views with him in order to redraft some points in the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia."
Immediately after his return to Vienna from leave of absence, M. Schebeko submitted M. SazonofT's request to Count Berchtold. But the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister informed him that, since Austria-Hungary had de- cided to take a decisive step in connection with her dispute with Serbia, she could not retract and enter into a discus- sion of the note. Public opinion would rebel against such a proceeding even if the government consented to it. This reply, communicated to the Russian Foreign Ministry on the same day as Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia, was interpreted in the sense that Austria-Hungary refused to continue an exchange of views with regard to her conflict, and this chagrined M. Sazonoff very much.
A hint from Count Pourtales, German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, induced Count Szapary to endeavor to dispel M. SazonofT's misgivings by repeating that Austria- Hungary had no intention of annexing Serbian territory or infringing the independent sovereignty of Serbia. M. Sazo- noff said that he was convinced of Austria-Hungary's
14 The Great War
sincerity as far as Serbian territory was concerned, but that to force on Serbia some of the conditions in the note would reduce her to a vassal state.
Count Pourtales on July 29th reported to his own govern- ment M. Sazonoff's disappointment at Austria-Hungary's attitude. A candid examination of the evidence which is available tends to show that at this time the Kaiser and his government were going as far as was compatible with their conception of the duty of an ally to bring about an understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Un- fortunately there is almost no positive evidence of unim- peachable authenticity to enlighten us as to the nature of Germany's efforts in this direction.
Von Mach remarks: "If the Chancellor says that Ger- many was using her good offices in Vienna, this is as valuable a bit of evidence as the reprint of a dispatch in the White Paper (British Blue Book), unless we wish to impugn his veracity, in that case the copy of a dispatch would be valueless, for he might have forged it."
While the statement of von Mach is true in a general sense, nevertheless, assuming the credibility of both, the dispatch will usually have more historical value than a general declaration such as that of the Chancellor, because it is more specific. It tends to show in what particular manner the influence of one power was exerted on another.
One document, at least, a dispatch that the German For- eign Office claims to have sent to the German ambassador in Vienna on July 30th, may be cited as evidence for Ger- many's pacific action. This message is not included in the German White Book. It was communicated to the Berlin correspondent of the Westminster Gazette on August 1st. Its authenticity has been attacked, but it seems probable that it was a genuine part of the correspondence. The text is as follows:
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 15
"The report of Count Pourtales does not harmonize with the account which your Excellency has given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian government.
"Apparently there is a misunderstanding which I beg you to clear up.
"We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia with which she is in a state of war.
"The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Peters- burg would be a grave mistake.
"We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty.
"As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not re- specting our advice.
"Your Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness."
The Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold, is reported to have replied that there was, in effect, a misunderstanding, and that the Austro- Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg had already re- ceived instructions to renew conversations with M. Sazonoff.
On the same day that the above-mentioned dispatch was transmitted to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, Count Berchtold had a long interview with M. Schebeko, and their conversation, conducted in a friendly tone, was greeted in diplomatic circles as a very auspicious omen. Count Berchtold expressed his willingness that the ex- change of views should be resumed in St. Petersburg; they had been interrupted, as he explained, in consequence of a misunderstanding on his part as to the scope which M. Sazonoff wished to attribute to them.
Reference has been made in the first volume (page 245) to the general impression that Austria-Hungary yielded at the last, and that the belligerent attitude of Germany thwarted the pacific effect of this conciliatory departure in
16 The Great War
the policy of her ally. By yielding, we understand a will- ingness on the part of Austria-Hungary to submit her note to a revision. The opinion was expressed in the first vol- ume that such a recession on the part of Austria-Hungary was very improbable. The question may now be investi- gated upon a broader basis of documentary evidence. It is a problem of fundamental importance for the apprecia- tion of the psychological forces behind the great war. Was Austria-Hungary at the end dragged into the war, an unwilling partner, as some believe, or did her rulers follow a consistently voluntary policy throughout? The answer is involved in the problem before us.
The opinion that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg had conveyed to the Russian Foreign Office the willingness of the Dual Monarchy to submit its quarrel with Serbia to international discussion was disseminated by dispatches from M. Sazonoff to the Russian diplomatic representatives in the principal capitals. It appeared that this very important communication had been made in an interview on the evening of July 31st. It was inferred that Austria-Hungary was ready to consent to a revision of her demands. But the report took on a variation in tone according to chance circumstances of transmission or the temperamental differences of the individuals through whom it passed. Some of its distinctions in version are puzzling.
One instance will suffice as an example. According to the British diplomatic correspondence, as published, the counsellor of the Russian Embassy in London reported the substance of M. Sazonoff's communication of the 31st as follows:
"The Austro-Hungarian ambassador declared the readi- ness of his government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. M. Sazonoff replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that
m,m
The houses of Parliament, London.
The Reichstag, Berlin.
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 17
the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.
"M. Sazonoff hoped that the British government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop pro- visionally to her military action on Serbian territory."
In this form the report has an optimistic air. But the corresponding entry in the Russian Orange Book in M. Sazonoff's words has the following tenor:
"I have requested the British ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he had adopted in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present situation need not yet be abandoned.
"I also requested him to inform the British minister that in my opinion it was only in London that the discus- sion might still have some faint chance of success and of rendering the necessary compromise easier for Austria."
Unless it should be assumed that the Russian govern- ment has withheld a more significant dispatch, this message would indicate that the interview in St. Petersburg on the evening of July 31st was unimportant; and this view is supported by a report of the British ambassador in Russia. Sir George Buchanan telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey on August 1st that M. Sazonoff had had an interview with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador the evening before, but that the latter, "not being definitely instructed by his govern- ment, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria- Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia." M. Sazonoff had to remind him that "the real question which they had to solve at the time was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to
18 The Great War
the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent state."
In sifting the correspondence that passed between Count Szapary and Count Berchtold we find a telegram from the former dated the 31st, acknowledging the latter's com- munication of the 30th, in which the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister had authorized the continuation of the conversations in St. Petersburg. Count Szapary stated that he had already at his own initiative resumed conversations with SazonofT, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially approximated to each other. There is no mention in this telegram of any conversation with M. SazonofT subsequent to the receipt of Count Berchtold's instructions of the 30th.
Another dispatch from Count Szapary dated August 1st reported that he had visited M. SazonofT on the same day and had informed him that he had received instruc- tions from Vienna (still those of July 30th, apparently) which he transmitted to him with the reservations imposed by his ignorance of the subsequent attitude created in Vienna by the general Russian mobilization. He had in- formed M. SazonofT that Count Berchtold was prepared to submit the text of the note to discussion as far as its inter- pretation was concerned. M. SazonofT had expressed satisfaction and suggested that the negotiations should be carried on in London. Count Szapary had replied that Count Berchtold had assumed direct contact in St. Peters- burg and he was not in a position to commit himself as to London.
One is tempted to ascribe this message to the 31st and identify the interview described in it as the conversation of the evening of the 31st to which such a striking character has been attributed, assuming an error in the date as pub- lished in the Red Book. In any case the dispatch reveals
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 19
no inclination to accept a revision of the demands made to Serbia.
All the evidence thus far considered refers back, as we have seen, to the position taken by Count Berchtold on the 30th. Leading German authorities regard the 30th as the focal point in Austria-Hungary's policy and Count Berchtold's expressions on that day as the convincing proof of Austria-Hungary's compliance and Russia's perfidy. Russia responded to Austria-Hungary's compromising attitude by a general mobilization, thereby making war inevitable. But there is nothing in our accounts of the proceedings on the 30th to prove that Austria-Hungary was willing to compromise. On the contrary, there is positive evidence that she was not prepared to modify her position with respect to Serbia in any essential point. Count Berchtold authorized Count Szapary to give M. Sazonoff any explanation he desired concerning the note to Serbia, but he added:
"In any case this could only take the form of subse- quent explanations as it was never our intention to depart in any way from the points contained in the note."
A seemingly more striking communication is reproduced in the Red Book with the date July 31st. In accord- ance with instructions from Herr von Jagow, Herr von Tschirscky, German Ambassador in Vienna, had com- municated to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the 30th the suggestion made by Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky on the 29th regarding mediation by four powers. That was the time when the British Foreign Secretary urged that the German government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four powers not directly concerned in the contro- versy could be used to prevent war. Accordingly, on the 31st, Count Berchtold sent the following instructions
20 The Great War
to Count Szogyeny, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin:
"I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary of State (for Foreign Affairs) for the com- munications made to us through Herr von Tschirscky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has since arisen through the mobiliza- tion of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir Edward Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia.
"The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude."
The text of this message was communicated likewise to the Austro-Hungarian ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg.
A thoughtful consideration of this dispatch will show that while its tone is conciliatory, it does not prove that the Vienna government receded in any essential point from its original position. The mere acceptance of mediation in itself did not bind the Austro-Hungarian government to submit to such terms as the mediating power or powers might suggest. The Austro-Hungarian rulers probably regarded the proposed mediation as a convenient channel for the transmission of Serbia's submission, and the adjust- ment of the details for the application of their demands.
This communication, even if it had contained a substan- tial concession, would probably have been too late to exert any decisive influence on the course of events.
Sacking the house ami destroying the furniture of a Serbian in Sarajevo.
The younger generation's enthusiastic reception in Berlin of the news of war.
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 21
The official Fremdenblatt in Vienna denied the supposed change in the Austro-Hungarian policy on September 25th in the following terms:
"The report of (Sir Maurice) de Bunsen, former British Ambassador in Vienna, of September 1, 1914, regarding the background of the present war, as published by the British government, contains the statement of his Rus- sian colleague that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Szapary, informed Minister Sazonoff that Austria-Hungary agreed to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which were incompatible with Serbian independence.
"As we learn from an authoritative source, this statement disagrees entirely with the facts. . . . The passage cited in the ambassador's report" is "due to a design of repre- senting the action of German diplomacy as the real cause of the outbreak of the war by alleging that Austria-Hungary adopted a yielding attitude. Such attempts cannot obscure the truth that Austria-Hungary and Germany harmonized in the desire to maintain the peace of Europe."
Our examination of the evidence leads to the following conclusions regarding the Austro-Hungarian attitude:
The Austro-Hungarian government promised to respect the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of Serbia.
It was prepared to interpret or explain the demands con- tained in the note to Serbia, and to accept the mediation of third parties for the negotiation of terms of peace with Serbia.
But it was not willing to depart in any essential respect from the demands contained in the note.
The folly of hasty conjectures has nowhere been more signally illustrated than in the prophecies that were made with such facility with regard to the fate of the Dual
22 The Great War
Monarchy. Austria-Hungary was described as "a ram- shackle empire, bound together by a rope of sand," which would fall to pieces from the impact of the first hostile blow. Germans even, while convinced of the ultimate victory of the Fatherland, sometimes predicted that the present world-war would result in the liquidation of the Hapsburg realm; and, at the news of the early Russian victories in Galicia, our own press did not hesitate to pro- claim the destruction of the monarchy's power of resistance and the defenselessness of Vienna.
Yet Prince Bismarck once declared that if Francis Joseph ever mounted his charger all the nationalities in his domin- ions, in spite of their mutual jealousies, would march in his train; and the course of events has in large measure confirmed the truth of his assertion. The bond of union has held against the repeated terrific blows. The common danger has brought a realization of common interests and of the advantages of political association. The tempest of war has apparently purified the political atmosphere. The fierce heat of conflict has fused to a large extent the hith- erto discordant sentiments of nationality.
In consequence of the tardy achievement of her national unity, and the correspondingly late development of her colonial aspirations, Germany's share in the exploitive areas of the earth was absurdly disproportionate to her greatness. The Welt-politik approved by the German gov- ernment since the closing years of the nineteenth century was the expression of a determination to arrest the tendency of closing the doors against the penetration of new lands by German enterprise and influence. Germany had indi- cated that she would not sanction a further reduction of the remaining independent area of the world in disregard of her interests or a curtailment of equal opportunity where it still existed.
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 23
This policy was undoubtedly approved by the intel- lectual, industrial, and commercial classes. It commended itself to the favor of the substantial, influential people generally throughout the country. The comprehen- sion of this fundamental doctrine is the key to Ger- many's attitude in relation to international questions before the war, and a very important factor in under- standing the spirit with which the German people entered into the struggle.
Persia and Morocco had been conspicuous examples of unappropriated exploitive areas. But no sooner had atten- tion been directed toward Persia as a promising field for German enterprise than Great Britain and Russia signed a convention by which they compromised their conflict- ing ambitions in Asia and particularly agreed to separate spheres of influence in Persia. This arrangement was regarded in Germany as a first, but definite, step towards the conversion of Persia into exclusive preserves. But Germany, in the Potsdam Conference between the Tsar and the Kaiser in 1910, recognized the existence of Rus- sia's special interests in Northern Persia, and contented herself with the withdrawal of Russia's opposition to the development of the Bagdad Railway, and her promise to construct a line from Teheran to Khanikin on the Turkish frontier for the purpose of linking the Bagdad Railway with the proposed Persian system.
The threatened absorption of Morocco had put the new Welt-politik to its first important test. The determined atti- tude of the German government resulted in the Algeciras Conference and the establishment of the principle of inde- pendence and the "open-door." Subsequent French en- croachments in Morocco led to the more drastic assertion of German policy, the Agadir incident in 1911. But in the ensuing negotiations Germany abandoned Moroccan
24 The Great War
independence in return for territorial compensations of doubtful value in the Congo.
If we survey the history of the last few years from the German point of view, considering especially the attitude of the German government in regard to Persia and Morocco, and bearing in mind that the chief concern of the German government is with the aspirations of the Ger- man people, we may be inclined to admit the sincerity of Germany's rulers in their repeated assertions that they had kept the peace in spite of serious provocations and difficulties.
The general feeling of disappointment aroused in Ger- many by the terms of settlement of the Moroccan difficulty in 1911 was an essential element in the psychological state of the German people in the years intervening before the Great War, as regards their attitude on the foreign situation. A feeling of annoyance and disillusionment penetrated all classes. Even the Socialists united their criticism with the reproaches of the other parties, although they regarded the government's mistakes as proof of the futility of Im- perialism, not as evidence of a lack of courage in sup- porting an expansionist policy.
German pride was wounded by the treaty of November 4, 1911, and a large part of the German people did not forgive the government for its alleged submission in the face of threats. They regarded the treaty as a humiliation, and looked upon the unexpected attitude of firmness ex- hibited by France as an unjustifiable impertinence.
Not only the chronological sequence of events, but the attitude of an overwhelming majority of the French people and the whole spirit of French political life in recent years, which has been largely absorbed in domestic conflicts and in policies utterly opposed to military aggran- dizement, prove that the reestablishment of three years'
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 25
service in France was solely the result of the unusual augmentation of the German military forces in 1913. Nevertheless, after these exceptional measures had been proposed, first in Germany and then in France, the Ger- man authorities turned the French program to account as an argument in urging the adoption of their own proposals.
Allusion has already been made to the shrewdness of the German government in manipulating public opinion in advance so as to make it responsive to the demand for unusual exertions. The series of centennial celebrations in commemoration of the heroic events of 1813 furnished an admirable opportunity of nerving patriotic enthusiasm for considerable sacrifices. The extraordinary exertions undertaken by the French made a profound impression in Germany. The Germans had become accustomed to regard the military inferiority of the French as an immu- table factor in all their calculations. The French intention of restoring a situation approaching military equality, by reinstituting compulsory service for three years, excited a feeling of irritation and annoyance; it was even looked upon as menacing and provocative. The semi-inspired Cologne Gazette declared in an article full of bitterness that the greatest danger appeared to threaten Germany from France.
The French Yellow Book contains under number 2 the text of an alleged official, secret German document, dated March 13, 1913, dealing with the strengthening of the German forces, which was submitted by the French Minister of War to his colleague of foreign affairs with the assertion that it was derived from a trustworthy source. The document contains the following striking passage:
"The idea that our armaments are a reply to the arma- ments and policy of the French must be instilled into the people. The people must be accustomed to think that an
26 The Great War
offensive war on our part is a necessity if we are to combat the adversary's provocations. We must act with prudence in order to arouse no suspicion, and so as to avoid the crisis which might damage our economic life. Things must be so arranged that under the weighty impression of powerful armaments, of considerable sacrifices, and of political tension, an outbreak shall be considered as a deliverance, because after it would come decades of peace and of prosperity, such as those which followed 1870."
The document emphasized the importance of an under- standing with the leaders of discontented factions in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco, so as to prepare revolutions which would break out simultaneously with a European war. It declared that the small states in Europe must be forced to side with Germany or be cowed. It expressed the opinion that the fortresses of Belgium and Holland could probably be rapidly conquered and neutralized, so as to preclude the possibility of a flank attack against Germany.
"In the south," it continued, "Switzerland forms an ex- tremely solid bulwark, and we can count on her defending her neutrality against France with energy, and thus pro- tecting this flank. As has been said above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwest frontier cannot be viewed in the same light. There the matter is vital for us, and the end towards which we should strive should be to take the offensive in great superiority from the outset. For this it will be necessary to concentrate a great army followed by strong forces of the Landwehr, which will lead the small states to follow us, or, at least, to remain inactive in the theatre of war, and which will crush them in the case of armed resistance. If these states could be persuaded to organize their system of fortifications in such a manner that they could make an effective protection
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 27
for our flank, the invasion plan might be given up. But for this it would also be necessary, particularly in Belgium, that the army should be reformed so that it might offer serious guarantees of effective resistance. If, on the other hand, that country's defensive organization were turned against us, which would give obvious advantages to our western adversary, we could not in any way offer Belgium any guarantee of the security of her neutrality."
We may compare with this statement of military policy the following remarks of General von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff:
"The commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor must be disregarded. When war has become necessary it must be waged by ranging all the chances on one's own side. Success alone justifies it. Germany cannot and must not give Russia time to mobilize, or she will be obliged to maintain on the eastern frontier a force which would leave her in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, in front of France. Therefore, we must fore- stall our principal adversary immediately there are nine chances in ten that we are going to have war, and we must begin war without waiting, in order brutally to crush all resistance.'*
The authenticity of the document quoted above has apparently not been challenged. While its significance must not be overestimated, judged by itself it is weightier evidence of bellicose intention than the documents discov- ered by the Germans in the Belgian archives.
Notwithstanding the impulsive attitude of military cir- cles, it is a fact that an overwhelming majority of the German people earnestly desired the maintenance of peace, so long as it was compatible with national honor and vital interests. The educated and influential classes generally regarded the cardinal principles of German Welt-politik
28 The Great War
as the indispensable guarantee for the preservation of these national interests.
There was, undoubtedly, an impetuous, noisy minority, even among civilians, composed of representatives of dif- ferent parties and classes, who held that the conditions required that Germany should precipitate events by inaug- urating a more aggressive policy leading to war. In the ranks of the hereditary nobility and large rural proprietors, the Junker-class, there were some who regarded the exist- ing situation as intolerable, the actual social and economic tendencies as subversive of their privileges and interests, and war as the only exit from a fatal impasse. The numer- ical strength of the nobility in the Reichstag had been steadily declining. Their representation fell from 162 in 1878, to 83 in 1898, and 57 in 1912, of whom only 27 identified themselves with the Conservatives. The process of democratization, although less advanced than in western Europe, was slowly but surely undermining the traditional authority of the Junkers, blighting their prestige by its profane touch. Experience has shown, moreover, that the patriotic fervor born in brilliant victories, by creating an excessive spirit of devotion to national ideals and preju- dices, strengthens traditional institutions and privileges.
The extreme Conservatives demanded a modification in the political franchise of the empire. This view is repre- sented in an interesting political monograph which appeared in 1912, entitled, "If I were Kaiser" {Wenn ich der Kaiser war), in which the author, Herr Frymann declared:
" Politically, the German nation is ill unto death. It can be saved only by an alteration of the constitution, and if the constitution cannot be altered owing to the opposition of parliament, then it must be altered notwithstanding the will of parliament, exactly as a father orders the surgeon to operate on a child against the child's will."
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Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 29
The author proposed that existing international antago- nisms be allowed to follow their natural course leading to war, which would invigorate the healthy, nationalist forces in Germany. He maintained that a successful war would result in a moral revival and the election of a Reichstag with a large patriotic majority. The government should take immediate advantage of this to secure an amend- ment of the constitution abolishing the present electoral basis of equal, universal suffrage, so as to guarantee in the future the political preponderance of the trustworthy, conservative forces, thoroughly imbued with nationalist principles.
To the ruling classes it must indeed haVe seemed that there was an alarming element of infection in the state, since they regarded the largest body of voters, by reason of their adherence to a certain party, as political outcasts, unworthy of association in the common bond of citizen- ship. The Kaiser once said of the Social Democrats:
"For me every Social Democrat is an enemy of the Empire and the Fatherland."
Prince von Biilow declares in his Imperial Germany that the Social Democratic movement is the antithesis of the Prussian state. He says:
"From first to last during my term of office I recog- nized that the Social Democratic movement constituted a great and serious danger. It is the duty of every German ministry to combat this movement until it is defeated or materially changed."
Social Democracy was uncompromisingly opposed to the spirit of the existing monarchy. It detested militarism, denounced the increase in armament, and ridiculed the policy of expansion.
The steady growth of the Social Democrats may be traced in the following table of the number of Socialist
30 The Great War
votes cast, and of the Socialist members returned to the Reichstag, at successive elections:
|
Date. |
Votes cast. |
Members returned. |
|
1884 |
550,000 |
24 |
|
1887 |
763,000 |
11 |
|
1890 |
1,427,000 |
35 |
|
1893 |
1,787,000 |
44 |
|
1898 |
2,107,000 |
56 |
|
1903 |
3,011,000 |
81 |
|
1907 |
3,539,000 |
43 |
|
1912 |
4,250,000 |
110 |
The results of the elections for the Reichstag in 1912 Were a cause of very grave concern for those who regarded the Social Democrats as dangerous enemies of the state. The position of the Social Democrats in the new chamber will be illustrated by a comparison of the numerical repre- sentation of the leading political groups and parties, as follows: Conservatives 45, Center 90, Poles 18, Alsace- Lorrainers 9, National Liberals 44, Radicals 41, Social Democrats 110. The Social Democrats controlled more than one-third of the entire number of votes cast at this, the last election before the war; and many persons cher- ished the fond conviction that the ever-diminishing margin between the actual strength of the Social Democrats and the attainment by them of an absolute majority in the Reichstag was the measure of the space which separated European society from the realization of enduring peace, not necessarily because they regarded the intentions of the German government as more belligerent than those of other states, but because it takes two parties to make a quarrel, and in any quarrel involving the Great Powers Germany must inevitably be the dominating factor on one side of the conflict. Therefore the elimination of Germany
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 31
as a potentially belligerent power through the agency of a Social Democratic majority would destroy the very ground- work for a great war.
Monster meetings were organized by the Socialists as a demonstration against the impending war. On the evening of July 29th no fewer than twenty-seven such meetings were reported in Berlin alone, with an aggregate attend- ance of 60,000, and the number rose to fifty on the evening before the declaration of war. This agitation spread to all parts of the country, but it had absolutely no influence on the course of events.
The world had been deluded by an exaggerated estimate of the effectiveness of Socialism as a force making for peace. Both the hopes and fears that had been enter- tained regarding the probable attitude of the Socialists everywhere turned out to be fictitious in the presence of war as a reality. The seeming contradiction between the Socialists' professions of passionate hostility to war and their meek compliance with the government's decision has been the subject of reproachful comment. One rea- son for their submission is the fact that the declaration of martial law, by severing communication between the dif- ferent countries, prevented the international cooperation of the Socialistic forces. Then, in general, the Socialists in each country regarded the war, in so far as it concerned themselves individually, as a defensive war and therefore not incompatible with their principles.
In Germany, as we shall presently see, the Social Demo- crats voted unanimously for the war appropriation in the Reichstag, although it is reported that Dr. Liebknecht and several others opposed this in the preliminary confer- ence when the attitude of the party was determined.
In explaining the position of the German Socialists it is necessary to observe that the situation at the outbreak of
32 The Great War
the war as viewed in Germany was most favorable to national solidarity of opinion, because it permitted the government to appear as the involuntary defender of the higher civilization against the hideous menace of Panslav- ism. Probably no other aspect of affairs could have rallied the sentiment of the rank and file of the Social Democrats so successfully to the support of the govern- ment's policy.
The warlike enthusiasm of a large portion of the Berlin populace was revealed by the spirit with which intelligence of the Austro-Hungarian note and the subsequent Serbian reply was received. On Saturday evening, July 25th, in spite of the pouring rain, crowds stood in front of the newspaper offices, especially in Unter den Linden, await- ing tidings of the Serbian response. Special editions of the papers announced the rupture at Belgrade, and when this news was disseminated, about 8.30, a crowd of young people paraded Unter den Linden, singing patriotic songs and shouting, "Long live war," and "Down with Serbia." They marched to the Siegessaule (Column of Victory), and offered their exulting respects before the Austro- Hungarian and Italian Embassies, including the famous Siegesallee (Avenue of Victory) in their route, where, like echoes from the dark recesses of the Tiergarten, came martial recollections of the victorious Hohenzollerns, who stand in a double row, at accurate intervals, in rigid white- ness, spectral monitors of an unbroken tradition — a much- criticised series of statues, detested abroad as the plastic expression of Prussian arrogance.
The correspondent of the Westminster Gazette writing from Berlin on July 26th, indicated concisely, and with insight, the position of the Teutonic powers ; and while the peremptoriness of Germany's attitude was somewhat ex- aggerated, the course of events has proved the approximate
Siegesallee, Avenue of Victory, Berlin, where in a double row statues of victorious Hohenzollerns have been erected.
Emperor William speaking from the balcony of the palace in Berlin.
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 33
accuracy of his exposition. "The policy of the Ger- man and Austrian governments," he said, "is absolutely beyond doubt; Russia will not be allowed to meddle in what is claimed to be entirely an Austro-Serbian affair. Germany is solid with Austria and any unfriendly Russian action will bring a declaration of war. It is even probable that any Russian action which can be interpreted as a provisional threat will be met by a German note, asking Russia to say definitely whether she proposes to intervene or not. There is so far no German official, or even ' in- spired,' ground for this assumption: but military consid- erations, emphasized officially only a few months ago, will not allow the Austro-German allies to give away any strategical points to Russia, such as a new ' trial mobiliza- tion' or Veiled concentration of troops.' . . . The German press with the exception of Socialist organs accepts this offi- cial attitude as self-evident, and shows complete solidarity."
Russia regarded as historically untenable the proposition that a great power might regulate alone, at its own discre- tion, a controversy with a Balkan state. Her prestige, as we have seen, was involved in maintaining the independ- ence and integrity of Serbia.
The policy of Germany, like that of each of the other belligerent powers, had its crucial moment. It came to the parting of the ways, the fateful choice. The forces of enmity had been gathering silently and inevitably for decades; but they were released to wreak destruction through the agency of conscious acts of human judgment. Destiny and free will were thus mysteriously associated.
M. Sazonoff declared on July 28th that the key to the situation was in Berlin. German writers have called this war the German War, and their opponents would prob- ably not begrudge them this designation. Just as Germany is the most prominent belligerent power, so it may be
34 The Great War
readily conceded that the decisive moment in German policy was the most significant point in the bewildering maze of occurrences that preceded the war, whatever opinion we hold concerning Germany's responsibility. Unmistakable signs will guide us to this point of supreme importance.
On the evening of the 28th Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia. On the morning of the 29th a con- versation took place in a friendly tone between M. Sazonoff and the German ambassador. But later in the day news of Count Berchtold's refusal to discuss the terms of the note to Serbia reached the Russian Foreign Minister, de- stroying M. Sazonoff's hope of arriving at a direct under- standing with the government at Vienna. Russia proceeded to a partial mobilization in response to Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude.
Russia's mobilization was reported in Berlin on the same day, and in the afternoon the German ambassador in St. Petersburg called upon M. Sazonoff to deliver a charac- teristically emphatic message. He promised that Austria- Hungary would respect Serbian integrity, but declared that the German government was resolved to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Count Pourtales had intimidated Russia by a peremptory summons at the time of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis in 1909. He was convinced that Russia would likewise be unwilling to risk a war on Serbia's account in 1914. His communication on the afternoon of July 29th was really a veiled threat, because it was generally recognized that mobilization in Germany almost inevitably meant war. This time Russia did not recede. M. Sazonoff declared in a communication to the Russian ambassador in Paris: "As we cannot comply, we have no alternative but to hasten our preparations and assume that war is inevitable."
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 35
Germany had adopted the attitude that the Austro- Serbian controversy was a purely local affair in which no other power had any right to intervene, and apparently the German government was prepared to interpret any military demonstration calculated to exert pressure on Austria-Hungary as equivalent to interference in the Austro-Serbian quarrel. Russia refused to acquiesce in this position. A direct conflict of views was thus pro- duced, and it devolved upon Germany to enforce her doctrine or abandon it. It was Germany's turn to show her hand. Evidently the crucial moment for Germany's conduct had arrived. The days before the war were pro- lific in sensational incidents to which the circumstances attributed an appropriate setting. We involuntarily recall certain midnight interviews and dispatches in the night of July 29-30, whose unusual nocturnal character betrays the terrific tension, the culmination in the crisis of deci- sion. They are the glow in the sky at night which reflects the seething crater of frenzied anxiety. Signifi- cant proceedings were crowded into the short hours of this summer night with ideally dramatic compactness and definiteness.
The leading civil and military authorities of the German Empire were the Kaiser's guests at dinner in the Neues Palais on the evening of Wednesday, July 29th. The dinner was followed by an extraordinary council, which occupies a unique position of importance among the deci- sive events of the critical days that preceded the war. When all the historical evidence will be available, and will have been sifted, perhaps fifty years hence, this conference in the stately palace that terminates the long vista through the park at Potsdam will probably be regarded as unques- tionably the most significant occurrence in the action of the forces that brought on the hour of destiny.
36 The Great War
Around the solemn council board, with the Kaiser pre- siding, were gathered the military and civil dignitaries and advisers, such as Field Marshal von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, and his associates, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, the Father of the German Navy, Imperial Chan- cellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Secretary of State for For- eign Affairs von Jagow, the impetuous Crown Prince, and Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the Kaiser, the sailor prince, Inspector-General of the German Navy, who had just returned from a visit in England, where of course his eyes had not been closed to the evident signs of an immi- nent conflict in Ireland.
Perhaps the reminiscences of a participant will some day reveal the course of debate on this momentous occasion. For the present, we are dependent on casual hints and allusions. The firmness of Russia had shattered the hope of a decisive diplomatic victory. We may be sure that von Moltke and the other military chiefs, who had been receiving disquieting communications concerning Russia's extensive preparations, pressed for energetic measures, immediate mobilization and war. We may assume, on the other hand, that the civilian chiefs urged in opposition that the field be left open for diplomacy, which still gave promise of arriving at a satisfactory agreement. The mili- tary group confronted their opponents with arguments based on inflexible, material facts. War with Russia and France was sooner or later inevitable, and there would never again be so favorable an occasion for waging it. The Teutonic powers possessed the initiative and a just cause. But every hour of delay diminished Germany's advantages, which consisted in the perfection and adapt- ability of her organization. This enabled her to concen- trate her troops with rapidity and in superior strength at the strategic positions. But these advantages would be
Count Hellmuth von Moltlce, chief of the general staff of the German army at the
outbreak of the war.
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 37
neutralized if Russia were given time to bring up her formidable masses. A campaign conducted with deter- mination and alacrity would be brief, inasmuch as the decisive factors were preparation and technical resources, in which Germany was vastly superior.
The reflections and considerations that passed through the Kaiser's mind may never be revealed. Convinced of his stupendous responsibility before God for the welfare of 67,000,000 people, he doubtless contemplated on the one hand the palpable danger that threatened his highly- developed empire, and the ignominy of appearing to hide another discomfiture behind the screen of a plausible com- promise; on the other, the imponderable consequences of a deliberately aggressive policy. Involuntarily, perhaps, his imagination surveyed in rapid flight the achievements of the past, the heritage of glory and of duty. For many generations the fortunes of Prussia had been describing an upward curve. The soaring progress of power and prosperity gave assurance of a still greater destiny. The vision of an imposing hegemony extending from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf, embracing the most promising exploitive regions, was no longer remote, an empire of peace that would obscure the brilliant trophies of Alexan- der the Great and Julius Caesar. One more determined effort and the guarantee of an unparalleled development would be secured. One throw of the dice, one word — mobilization — would set in movement the tremendous machinery for fashioning the crowning element, the apex, of the structure on which successive generations had toiled. But still the Kaiser scrutinized his conscience and was reluctant to take the fateful step.
The council probably reviewed and sanctioned provi- sionally the plan of campaign on two fronts, of which the essential features were the smashing blow across Belgium
38 The Great War
at France, and the subsequent hurried movement east- ward before the slowly-moving Russians were ready, so as to cooperate with Austria-Hungary in crushing them in detail.
Finally, the council confirmed the position in regard to Russia, which made war almost certain, but owing chiefly to the Kaiser's hesitation, no doubt, active measures were suspended until Russia could be again approached and Great Britain sounded. But the feverish anxiety of the chiefs of the German government was so great that they could not tolerate a delay until morning to communicate with these two powers on the most fundamental questions of policy.
After this extraordinary council, at one o'clock in the morning of the 30th, as we have already observed in the first volume, the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar, to support the action of the German ambassador and em- phasize the perilous consequences of Russian mobilization.
Count Pourtales called upon M. SazonofT at two o'clock the same morning and urged in somewhat less categorical terms that Russia should cease military preparations. He inquired whether Russia could not be satisfied with the promise that Austria-Hungary would not violate Serbia's integrity. M. SazonofT replied that Russia had to safe- guard Serbia's independence and sovereignty as well. He expressed his conviction that Germany was intervening in St. Petersburg while refusing to intervene in Vienna, so as to give Austria-Hungary time to crush her neighbor before Russia could bring aid. It is reported that the German ambassador "completely broke down on seeing war was inevitable," and appealed to M. SazonofT "for some sug- gestion which he could telegraph to the German govern- ment as a last hope." At that M. SazonofT drew up the formula by which Russia engaged to stop all military
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 39
preparations on condition that Austria-Hungary would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which violated the sovereignty of Serbia. As we have already seen, this formula was rejected by Herr von Jagow as unacceptable for Austria-Hungary.
It was directly after his return from the council at Potsdam that Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, after requesting Sir Edward Goschen to come to him, made the startling inquiry whether Great Britain would remain neutral in a European war on condition that Germany would promise to respect the neutrality of Holland and the territorial integrity of France as distinguished from her colonies and dependencies, a proposal which Sir Ed- ward Grey very promptly rejected. It was indeed an alarming revelation that the German government already contemplated the possibility or necessity of hostile opera- tions against France, and had apparently even reflected on the nature of the spoils of victory. This interview in itself would be strong presumptive evidence that the council at Potsdam regarded war as practically unavoid- able, and it would be corroborated by the convening of the Federal Council on the 30th. For without the adhe- sion of this sovereign body a declaration of war would scarcely be constitutional.
Even at the last, when the steadfast adherence of Ger- many and Russia to their respective policies left apparently no other alternative than war, it is not unlikely that the Kaiser gave his sanction reluctantly to mobilization and hostilities. There is even a rumor that the Kaiser was constrained to take the fatal step by the threatened resig- nation of the military and naval chiefs.
The first days of August have left their ineffaceable impression upon the memory of all those who experienced the thrilling events and sensations in Berlin. The news
40 The Great War
that Germany had delivered ill St. Petersburg what was virtually an ultimatum was disseminated by a special edition of the North German Gazette late in the afternoon of July 31st. It was immediately recognized that war was almost unavoidable. The realization of the gravity of the situation impregnated the throbbing life of the great city with an irrepressible feeling of elation. The stirring spectacle of the departure of the troops in 1870, graven in the hearts of surviving witnesses, perpetuated by art, loomed large in the popular imagination. The commonplaces of life were swept aside like autumn leaves before the tingling, stimu- lating blast of patriotic exhilaration.
At half past five the Kaiser appeared at the balcony of the palace, surrounded by members of his family and courtiers, above a sea of upturned faces. For a time it seemed as though the frenzied roar of applause that swelled and reverberated from the countless throats of the dense multitude would never cease. When finally it subsided the Kaiser addressed the people in a clear, penetrating voice, as follows:
"A stern hour of tribulation for Germany has arrived. Envy on all sides compels us to assume a righteous attitude of defense. The sword is forced into our hand. If my efforts at the last moment do not avail to bring our oppo- nents to reason and maintain peace, I trust that with God's help we shall so wield our sword that we can sheathe it with honor. War would extort from the German people an enormous tribute of wealth and blood, but it would prove to our opponents the gravity of assailing Germany. And now I commend you to God. Go to church, kneel before God, and implore His help for our gallant army."
At a quarter before twelve on the night of July 31st a great concourse of people marched in procession from Unter den Linden down Wilhelmstrasse singing patriotic
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 41
songs and drew up before the Chancellor's Palace. The Chancellor appeared at the central window of the Congress Chamber, the historic hall where the Treaty of Berlin was drawn up in 1878, and the convention for the partition of Africa sanctioned in 1885; Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was received with a loud ovation. When silence had been obtained, speaking in firm, ringing tones, he addressed the assemblage as follows:
"At this momentous hour, to give expression to your patriotic feeling, you have come to the house of Bismarck, who, with the Emperor William I and Field Marshal von Moltke welded the German Empire together. We wish to go on living tranquilly in the empire that we have developed in forty-four years of peaceful labor. The whole effort of the Kaiser has been devoted to the main- tenance of peace. To the very last hour he has striven to preserve the peace of Europe, and he is still working for this purpose. Should all his efforts prove fruitless, should the sword be forced into our hands, we shall take the field with a clear conscience, and the conviction that we did not seek war. We shall then wage war for our existence and for our national honor to the last drop of our blood. In the gravity of this hour I remind you of the words which Prince Frederick Charles cried to the men of Brandenburg: ' Let your hearts beat to God, your fists on the enemy/ '
Again, after news had spread on August 1st that mobi- lization had been ordered, a vast concourse of people assembled in the square in front of the palace, crying, "We wish to see our Kaiser, we wish to see our beloved Kaiser," until the Kaiser, accompanied by the Kaiserin, appeared at a balcony, and addressed the people in the following words :
"I give thanks from the depths of my heart for your outburst of devotion and loyalty. In the impending
42 The Great War
contest I know no parties amongst my people, only Ger- mans. And whatever parties have assailed me in the conflict of opinions, I forgive them all. Our only concern at present is to stand together like brothers, and then God will aid the German people to victory."
The Berlin Lokalanzeiger declared on August 3d: "We begin to-day the final fight which shall settle forever our great position in the world, which we have never misused, and when the German sword again glides into its scabbard, everything that we hope and wish will be consummated. We shall stand before the world as its mightiest nation, which will then, at last, be in a position, with its modera- tion and forbearance, to give to the world forever those things for which it has never ceased to strive — peace, en- lightenment, and prosperity."
The German Reichstag was hastily summoned to meet on August 4th, for the purpose of voting the necessary supplies for the war. The opening of this extraordinary session was an impressive ceremony. The deputies assem- bled in the famous White Hall of the Royal Palace in Berlin at one o'clock, where the Kaiser, in the presence of the Kaiserin, the Crown Princess, the Princes Eitel Fred- erick and August William, the Chancellor and Secretaries of State, and the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, read the following address from the throne:
"In this hour of destiny I have summoned the chosen representatives of the German people about me. For nearly a half century we have persistently followed the path of peace. Attempts to impute a warlike inclination to Germany and to restrict her position in the world have been a severe test for our people's patience. But with unswerving honesty of purpose my government has con- tinued to pursue, even amid provocative circumstances, the development of all moral, spiritual, and economic
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 43
forces as the highest goal. The world has witnessed how tirelessly amid the confusion of conflicting forces of recent years we have kept our place in the front rank to shield the nations of Europe from a war between the greatest powers.
"The gravest dangers which had been evoked by the occurrences in the Balkans seemed to have been sur- mounted, when the murder of my friend, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, caused the abyss to open. My noble ally, the Emperor and King Francis Joseph, was forced to grasp the sword for the defense of his empire against a dangerous agitation which proceeded from a neighboring state. The Russian Empire thrust itself in the way of the allied monarchy in the latter's pursuit of her lawful inter- ests. Not alone our duties as ally call us to the side of Austria-Hungary. We have the mighty task of pro- tecting the common civilization of the two empires at the same time as our own position against the assaults of hostile forces.
"With a heavy heart I have been compelled to mobilize my army against a neighbor, by whose side it has fought on so many battlefields. I beheld with sincere grief the destruction of a friendship which Germany had loyally maintained. The Imperial Russian government, giving way to an insatiable nationalism, has taken the side of a state which has occasioned the misfortune of this war by countenancing criminal conspiracies. It was no surprise that France ranged herself on the side of our opponents. Too often have our attempts to arrive at more friendly relations with the French republic encountered the old- time aspirations and bitterness.
"Gentlemen, all that human forethought and energy can accomplish in arming a people for a supreme contest has been done with your cooperation. The enmity which
44 The Great War
has been spreading for a long time in East and West has now burst forth in bright flames. The present situation is not the consequence of temporary conflicts of interests or diplomatic constellations; it is the result of a spirit of hostility toward the power and success of the German Empire which has been active for many years.
"No passion for aggrandizement impels us. We are inspired by the unbending determination to preserve the place which God has granted us for ourselves and all coming generations.
"You can perceive in the documents laid before you how my government, and particularly my Chancellor, struggled to the last moment to avoid the supreme catas- trophe. We grasp the sword with a clear conscience and innocent hand for a necessary action in self-defense which has been forced upon us.
"My summons goes forth to the peoples and races of the German Empire to bid them stand with undivided strength as brothers by the side of our allies for the protection of all that we have created in peaceful labor. Like our fore- fathers, firm and faithful, earnest and chivalrous, humble before God and eager for battle in the face of the enemy, we put our trust in the Almighty, and may He be pleased to strengthen our defense and guide us to a happy issue.
"Gentlemen, the entire German people, grouped about its princes and leaders turns its eyes upon you to-day. Pass your measures with unanimity and expedition ; that is my innermost wish."
Having reached the intended termination of his address from the throne, the Kaiser laid aside his manuscript; but then, borne along by the impulsive force of his emotion, he added:
"You have read, gentlemen, what I said to my people from the balcony of the palace. I repeat that I no longer
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Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 45
know any parties; I know only Germans. And as sign of this, that you are determined, without distinction of party, class, or religion, to stand together with me through thick and thin, peril and death, I summon the leaders of the parties to step forward and pledge this by a grasp of the hand."
The swelling emotion of those who had witnessed this simple but impressive ceremony found spontaneous expres- sion in singing the national hymn; and then the Kaiser, after grasping the hand of the Chancellor and that of Gen- eral von Moltke, left the hall amid a storm of enthusiasm.
The business session in the Hall of the Reichstag con- vened at three o'clock and continued until 5.50. It was opened by the Chancellor with the following speech, to which the members responded at intervals with prolonged outbursts of applause :
"A tremendous crisis has broken in upon Europe. Since we won for ourselves the German Empire and a place of respect before the world, we have lived for forty-four years in peace and have guarded the tranquillity of Europe. We have grown strong and mighty in peaceful labor and are therefore envied. We have borne with dogged patience the fact that in East and West hatred was nourished against us and bonds were fashioned for us under the pretence that Germany longed for war. The wind which was then sown has brought forth the whirlwind. We desired to live on in peaceful pursuits, and like a silent vow the feel- ing passed from the Kaiser to the youngest recruit; only in defense of a righteous cause may the German sword ever glide from its scabbard. The day on which we must draw it has come against our wish, and in spite of our sin- cere endeavors. Russia has applied the torch to the house. We stand in the midst of a war which has been forced upon us by Russia and France.
46 The Great War
"Gentlemen! A number of documents hastily collected under the pressure of rapidly succeeding events has been placed before you. Permit me to point to the facts which determine our attitude.
"From the very beginning of the Austro-Serbian con- flict, we declared that the dispute must be confined to Austria-Hungary and Serbia and we worked with this end in view. Every cabinet, particularly that of England, adopted the same attitude. Russia alone declared that she must have a voice in the decision of this controversy. Thus the danger of European complications raised its threatening head. As soon as the first definite informa- tion about military preparations in Russia reached us, we notified St. Petersburg, in a friendly but emphatic tone, that warlike measures against Austria would find us at the side of our ally, and that military preparations against our- selves would compel us to take corresponding measures, and that mobilization was very near to actual war. Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for peace, and that she was making no military preparations directed against us. In the meantime, England endeav- ored to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and in this attempt we warmly seconded her efforts. On July 28th the Kaiser besought the Tsar by telegram to take into consideration that Austria-Hungary had the right and duty to protect herself against the Greater Serbian agita- tion, which threatened to undermine her existence. The Kaiser drew the attention of the Tsar to the solidarity of monarchical interests in face of the outrage of Sarajevo. He asked for the latter's personal assistance in clearing away the differences between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Almost at the same time, and before the receipt of this telegram, the Tsar asked the Kaiser to come to his aid by inducing Vienna to moderate her demands. The Kaiser
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 47
undertook the role of mediator. But this action at his order had scarcely been started, when Russia mobilized all her military forces which are directed against Austria- Hungary, while Austria-Hungary had only mobilized those of her army corps which are immediately directed against Serbia; toward the north she had only mobilized two of her army corps, and they were far from the Russian boundary.
"The Kaiser straightway pointed out to the Tsar that this mobilization of the Russian forces against Austria- Hungary rendered difficult, if not impossible, the role of mediator, which he had accepted at the Tsar's own request. Nevertheless, we continued our mediation in Vienna, and carried it to the farthest point compatible with our position as ally. During this time Russia spontaneously repeated her assurances that she was making no military prepara- tions against us.
"We come to July 31st. The decision was to be taken in Vienna. We had already by our representatives brought about the resumption of direct communications between Vienna and St. Petersburg which had been interrupted for a time. But before the final decision had been taken in Vienna, came the news that Russia had mobilized all her military forces — mobilized, therefore, against us as well. The Russian government, which knew very well from our repeated representations what mobilization on our frontier meant, gave us no notification or explanation of this mobi- lization. It was not until the afternoon of the 31st that a telegram came from the Tsar to the Kaiser in which the Tsar guaranteed that his army would not assume a provo- cative attitude towards us. But the mobilization on our frontier had been in full progress since the night of July 30-31. At the same time that we were acting as mediator in Vienna in compliance with Russia's request,
48 The Great War
the Russian forces were appearing along our extended and almost completely open frontier; while France, without actually mobilizing, was making military preparations, as she herself confesses.
"What was our position? We had thus far deliberately abstained from calling up a single reservist for the sake of European peace. Were we to continue patiently wait- ing until the powers, between whom we are wedged in, chose a convenient time for striking a blow? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such a peril. Therefore, on July 31st, we demanded Russia's demobili- zation as the only means which could still preserve the peace of Europe. The Imperial (German) ambassador in St. Petersburg received further instructions to declare to the Russian government that in case our demand met with refusal we must consider that a state of hostilities existed.
"The Imperial ambassador carried out these instructions. We do not even yet know what Russia replied to our de- mand for demobilization. No telegraphic communication on the subject has reached us, although the telegraph lines still transmitted less important dispatches.
"Therefore, long after the expiration of the indicated time-limit, the Kaiser was obliged on August 1st, at five o'clock in the afternoon, to order a general mobilization of our forces.
"At the same time it was necessary for us to assure our- selves of the attitude of France. To our direct question, whether she would remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia, France replied that she would act as her interests demanded. This was an evasive, if not a negative, reply to our question."
After presenting evidence intended to show that France initiated hostilities on the Franco-German border, chiefly
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 49
the incidents mentioned in the German declaration of war against France, the Chancellor continued as follows:
" Gentlemen, we are now in a position of necessity ; and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg; perhaps they have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is in contradiction to the rules of international law. The French government has de- clared in Brussels that it is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it is respected by the enemy. But we knew that France stood prepared for an invasion. France could wait, but we could not. A French inroad on our flank on the lower Rhine could have been fatal to us. So we were forced to set aside the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. The wrong — I speak openly — the wrong that we now commit we will try to make good again as soon as our military goal has been reached. When one is threatened as we are, and all is at stake, he can only think of how he can hack his way through.
"Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria- Hungary.
"As for England's attitude, Sir Edward Grey's statements made yesterday in the House of Commons show clearly the point of view of the English government. We have assured the English government that, as long as England remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we will not violate the territorial integrity or independence of Belgium. I now repeat this statement before the whole world, and I may add that, so long as England remains neutral, we would also be willing, in case of reciprocal assurances, to abstain from all hostile operations against the French merchant marine.
"Gentlemen, such has been the course of events. I repeat the Kaiser's words: 'Germany goes to war with a
50 The Great War
clear conscience!' We are fighting for the fruits of our peaceful labor, for the inheritance of a great past, and for our future. The fifty years are not yet passed during which, Count Moltke said, we should have to remain armed for the defense of our inheritance and the con- quests of 1870. Now the great hour of trial for our people has struck. But we face it with clear confidence. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle — behind them stands the entire German people — the entire German people [he glanced at the Social Democrats, pausing an instant to receive their expression of approba- tion] united to the last man!
"You, gentlemen, know your duty in all its greatness. The bills before you require no further explanation. I ask you to pass them quickly."
The response of the Social Democrats, as expressed by their parliamentary leader, Herr Haase, has a peculiar interest:
"On behalf of my party I am commissioned to make the following statement: We are face to face with an hour of destiny. The consequences of imperialistic policy, which has inspired an era of armament competition, and accentuated the differences between the nations, have burst over Europe like a deluge. The advocates of this policy must bear the responsibility. We refuse to accept it. The Social Democrats have struggled against this fate- ful development with all their power, and until the very last moment they worked to preserve peace through im- pressive demonstrations in all countries, in accord with their brothers in France. Their exertions have been in vain. We stand now before the inexorable fact of war. The horrors of hostile invasion threaten us. The question before us is not now that of war or peace, but concerning the necessary supplies for the national defense. We must
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 51
now consider the millions of our fellow-countrymen who, without any fault of their own, are plunged into this catastrophe. They will suffer most from the ravages of war. Without distinction of party, we follow with our innermost good wishes those of our brothers who have been called to the colors. We think also of the mothers who must part with their sons, of the wives and children who are robbed of their supporters, and for whom the terrors of hunger are added to anxiety of death. To these will soon be added thousands of wounded and crippled soldiers. We regard it as an imperative duty to stand by them all, to mitigate their sufferings, to help their im- measurable need. For our nation and for its future liberty, much, if not all, is hazarded, should victory come to Rus- sian despotism, whose hands are already stained with the blood of the best of its own people. This danger must be averted and the civilization and independence of our own land secured. In these circumstances we prove the truth of our constant assertion: in the hour of danger we do not leave our Fatherland in the lurch. And in this atti- tude we feel that we are true to the principles of the International, which recognizes the right of every nation at all times to independence and self-defense, just as, in accordance with it, we condemn any war of conquest. We demand that as soon as the end of securing our safety has been attained, and the enemy is inclined to peace, this war be terminated by a treaty which shall make friendship with our neighbors possible. We demand this not only in the interests of international solidarity, for which we have always striven, but also for the good of the German nation. Guided by these principles, we agree to the credits which are required."
The extraordinary credit of 5,000,000,000 marks ($1,190,- 000,000), the largest single war-credit ever demanded of
52 The Great War
any legislative assembly, was unanimously passed, and the Reichstag was adjourned until November 24th.
While the violation of Belgian neutrality from the British and Belgian points of view, together with the question of moral culpability, is treated elsewhere, the present situation is a convenient point for the consideration of a question which must challenge the curiosity of all thoughtful stu- dents of Germany's method of inaugurating her campaign. What effect, if any, did the German authorities believe that their traverse of Belgium would exercise in the deter- mination of British policy ? Did they regard British con- duct as immutably fixed without reference to Belgium? Was their invasion of Belgium in effect a conscious de- fiance of Great Britain ?
Professor Hans Delbriick declares that if it were true that England entered the war because Germany disre- garded Belgian neutrality, Germany cheated herself out of a sure victory by her unwise step. He contends that it is absurd to credit the Kaiser, Chancellor, and German General Staff with such a blunder, and concludes that these authorities must have been convinced that Eng- land would have entered the war in any case and that the Allies themselves would have crossed Belgium if the Germans had permitted them the opportunity. It was, in fact, almost inevitable that Great Britain would sooner or later have been drawn into the war. Professor Delbriick implies, however, that there were only two conceivable courses of British conduct, namely, interfer- ence in any case, and interference in consequence of the violation of Belgian neutrality, the latter of which he repudiates. But logically there was a third possi- bility, interference in no case. Germany's conduct could be explained just as readily on the assumption of a belief that Great Britain would not intervene in any
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 53
circumstances, as of a conviction that she would interfere in any situation.
Count Andrassy, to whose views reference has already been made, regards as untenable the view that the active participation of Great Britain came as a surprise to the leading circles in Berlin. On the other hand, an English writer declares just as categorically: "All the evidence indicates that it was an idee fixe in Berlin that under no circumstances whatsoever short of an actual attack on British shores would the United Kingdom participate in a European war." These two expressions of opinion taken at random illustrate the absolute diversity of views regard- ing a question of fundamental interest.
In endeavoring to form our own judgment on this problem, we shall examine separately the attitude of the German civil and military authorities. This method will not compromise the value of the investigation, and it may contribute to the accuracy of the results.
There is no doubt that one of the principal aims of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's policy had been to secure a durable understanding with Great Britain. In the course of his important address before the Reichstag, December 2, 1914, he alluded to this hope, declaring that by wearisome efforts it had been possible to arrive at an understanding regarding some economic points of con- troversy, reducing thereby the possible causes of friction. It is known, for example, that an agreement had been concluded regarding the extension of the Bagdad Railway to the head of the Persian Gulf. The fact, of itself, that the Chancellor made the above-mentioned admission in a speech, the tendency of which was to establish Great Britain's stubbornness, might seem to indicate that the progress accomplished in the policy of reconciliation had really been considerable. We may assume, therefore, that
54 The Great War
before the war the German Foreign Office cherished the hope of maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain; and it is not irrelevant to recall, in this connection, the Chancellor's very hearty expression of approbation of Sir Edward Grey's skill and fairness in dealing with the Balkan crisis of 1913.
In the course of the memorable midnight interview with the British ambassador in the night of July 29-30, the Chancellor declared that the object of his policy had always been to bring about an understanding with Great Britain, and that "he had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was, of course, at the present moment too early to discuss de- tails, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce would enable him to look forward to the realization of his desire."
On the morning of August 4th, after the invasion of Belgium had become a reality, Herr von Jagow sent the following message to Prince Lichnowsky, German Am- bassador in London:
"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable in- formation. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 55
neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."
This message was communicated to Sir Edward Grey, who read it to the House of Commons on the same day, where, in spite of the gravity of the situation, the uncon- sciously humorous inconsistency of the proof of good intentions proposed by the German Foreign Secretary provoked a general manifestation of amusement. This communication betrayed a deplorable inability to survey the situation from any other than a subjective point of view. For how could those who regarded the invasion of Belgium as the breach of a solemn covenant be persuaded that a new promise would serve as pledge for the harmless consequences of the violation of the old one? Such a message would never have been dispatched by one who was convinced that the participation of Great Britain in the war was inevitable.
Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, pre- sented the British ultimatum to Herr von Jagow at the Foreign Office at about seven o'clock on the evening of August 4th, demanding assurance by twelve o'clock the same night that the German government would not pro- ceed with its violation of the Belgian frontier. " In a short conversation which ensued," Sir Edward Goschen reports, "Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France."
Directly afterwards the British ambassador called to take leave of the Chancellor. The latter, who was in a very excited state in consequence of the step which Great Britain had taken, gave way to a passionate outburst. To quote again from Sir Edward Goschen's report (given at length in the Appendix to this volume) :
56 The Great War
"He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Govern- ment was terrible to a degree ; just for a word, — 'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain respon- sible for all the terrible events that might happen. I pro- tested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to under- stand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of ' life and death ' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neu- trality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engage- ments given by Great Britain in the future? The Chan- cellor said; 'But at what price will that compact have been kept! Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument."
After reading the account of this historic interview it seems impossible that any agency less potent than
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 57
amazement and the keenest disappointment could have torn aside so completely the veil of customary reserve and laid bare the experienced bureaucrat's most intimate state of feeling, impelling him to utter in a moment of abandon- ment expressions which he may subsequently have re- gretted, and which furnished a slogan to his country's foes. The Chancellor's stupefaction is the most convincing proof that the heads of the civil administration had not regarded the hostility of Great Britain as probable.
To the testimony already noted in this connection, we may add of course, as cumulative evidence of the belief of the German state department that Great Britain would stand aloof, all the restraining circumstances mentioned in Volume I, Chapter VIII, in connection with the threaten- ing state of affairs in Ireland.
Turning our attention now to the chiefs of the military administration, we shall discover that all the evidence seems to indicate that in the opinion of the German General Staff, the intellectual leadership of the military establish- ment, while Great Britain's participation in the war was probable, it might be disregarded as a factor of slight importance in relation to the main features of the German plan of campaign. A monograph appearing a short time before the war, entitled Germany's Hour of Destiny, by Colonel H. Frobenius, may be regarded as a fairly accu- rate expression of the prevailing opinion in the leading military circles. The German Crown Prince telegraphed his congratulations to Colonel Frobenius on account of this work, saying: "I hope your book will find its way into every German home."
Colonel Frobenius bases his conjectures upon the funda- mental distinction of the purposes of warfare into two classes, the unlimited and limited, as defined by the great strategist Clausewitz. The former involve the utilization
58 The Great War
of all the energy and forces of a state in the supreme endeavor of crushing its opponent. The latter are con- fined to the attainment of some particular, restricted advan- tage; they do not aim at the complete subversion of the enemy. The purpose of France, for example, in a war with Germany would be unlimited; but that of Great Britain would be limited, confined to the destruction of the German fleet. Great Britain would wish to spare the German army as much as possible for the maintenance of an equilibrium on the continent after the war, or as a useful auxiliary in an eventual conflict with Russia.
For this reason, according to Frobenius, the interests and strategic plans of Great Britain and her continental allies would be widely divergent. The latter's operations would naturally be directed along lines converging on Berlin, whilst Great Britain would wish to employ her expeditionary force solely in ferreting out the German navy from the harbors where it would take refuge, that it might be destroyed by the superior British navy. Colonel Frobenius was convinced that it was the British intention that the expeditionary force of 150,000 men should disem- bark at Antwerp and act in concert with the French armies, extending their left wing, until a first important victory had been gained over the Germans, when the British would turn to the more congenial task of cooper- ating with their • own fleet in subduing the German naval bases and coast defenses. The violation of Belgian neu- trality is assumed by this author without comment. He remarks: "In France the opinion prevailed that England would unselfishly furnish a military force to serve French interests. This is preposterous in the case of this country, which never yet subordinated its own interests to those of other nations. Quite the contrary, in many cases it utilized their forces for its own purposes and interests."
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 59
The conclusions of Colonel Frobenius as to the scope of the prospective British operations on the continent and the limited strength of the forces contemplated were supported by many indications. For instance, a sensation had been created in Germany in the autumn of 1905 by the state- ment of M. Delcasse, French Foreign Minister during the international crisis a short time before, that he had received Great Britain's promise to disembark 100,000 men in Schleswig and seize the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal in the event of hostilities between France and Germany.
The substance of the Anglo-Belgian conversations rela- tive to the disembarkation of a British expeditionary force, first of 100,000, later 160,000 men, to defend the neutrality of Belgium, as revealed in the documents "discovered" by the Germans in the War Office in Brussels, was probably not unknown to the German General Staff.
The opposition in Great Britain, France, and Belgium to the Dutch plan of erecting a modern fortress at Flushing to command the estuary of the Scheldt made a great im- pression in Germany, where it confirmed the suspicion that the British expeditionary force would be disembarked at Antwerp. This project of fortifying Flushing was pro- posed in November, 1910, several months before the final Moroccan crisis, as part of a larger plan of coast defenses in the Netherlands. Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons on February 16, 1911, that the British government thought it undesirable to state its view on the measures taken by a foreign government to protect its own territory. There was a strong movement in the Netherlands itself against the scheme of fortification on ac- count of the expense involved, and it was quietly dropped.
Our conclusions regarding the opinion of the controlling personalities in Germany about British policy in relation to the German invasion of Belgium may be briefly summarized.
60 The Great War
The civil authorities thought that Great Britain would probably abstain from interference in a continental conflict so long as there was a prospect that the integrity of France and the smaller neutral countries would not be destroyed. The military authorities regarded the intervention of Great Britain as probable, but not a matter of vital importance to Ger- many. For all assumed, apparently without exception, that Great Britain's participation in continental warfare would not in any case extend beyond sending the expeditionary force of 160,000 men, which, in view of the enormous numbers engaged, would scarcely exert an appreciable effect in deter- mining the issue. The general staff was probably confident that with actual conditions a conflict with France could be brought to the decisive point before Great Britain could make ready other forces to be transported to the continent.
Loath to believe that Germany would persist in her harsh design with reference to Belgium, Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister in Berlin, solicited an interview with Herr von Jagow on August 4th. After listening while Baron Beyens explained that any other reply to Germany's demands than the refusal which had already been conveyed to the Ger- man government would have been incompatible with the honor of Belgium, the German Foreign Secretary admitted privately the justice of the Belgian minister's argument.
Herr Gottlieb von Jagow is before all else a gentleman of affable manners, conciliatory temperament, and tactful address. He had earned conspicuous merit as ambassador at Rome during a critical period of four years when the mutual recriminations and jealousy of Italy and Austria and the former's venture in Tripoli threatened to destroy the Triple Alliance. The renewal of the pact in these trying circumstances had been a noteworthy diplomatic achievement. Herr von Jagow returned to Berlin very reluctantly, at the Kaiser's urgent request, in 1913 to
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 61
undertake the duties of the Foreign Office as successor of the late Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter.
The suggestion is apt to present itself to the mind of one who studies attentively the diplomacy of the critical days before the war that if the policy of Germany had been guided by the personal feeling and conviction of Herr von Jagow, the war could have been avoided, or at least post- poned. But unfortunately the whole course and character of events convey the impression that Herr von Jagow's initiative was strictly limited and that in all important matters the decision was dictated from sources higher up. It must have violated Herr von Jagow's finer sensibility to endorse a policy which subordinated the distinction of right and wrong to considerations of expediency.
As Herr von Jagow recited the motives of the German government he seemed to Baron Beyens to be merely repeating a lesson taught him by the Chief of the General Staff. His final declaration with regard to the German movement into Belgium, expressed, no doubt, with a very sincere feeling of anguish and with absolute frankness on his own part, was as follows:
"We have been compelled by absolute necessity to make this demand upon your government. It is for Germany a question of life and death. In order that she may not be crushed, she must herself crush France and then turn against Russia. It is with a feeling of extreme mortifica- tion that the Kaiser and his government have been obliged to take this decision. To myself it is the most painful step that I ever have taken in my career."
When Baron Beyens demanded his passports, Herr von Jagow's ingenuous exclamation of astonishment, his remark that he did not wish to break relations with him, serves to show that the German government did not expect that Belgium would carry her resistance to the point of actual
62 The Great War
warfare. When Baron Beyens predicted that the hostility of Great Britain would be the consequence of Germany's conduct and asked Herr von Jagow whether the supposed advantages of crossing Belgium were worth the price, the latter merely shrugged his shoulders in reply.
Baron Beyens took his dinner alone at the adjacent Hotel Kaiserhof, absorbed, doubtless, in gloomy meditations. His mission was at an end. The methods of diplomacy were powerless before the stern resolution that was impelling the world's most formidable military organism. The in- dustry and commerce of the civilized nations had attained a giddy pinnacle of prosperity. On every side were the evidences of amazing progress. But to Baron Beyens it must all have seemed a mockery, a world from which the soul had been banished, a society deaf to the plea of justice, a generation which witnessed and approved the apotheosis of a heartless materialism.
He may have passed over in memory, with an impression of cruel irony, the many assurances and attentions which his king and nation had received from their powerful neighbor. Perhaps his reflections turned to prominent instances in Prussian history where a similarly contemptu- ous disregard of justice seemed to have been exhibited, the invasion of Silesia by Frederick the Great " without any demand for reparation, in the very act of pouring forth compliments and assurances of good-will," the entirely un- expected invasion of Saxony by the same monarch which inaugurated the Seven Years' War and inflicted upon the unhappy electorate the misery which Belgium has suffered. It is true that in this second event genuine evidence of the complicity of Saxony in a coalition of powers against Fred- erick was discovered among the state papers at Dresden.
Later in the evening, when Baron Beyens issued from the hotel, the newsvendors were already hawking an extra
Moral Forces in the Teutonic Empires 63
edition of the Tageblatt announcing Great Britain's declara- tion of war against Germany. The prediction of Baron Beyens had been realized with startling rapidity. A crowd of well-dressed people, — not riffraff, — roused to a fury of indignation by the news just published had gathered in front of the British Embassy in Wilhelmstrasse, and were singing the national hymn, "Deutschland, Deutschla?id, iiber alles," in tones of defiance. The attitude of these people could not have been more concisely expressed than by the Chancellor's words when he said of Great Britain's action, that it "was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants." Deceived until the last moment as to the probable conduct of Great Britain, the populace naturally ascribed their delusion to the studied duplicity of their new opponent rather than to the lack of perspicuity on the part of their own government.
Their fury increased in intensity. The two policemen stationed before the door of the embassy were either over- powered or remained indifferent to the whole proceeding, and presently a volley of brickbats crashed through the windows of the drawing-room. Sir Edward Goschen im- mediately communicated with the Foreign Office and Herr von Jagow not only informed the Chief of Police, so that an adequate force of mounted police was dispatched for preventing any repetition of this unpleasant occurrence, but very courteously went himself to the embassy to express his regrets for the rude behavior of his countrymen. The British ambassador had nothing but words of praise for the thoughtful conduct of Herr von Jagow throughout these trying days. On the morning of the 6th the ambassador and his household were smuggled away in taxicabs by side streets to the Lehrter Station, whence they departed in a special train, without any molestation, for the Dutch frontier.
CHAPTER II
The Moral Factors in Belgium, France, and Italy
Condition of Belgium before the war. King Albert I. Relations with Germany. German plan of traversing Belgium not an improvisation. Belgian precautions. The Belgian government and the crisis; Luxem- burg; German ultimatum; Belgian deliberations and reply. German declaration of war. Vagaries of German apologists. Count Andrassy's opinion. France : the Alsace-Lorraine Question. Recent French politics. M. Jaures. Socialism in France and Germany. Military law for three years' service. Doumergue Cabinet. Caillaux Case. The elections of 1914, and ministerial crisis. Viviani Cabinet. Senator Humbert's dis- closure. Assassination of M. Jaures. The French people and the war- crisis. The declaration of war. The historic session of the Chamber. The coalition ministry. The moral forces in Italy.
In turning now to Belgium, if we ask ourselves, in Glad- stone's words, "What is that country?" and search the answer, we shall discover that her distinction among the nations had even increased since the Great Commoner de- picted it with such generous enthusiasm before the House of Commons in 1870.
The official enumeration of 1910 found 7,423,784 souls in Belgium, as many, in other words, as dwelt in all the vast expanse of Canada, living and prospering in 11,372 square miles of territory; and what is more astonishing, increasing by immigration as well as by the natural excess of births over deaths. Belgium is the most densely peopled country in Europe. With the same degree of density the British Isles would have had a population of 79,414,187, instead of 45,370,530, in 1911, and France, 135,185,556, instead of 39,601,509. Let the French cease to deplore their stationary population and imitate their neighbors!
64
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During the past three hundred years the provinces which constitute Belgium have been ruled over, in turn, by Spain, Austria, and France; after the downfall of Napoleon they were united with Holland to form the kingdom of the Netherlands. In 1830 the people revolted and an independent kingdom was formed.
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 65
The rate of increase during ten years in Belgium had been slightly higher than in Maryland, and a little lower than in Virginia. Although Belgium has the population of Penn- sylvania crowded into an area only twice the size of Con- necticut and Rhode Island, her national wealth before the war was equivalent to the aggregate valuation of all real and personal property in Illinois, and every fourth person had an account in the savings banks.
Doubt has been expressed as to the existence of a Belgian nation. For the country never formed an independent political unit until 1830; its very name was resurrected from antiquity. It contains to-day peoples of very distinct stock, the Flemish in the west, of Teutonic origin, and the Walloons in the east, of Latin-Celtic descent, the former somewhat more numerous than the latter. But no more effective agency than Belgium's present experience could be imagined for fusing and amalgamating the two peoples. The Belgians will come forth from the fiery furnace a spiritually welded and unified nation.
Nature and man had worked together to make Belgium at the same time a hive of industry, the home of art, and a very agreeable abiding-place. The combination within so small an area of a remarkable diversity of landscape and physical features makes Belgium a sort of miniature of Europe. It offers nearly all the varieties of rural exploita- tion, from vineyards and orchards to grazing and the pro- duction of the hardier grains. Agriculture and the breeding of domestic animals have been developed by patient, intelli- gent labor to a very high state of excellence. The accurate attention devoted by the public bureaus to the collection of agricultural statistics, especially those relating to the economic aspects of the distribution of land and to intensive cultivation, makes Belgium serve the purpose of an experi- mental laboratory for her neighbors in western Europe.
66 The Great War
Abundant deposits of coal, accessibility to the sea, and convenient inland waterways favored the development of Belgian industry. The collieries produced 23,053,540 tons of coal in 1911, about as much as those of Ohio. The production of pig-iron amounted to 2,466,700 metric tons in 1913, having doubled in eleven years, while that of steel ingots rose to 2,515,040 tons in 1912. Belgium had the largest per capita production of iron and steel of any country. The aggregate horse-power of Belgian indus- trial plants doubled in the interval 1900-1911. Liege and Charleroi, in the midst of the coal deposits, are the centres of the metallurgical industry. There are ordnance foun- dries at Liege and Mechlin, and celebrated manufactures of small-arms at Liege.
The foreign commerce of Belgium was comparable with the entire external trade of South America. Antwerp vied with the world's leading ports in its tonnage of exports and imports. A network of canals connects the Scheldt and the Meuse with all the important industrial centres of the country, as well as with the Rhine and the navigable rivers of northern France. Belgium possesses the greatest rail- way mileage of any country in proportion to her area.
Every prospect was gladdened by the bounty of nature carefully nurtured, the evidences of useful industry, or suggestions of the amenities of life in a land of century-old civilization and refinement. Belgium was stored with the monuments and masterpieces of art and the ingenious products of human handicraft and skill. In no country would the operations of a hostile army create greater dis- turbance to the intricate web of human occupations or more cruel, relentless havoc.
By a heartless irony of destiny Belgium was the first victim in a conflict regarding Serbia — Belgium, whose unique concern had been to avoid entanglements and to
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 67
live at peace with all her neighbors. The tempest of war broke with terrifying suddenness and irresistible fury over the devoted country. Before the majority of the Belgians had fairly realized that there was an international crisis a veritable human inundation was submerging their fair provinces. Their gardens were trampled down by a ruth- less soldiery; their highways were filled with homeless fugitives fleeing destruction; towns and villages were re- duced to blackened, shapeless masses of ruins. The Bel- gians were made to expiate alleged violations of the rules of war by fire and sword. Their perversity in defending their homes incited savage acts of retaliation, the slaughter of civilians without discrimination by those whose very presence on Belgian soil was a transgression of international law, by those whom the rules adopted at The Hague in 1907, and subscribed to by Germany, if strictly interpreted, would deprive of the quality and rights of belligerents.
A situation is hardly apt to occur to which the assize of the nations would be more inclined to apply the following rules of The Hague Neutrality Conference of 1907:
Article I. Neutral territory is inviolable.
Article II. Belligerents are forbidden to send troops or convoys either of munitions of war or of provisions through the territory of a neutral state.
Article X. The act of a neutral state of resisting any vio- lation of its neutrality, even by fo?xe of arms, cannot be regarded as an act of hostility.
An assertion that Germany by an unprovoked declaration of war, without any reasonable grievance or demand for reparation, could appropriate the legitimate dignity of a belligerent in her action in Belgium might appear to be mere useless quibbling.
A systematic policy of intimidation and terrorism ap- pears to have been deliberately employed by the arrogant
68 The Great War
invaders of Belgium, who were indignant that a people whom they had been accustomed to regard with contempt should presume to embarrass for a moment the mighty progress of their plan of campaign. In a short space of time a land smiling with peace and prosperity was con- verted into one of sorrow and desolation.
An effort was made in the first volume of this history to demonstrate that the international guarantee for the invio- lability of Belgium was binding upon the German Empire as well as the North German Federation, chiefly because doubt as to its continuous validity has been raised by some promi- nent authorities on political science in this country. The German Empire itself had acknowledged quite unmistak- ably that it considered itself bound by these treaty obligations respecting Belgium. This statement will be substantiated in the course of the following considerations relative to the political background of Belgium's situation in the war.
There have been three kings of the Belgians. Leo- pold I, fourth son of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld, was succeeded, upon his death in 1865, by his more famous son, Leopold II, who died in his turn on December 17, 1909, leaving the crown to his nephew, Albert Leopold Clement Marie Meinrod, who rules as Albert I.
King Albert was born in Brussels, April 8, 1875, and was married to the Duchess Elizabeth of Bavaria, October 2, 1900. He has won the unlimited affection of his sub- jects and the glowing admiration of the world by his integrity and chivalrous qualities, his unsparing industry, unflinching devotion to duty, and invincible courage in the midst of the most disheartening and appalling disasters. The figure of Albert I will stand aloft on its pedestal in the Pantheon of human reverence when the niches of most of the world's warriors will have been usurped by more genuine benefactors of the race.
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 69
The present King of the Belgians gave proof of his zeal, as heir-apparent, by performing a tedious journey of inspection in the Congo, where the administration had fallen into disrepute. He left London, April 3, 1909, for Capetown, whence he proceeded to Katanga. From there he traversed the country on foot, through forests and jun- gles, a wearisome route of 1,500 miles to Boma on the lower Congo, and returned to Antwerp, August 16th.
The relations between the royal Belgian and imperial German families were apparently very amicable. The royal Belgian pair were entertained quite intimately at Potsdam in May, 1911, although, in consequence of the Kaiser's indisposition, the Crown Prince delivered the ad- dress of welcome at the state dinner, in which allusion was made to the felicity conveyed to the Belgian court by a German princess. The Kaiser, Kaiserin, and Princess Victoria Louisa returned this visit at the end of October of the same year, while the international exposition was in progress in Brussels. Never did the Kaiser abandon him- self more completely to his naturally impulsive inclination to amiability. Among other recipients of his special cordi- ality was M. Max, Mayor of Brussels, whose name we shall encounter later. The Kaiser expressed himself with the utmost enthusiasm with regard to the beauty of the city and the marvellous progress of the country which he had not visited for thirty-two years; and it may be freely ad- mitted that a return to Brussels after a much shorter absence and with a far humbler reception is likely to pro- duce a very lively feeling of satisfaction.
The Kaiser was charmed with all he saw — too captivated, the Belgians have since then been led to suggest.
The Kaiser made still another occurrence an oppor- tunity for a manifestation of cordiality towards Belgium. According to an ancient custom, the first entry into Liege
70 The Great War
of a new sovereign after his coronation is attended with a public celebration. The Kaiser availed himself of this "Joyeuse Entree" of the King and Queen of Belgium and the royal children into Liege, which took place in August, 1913, to send General von Emmich as a special envoy to bear to the royal family the solemn assurance of the friend- ship of the German ruler. At the festal banquet General von Emmich expressed in the warmest terms his admiration for the virtues of the Belgian people and the merits of their sovereign. But only a year later this messenger of peace and good-will forced his way into Liege at the head of an invading army bringing death and destruction.
The German minister at Brussels declared in 1905 that Belgian neutrality was a political dogma for his government.
The German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, took refuge as early as 1911 behind the same pretext for avoiding a formal, public promise which Herr von Jagow employed on July 31, 1914, namely, that a public statement of Germany's intentions regarding the observance of Bel- gian neutrality would be equivalent to a partial disclosure of the German plan of campaign against France, as elabo- rated for an eventual conflict, by reducing the range of uncertainty regarding the direction of Germany's opera- tions. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg assured the Belgian government privately that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but that a public statement in this sense would permit France to concentrate all her forces on her eastern frontier. One might suppose that a nation proud of its honor would shrink from exploiting the suspicion of a felonious intention for realizing a mili- tary advantage in time of peace.
Early in 1912, Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter, then Ger- man Foreign Secretary, while engaged in conversation with Baron Beyens, but lately arrived in Berlin as Belgian
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 71
minister, alluded in a tone of ingenuous surprise to the signs of apprehension in Belgium at the time of the inter- national crisis in 1911. "There is no ground for the fear that Germany would violate your territory or that of your neighbors in the Netherlands," he declared.
At the time when the proposed enlargement of the Ger- man military establishment and the corresponding financial measures were undergoing discussion in the committee stage, on April 29, 1913, two Social Democrat members of the Reichstag raised the question of Germany's eventual attitude towards Belgian neutrality by alluding to the ap- prehension felt in Belgium that Germany would not respect her treaty obligations, Herr von Jagow replied to their inquiry concerning the German government's intentions: "Belgian neutrality is determined by international agree- ments and Germany is determined to respect these agreements." At the renewed insistence of the Socialist members, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, de- clared: "Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganization of the German miliary system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Ger- many will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Bel- gium is guaranteed by international treaty." (See Appendix.)
An important commentary upon the German assertion, based upon one of the documents discovered in the War Office in Brussels, that Great Britain intended to disembark troops in Belgium and forestall Germany in violating Bel- gian neutrality, is a letter addressed by Sir Edward Grey to the British minister in Brussels, dated April 7, 1913. A rumor in a sense similar to the present German conviction regarding Great Britain's intentions had arisen in Belgium and the British Foreign Minister repeated in this com- munication his assurances to the Belgian minister in con- sequence of it, as follows:
72 The Great War
" I said that I was sure that this government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embar- rassing question, was what it would be desirable and neces- sary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do, if Belgian neutrality was violated by any power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justifica- tion for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and, as long as it was not violated by any other power, we would certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory."
A convincing array of evidence forces us to the conclu- sion that the German plan of campaign on the west, with the movement across Belgium as the characteristic feature in consequence of the invulnerable line of barrier fortresses in eastern France, had been prepared in every detail long before the war. And if this is true, we can scarcely escape the conviction that the frequent reiteration of Germany's correct and cordial attitude towards Belgium was really part of a deliberate plan of deception. It may extenuate the complicity of German officials and diplomatic repre- sentatives to suppose that they had not been fully initiated into the designs of the German General Staff, or that they believed that the scheme of crossing Belgium was merely an optional plan, held in reserve for the event of an actual violation of the Belgian frontier on the part of France.
Leopold II had not been blind to the danger which threatened Belgian independence from the east, and never allowed an occasion to escape for urging the necessity of strengthening Belgium's military capacity for resistance.
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 73
To the fortress of Antwerp, commonly regarded by Bel- gians as their national redoubt, Liege and Namur were added to hold the keys of the valley of the Meuse, the natural highway for armies traversing Belgium in either direction. The steel cupolas of the two latter, designed by the celebrated Belgian military engineer, M. Brialmont, were regarded for a time as the zenith of development in the art of fortification. In 1906 the sum of 63,000,000 francs ($12,159,000) was voted for remodelling and expand- ing the defenses of Antwerp, and fifteen new forts were constructed forming an outer ring about the city. Until 1909 the Belgian army, numbering about 100,000 men, was recruited by volunteer enlistments supplemented by con- scription, with substitution permitted for the benefit of those who were drafted. This antiquated system was inadequate as well as undemocratic; but it required a strenuous effort to induce the Belgians to submit to the unaccustomed inconveniences of universal compulsory military service. The middle classes in manufacturing communities, where the division of the population into industrial classes is accentuated, might naturally regard with aversion the promiscuous life and associations of the barracks. The proposal for a radical reform in the basis for military service involved a long parliamentary struggle. The last document signed by Leopold II on his deathbed was an act requiring the performance of military service by one son in each family; and finally, in 1913, a bill was passed establishing the principle of universal compulsory service, although in practice only about one-half of the annual contingent was to be called up for active service. The period of service with the colors was fixed at fifteen months for the infantry, and the aggregate effective forces available in time of peace were estimated at 56,080 for 1914-1915. At the close of 1913 the army comprised six
74 The Great War
divisions posted at Antwerp, Liege, Namur, Ghent, Mons, and Brussels. The effective forces on a peace-footing at that time amounted to 6,500 each for four divisions, and somewhat more than 8,000 for the other two. These num- bers would be raised to 25,000 and 32,000 respectively in time of war.
When the development of the reserve force should have attained its normal limit through the gradual diffusion of military training, the available forces on a war-footing would have numbered about 340,000. At the outbreak of the war in 1914 they actually amounted to about 226,000 soldiers and 4,500 officers.
In view of the strikingly suspicious indications, it is diffi- cult to understand how the foreign offices of the western powers could have entertained any illusions as to the designs of Germany. The strategic railways in Germany directed towards the Belgian frontier, the reluctance of the Chan- cellor to make a public statement of the German attitude in 1911, his non-committal expression on the same subject in the midnight interview with the British ambassador in Berlin on July 29, 1914, the evasive remarks of Herr von Jagow relative to the British inquiry on July 31st, and his reiteration of the pretext that a statement by the German government would disclose a certain part of the Ger- man plan of operations, and, above all, the very obtrusive fact that Germany did not accept the formal invitation of Great Britain- to agree specifically to abstain from molesting Belgium — these and many lesser signs would seem to have left small room for doubt that the German military author- ities had absolutely resolved to stake their chances of winning a brilliant campaign on an immediate flanking movement across Belgian territory.
Herr von Jagow, solicitous, as it would seem, about an available pretext for war, intimated in his conversation
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 75
with the British ambassador on July 31st that hostile acts had already been committed by Belgium, that a consign- ment of grain, for instance, for a German destination had been placed under an embargo. The Belgian authorities have shown that the actual circumstances of the incident which served as basis for this accusation were the follow- ing. A Belgian royal decree of July 30th prohibited provisionally the exportation of certain products, notably cereals. On the 31st the German minister at Brussels made an official inquiry regarding the detention by the Antwerp customs of cargoes of grain, which had arrived there for transhipment to Germany, and were not prop- erly included in the scope of the royal decree, because they had not originated in Belgium. In consequence, instructions were forwarded to the customs authorities on August 1st giving full satisfaction to the German representations.
The Belgian government must have been aware from the first that the international crisis involved an element of possible peril for their own position. On July 29th they decided to place the army on a strengthened peace foot- ing, which signifies calling to the colors three classes of the reserves. The Secretary General of the Belgian For- eign Office, Baron van der Elst, in explaining the nature of this military precaution, intended only to guarantee the fulfilment of Belgium's international obligations, to Herr von Below-Saleske, the German Minister, July 31st, asked the latter whether he had been informed of the conversa- tion which he (Baron van der Elst) had had with the pre- ceding German minister, which led to the Chancellor's private assurance concerning Belgian neutrality. Herr von Below-Saleske replied that he knew of this conversa- tion and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not been changed.
76 The Great War
In informing the Belgian government on the same day of the note of inquiry addressed by Sir Edward Grey to the French and German governments respectively on the subject of the preservation of Belgian neutrality, the British Minister, Sir Francis Villiers, expressed the expectation of the British Foreign Secretary that Belgium was resolved to do her utmost to maintain her neutrality and that she de- sired and expected that the other powers would respect and maintain it. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for For- eign Affairs, assured Sir Francis Villiers in reply that the powers guaranteeing Belgian independence could rest assured that Belgium would neglect no effort to maintain her neutrality and that her military forces, in consequence of the recent reorganization, were sufficient to enable her to defend herself energetically in the event of the violation of her territory. The French government made a formal declaration to the Belgian government on August 1st of their intention of respecting the neutrality of Belgium.
General mobilization was ordered in Belgium on the same day, and the Belgian diplomatic representatives at the capitals of the signatory powers of the Quintuple Treaty, as well as at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg, were instructed to read to the respective foreign ministers a communication stating that Belgium would strive un- flinchingly to fulfil the duties imposed on her by the treaty of April 19, 1839, and that the army had been mobilized and the forts of Antwerp and of the Meuse put into a state of defense so as to enable Belgium to discharge her international obligations.
An official dispatch from Luxemburg, August 2d, in- formed the Belgian government, as one of the powers which signed the treaty establishing its neutrality, that early in the morning German troops had entered the terri- tory of the grand-duchy, crossing the Moselle by the
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Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 77
bridges at Wasserbillig and Remich, and had proceeded in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital, while trains full of troops and ammunition were passing along the rail- way from Wasserbillig to the same point. These incidents were in violation of the perpetual neutrality of the Grand- duchy of Luxemburg which rested on a treaty signed at London, May 11, 1867, by Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia. The second article of this treaty reads as follows:
"The Grand-duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of April 19, 1839, under the guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall hence- forth form a perpetually neutral State.
" It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States.
"The high contracting parties engage to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Act.
That principle is and remains under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the powers (which are) signa- tory parties to the present treaties, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral state."
The government of Luxemburg did not fail to address an energetic protest against these aggressive actions to the German diplomatic representative at Luxemburg, and to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. Chan- cellor von Bethmann-Hollweg sent the ostensibly reassur- ing communication that Germany contemplated no hostile action against the grand-duchy [very satisfactory tidings — the two friendly and neighboring powers were to be spared the carnage and bitterness of a warlike contest!], and the military measures were only precautionary, in- tended to protect from a French attack the railways of Luxemburg which are under German management. The
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grand-ducal army, though kept in a constant state of mobilization at its war (as well as peace) strength of 155 men, quite sensibly abstained from intervention to prevent the execution of this very reasonable measure!
The Grand-duchy of Luxemburg, it may be explained parenthetically, has an area of 999 square miles, and con- tained a population of 259,891 souls in 1910. Its impor- tance, of course, lies chiefly in its deposits of iron-ore.
Likewise, on the morning of this same day, August 2d, Sir Francis Villiers informed M. Davignon that Great Britain had received no reply from Berlin to the com- munication sent in duplicate, July 31st, to the German and French governments in regard to Belgian neutrality. M. Davignon brought to Herr von Below-Saleske's notice the French minister's intention of publishing the formal statement, as conveyed the day before by the French gov- ernment to the Belgian, confirming the former's intention of respecting the neutrality of Belgium. Herr von Below- Saleske replied that up to the present he had not been instructed to make any official communication, but that the Belgian government knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which they had the right to enter- tain towards their eastern neighbors. M. Davignon added that while all that they knew of Germany's intentions, as indicated in many previous conversations, did not allow them to doubt Germany's attitude of perfect correctness towards Belgium, yet they would attach the greatest im- portance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian people would hear of with joy and gratitude.
The formal declaration of Germany's intentions was not long in making its appearance. It was precipitated into peaceful Brussels like an unexpected projectile of terrible explosive force launched from an invisible battery at long range.
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 79
Herr von Below-Saleske called at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at seven o'clock in the evening of the same day (August 2d) and handed to M. Davignon the following note, labelled "very confidential," requiring a reply within the period of twelve hours:
" Reliable information has been received by the German government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This in- formation leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.
"The German government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost good-will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guar- antee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany for her own pro- tection to enter Belgian territory.
" In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German government makes the following declaration:
"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Bel- gium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German government binds itself, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian kingdom in full.
"2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.
"3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to
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purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash pay- ment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.
"4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.
"In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the rela- tions between the two states must be left to the decision of arms.
"The German government, however, entertains the dis- tinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighboring states will grow stronger and more enduring."
This German ultimatum demanding free passage across Belgian territory for German armies, ostensibly in conse- quence of an imminent invasion of Germany by French forces traversing the same route, was presented nearly twenty-four hours before Germany declared war against France. The note requires no commentary. Hardly an effort had been made to palliate its brutal significance. It left no loophole for discussion. Its abrupt appearance directly after Herr von Below-Saleske's unctuous assur- ances and the scanty period left for deliberation, and that confined to the night-time, contributed a grim, appalling setting for the tragic situation. With unconscious irony the German authorities, who were destined so soon with such remorseless severity to devastate the towns of Belgium,
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 81
menaced the Belgians with indignant resentment should they themselves presume to destroy their own belongings, such as bridges, roads and tunnels.
The Belgian Cabinet was hastily summoned to confer upon the nation's policy and sanction the text of a response to Germany's demands. And throughout most of the ensuing night the manly young king, whose open, genial countenance is so well-known, surrounded by his responsible ministers, wrestled with the supreme problem of duty and the nation's destiny. In spite of the brave words of dispatches and manifestoes, they must have known too well the awful weight and terrible efficiency of the German military machine to allow themselves the consola- tion of any seductive illusions as to the consequences in case the fateful issue were to be decided by a serious military contest. All that Belgium had accomplished in generations of peaceful, laborious development was at stake. The pleas- ant, tranquil existence in ancient towns with their tall-gabled houses and tidy, brick-paved streets, in smiling villages, in white-washed cottages by shady lanes, by willow-margined canals with slowly-moving barges, and in trim fields where the crops cherished with fond attention were just ripening, where all was redolent of the languid charm of Flemish life and Flemish cheer; the hallowed monuments of the first rise of urban consciousness and independence in western Europe; the architectural treasures of the cen- turies; the varied fascination of life in Brussels; the com- merce of the world floating on the placid bosom of the Scheldt; the enviable prosperity of a varied industry; a land of opulence in all its most engaging forms — the destiny of all these things, and above all, a nation's honor and reputation were placed in these men's hands, and were involved in the decisions which must be reached within the arbitrary limit of twelve short hours.
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There is no situation from which frail human nature so instinctively, so persistently shrinks as one which requires an immediate, unconditional, final decision in matters of profoundest, vital import. How impulsively the imagina- tion applies itself to the task of devising specious pretexts for delay; and to what a cold, benumbing, cringing sense the mind gives way, if it finds itself caught as in a cul-de-sac, with no outlet for evasion, betrayed, committed to the dreaded necessity of an immediate, definite choice of con- duct. Intensify many times the stern, unrelenting quality of such exigencies in private life, and we vaguely grasp an impression of such crises in the history of nations which test the character of political leadership and distinguish the statesman from the merely laborious bureaucrat. The combination of conscientiousness and responsibility in statesmen through times like these requires a subtle, self- possessed intellect, an adamantine will, and nerves as sensi- tive and true as well-tempered steel.
The picture of this tragic conference calls to mind as counterpart the extraordinary council at Potsdam.
When we contemplate such scenes as these all the con- flict of the warring forces resolves itself into a human drama in which the attention is riveted upon the action of a few individuals. History becomes for the time intensely personal. For a moment all the perplexing accessories recede from view and the chief characters stand out against a neutral background in the simple majesty of epic heroism.
Responsibilities involving bigger consequences in men and means this war has produced, but none intenser or more inexorable than that which faced the leaders of the Belgian people, and with which they resolutely grappled through the painful hours of that fateful Sunday night. At first, perhaps, the choice appeared to be simply between igno- miny and suicide; between the preservation of Belgium's
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 83
material prosperity by the renunciation of a purely impal- pable possession, and the possible sacrifice of all wordly goods for a sterile, heroic ideal. But deliberation doubt- less confirmed the austere demands of duty. For what trustworthy guarantee of sincerity could be expected from a government which persisted in violating its solemn obli- gation? Might not a vital necessity be again advanced to justify the military retention of Belgian strongholds? Might not military occupation lead by an unavoidable series of intermediary stages to inclusion in the Imperial Zollverein, and then approximation to the status of Bavaria or Saxony, with summary annexation to Prussia as punish- ment for obstinacy? The initial loss of honor would involve almost inevitably the loss of independence and of national identity.
The king and council listened to the possibilities of de- fense as explained by the military authorities. Then the draft of the heroic reply to the German ultimatum, which had been prepared by the Foreign Ministry, was discussed, retouched, and finally adopted. And in the morning, before the expiration of the allotted time, the following intrepid response was forwarded to the German minister :
"The German Government stated in its note of the 2d of August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best inten- tions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assist- ance, an advance of French troops.
"The German Government, therefore, considered itself compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions
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to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two states to the decision of arms.
"This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.
"The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1st, in the name of the French Government.
"Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neu- trality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.
"The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.
"Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.
"The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic inter- est justifies such a violation of law.
"The Belgian Government by accepting the proposals submitted to it would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray its duty towards Europe.
"Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, it refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 85
"If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Government is firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in its power, every attack upon its rights."
This was a somewhat less drastic, but certainly no less heroic, manner of response than that of the Spartans to the heralds of the Great King who came demanding earth and water in sign of submission to the Persian yoke, and were thrown into a pit and told to find the symbols there.
At ten o'clock on the morning of the 3d, as no act of war had been committed by Germany, the Belgian Cabinet decided that it was not necessary to make an immediate appeal to the guaranteeing powers. About noon the French minister assured M. Davignon that the French government would immediately respond to an appeal from Belgium; and on the same day the French military attache communicated the specific offer of five French army corps to assist the Belgian army in the defense of the country. But M. Davignon replied that the Belgian government would decide later what it ought to do.
No communication or measure of the Belgian govern- ment at the time of the crisis can be cited as evidence that Belgium had in any way sacrificed her liberty of action, or bound herself by any agreement or understanding incom- patible with strict neutrality. She proclaimed her willing- ness to make any sacrifice to defend her neutrality, and her conduct offered no indication to prove that she was not disposed to defend it against an aggressive action by any power whatsoever.
The German minister made the following communica- tion to M. Davignon at six o'clock on the morning of August 4th :
"In accordance with my instructions, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the
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refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well- intentioned proposals made to it by the German Govern- ment, the latter to its deep regret, finds itself compelled to take — if necessary by force of arms — those measures of defense already designated as indispensable, in view of the menace of France."
This message was, in effect, the German declaration of war, and Herr von Below-Saleske received his passports the same day and entrusted the German legation to the care of his colleague of the United States. The course of the deliberations of a cabinet meeting, summoned to confer upon the necessary measures to be taken in the emergency, was determined by the tidings that German forces had already crossed the Belgian frontier at Gemmenich. In consequence, the following note was transmitted to the British, French, and Russian ministers at Brussels the same evening:
"The Belgian Government regrets to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Ger- many entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.
"The Royal Government is firmly resolved to resist by all the means in its power.
"Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to cooperate as guaranteeing powers in the defense of her territory.
"There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future mainten- ance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.
"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defense of her fortified places."
Far from associating herself with the enemies of Ger- many in any unjustifiable act of hostility, Belgium waited
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 87
more than twelve hours after her territory had been actu- ally invaded by the German armies before appealing to the guarantors of her neutrality for assistance.
In the meantime the British minister in Brussels presented the following communication to the Belgian Foreign Office:
"I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Government expects Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.
"In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government is prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium."
From this message also it will appear how scrupulously the proprieties of Belgium's peculiar international situation were respected by Great Britain.
The Belgian Parliament had been hastily summoned on the 4th for passing the necessary acts of legislation required by the emergency and impending war, and King Albert addressed the Chambers in solemn session as follows:
"Never since 1830 has a graver hour sounded for Bel- gium. The force of our right and the necessity for Europe of our autonomous existence make us still hope that the events which we fear will not take place; but if it is neces- sary to resist the invasion of our soil, duty will find us armed and decided upon the greatest sacrifices!
"From this moment our youth will have risen to de- fend our fatherland against the danger. A single duty is imposed on our will: a determined resistance, courage, and unity.
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"Our enthusiasm is shown by our irreproachable mobi- lization and by the multitude of volunteers.
"The moment for action is here. I have called you together to allow the Chambers to associate themselves in the enthusiasm of the country. You will find a way to pass all these measures at once. You are all decided to preserve intact the sacred patrimony of our ancestors. No one will fail in his duty.
"The army is equal to its task. The government and myself have full confidence. The government understands its responsibilities and will maintain them till the end to safeguard the supreme good of the country. If the stranger violates our territory, he will find all Belgians gathered round their sovereign, who will never betray his constitutional oath.
" I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends itself imposes respect on all and does not perish. God will be with us."
On August 5th the three governments to which the appeal of Belgium had been conveyed informed the Bel- gian government through their ministers in Brussels that they were prepared to respond to the appeal and cooperate in the defense of the country.
Likewise on the 5th, the Belgian Foreign Minister in- structed the Belgian representatives in all lands to transmit the following formal communication to the foreign minis- ters of the governments to which they were individually accredited:
"By the treaty of April 19, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty reads: 'Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State.'
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 89
Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations; she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality ; she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.
"In these circumstances the Belgian Government has learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Bel- gian territory in violation of the obligation undertaken by treaty.
"It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.
"The Royal Government is firmly determined to repel by all the means in its power the attack thus made upon its neutrality, and it recalls the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality, such action cannot be considered as a hostile act."
Some of the German apologists have propagated with apparently unaffected remissness a misapprehension tend- ing to obscure the true basis for judging Germany's atti- tude with respect to Belgium. For example, Dr. Dernburg cited the words of Mr. Gladstone denying that "the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee was binding on every party, irrespective of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises," as a possible argument to justify Germany in breaking the treaty and violating Belgian neutrality, because at the time it was contrary to the interest of Germany to maintain the agreement. Such an inter- pretation is a distortion of Mr. Gladstone's attitude as expressed in the speech from which the above words were extracted. Mr. Gladstone referred only to the duty of each
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of the contracting parties to intervene in active defense of Belgian neutrality against an aggressive action by any other power, not to the more fundamental obligation placed upon the signatory powers of abstaining themselves from the violation of Belgian neutrality. In Mr. Gladstone's opinion, conditions might possibly excuse one of the signa- tory powers from taking active measures in defending Belgian neutrality against violation, but it was far from his thoughts to suppose that circumstances could ever justify one of these powers in the actual perpetration of such a deed of iniquity. The authors of the illogical view which we are considering make no distinction between the failure to prevent, and the actual commission of, the transgression covered by the international agreement. It is a glaring injustice against Mr. Gladstone to suppose that he could have suggested that any conceivable situation would ever justify Great Britain in violating Belgian neutrality. It is hardly necessary to add that these apologists ignore the fact that, entirely apart from the treaty of 1839, Belgium, like any other state which sees fit to stand aside during a contest between its neighbors, has the right by international law and the most elementary, axiomatic principles of justice to possess her territory undisturbed and inviolate.
The assertion has been made and is perhaps correct, that Great Britain violated the rights of neutrality with the same contemptuous arrogance in bombarding Copenhagen in 1807, and that in the present situation she would not have drawn the sword if France had been the transgressor. But what do these statements prove? They remind us primarily that many German apologists are more eager to besmirch the reputation of Great Britain than to establish the justice of Germany's policy in Belgium. But history is not so much concerned about weighing the relative respectability of the actors whom she represents on the
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 91
stage of human affairs, as in investigating the causes and motives, and the results of their conduct. Historians whose field is quite another period will enlighten us with regard to the moral aspect of the bombardment of Copen- hagen, as of the annexation of Silesia or dismemberment of Poland. Our present concern is limited to the violation by- Germany of the neutrality of Belgium in contravention of a solemn treaty and of international law, which gave any or all of the other guaranteeing powers the right, and at the same time imposed the duty, of intervening. The fact that considerations of self-interest inspired Great Britain with greater alacrity in assuming the defense of Belgian neutrality is urged as a justification or palliation of Ger- many's offense. As though Germany, after overrunning and ravaging Belgium in open defiance of justice, as her own chief officials acknowledged, should have the right to insist that the powers which entered the lists in vindication of the outraged country ought to be as spotless and as free from selfish motives as the searcher for the Holy Grail !
It cannot be denied that until as late as August 2d the British government did not fully determine to regard the possible violation of Belgian neutrality as a cause for war; and this circumstance has been utilized for establish- ing the unrighteousness inherent in Great Britain's inter- vention in the war. But surely Great Britain did not waive her eventual right to intervene by her attitude of uncertainty before the occasion for action had arisen. No right or duty based on a formal agreement is annulled merely by the indecision of one of the parties about the expediency of acting on the basis of the right or duty, before the stipulated period for such action has expired or the compact has been formally repudiated.
As we have already observed (Volume I, page 267), the German government, expressing itself in the words of
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Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr von Jagow, ex- plained the invasion of Belgium, at the time, solely as a military necessity. Even the intimation that Belgium had committed acts of hostility, advanced tentatively by Herr von Jagow on July 31st, had been abandoned on August 4th, apparently because of its futility. The German decla- ration of war against France, August 3d, mentioned the flight of French aviators across Belgian territory. But nobody seems to have taken this allegation seriously, or to have assumed that it justified German intervention in Belgium.
At a later time, not content with this single basis of defense, the military necessity, the German authorities charged Belgium with many violations of neutrality, and the Chancellor declared that "there were already (on August 4, 1914) many indications of the guilt of the Bel- gian government." He added very judiciously that he had "no documentary evidence" at the time, the reason, doubtless, why no formal protest was made to the Belgian government or its diplomatic representative. We have already disposed of the most conspicuous example of this posthumous evidence, the military "conversations." The other charges would scarcely deserve our attention, except for their extensive circulation in this country.
Thus it has been alleged that Belgian fortifications were all directed against Germany and that this fact is proof of hostile intentions. As we have already noticed, there were three important fortresses in Belgium: Antwerp, Liege, and Namur. A summary method of disproving the above- cited charge would consist in pointing out that Antwerp is situated near the northern, or Dutch, frontier, Liege near the eastern, or German, frontier, and Namur near the southern, or French, frontier. But a less superficial view would regard the location of these fortresses as determined,
Exchanging the crepe drapery for flags and flowers on the Strassburg monument, which stands on the Place de la Concorde, Paris, on August i i, 19 1+.
The Prime Minister of Belgium speaking from the balcony of the Parliament House on the dav on which Germany declared war.
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 93
not by their proximity to frontiers, but by the physical features of the country.
Antwerp is the most prominent fortress simply because it is the all-important port. Liege and Namur are the keys to the valley of the Meuse, which is the natural route for armies endeavoring to traverse Belgium in either direction, the Germans towards France, or the French towards Germany. Liege and Namur command opposite ends of the central section where this route traverses a natural defile, the former nearer Germany, the latter nearer France.
It has been alleged that there were French officers on Belgian soil previous to the invasion of Belgium by Ger- many. The conventional usages of historical and judicial inquiry permit us to demand more specific evidence than this bare statement without seeming to impugn the veracity of those who have advanced it. If these officers were cap- tured in Belgian fortresses they must have been taken to some German detention camp, where their identity and the exact circumstances could be ascertained. But what judicial significance would their presence in Belgium con- vey, in any case ? German officers have been continuously present in Turkey since 1883 without involving the Turkish government in questions of violated neutrality. It is ob- vious that the presence of French officers in Belgium while France and Germany were still at peace could not constitute a valid excuse for Germany's hostile action. The neutrality of Belgium could in any case be impaired only by the presence of the French officers during the period intervening between the announcement in Brussels of the existence of a state of war between Germany and France and the invasion of Belgium by Germany. For manifestly, if the invasion of Belgium is to be justified by Belgium's violation of her own neutrality, such violation
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would necessarily consist in an action or a situation preced- ing the invasion. The German declaration of war against France was presented at 6.45 P. M. on August 3d. The German invasion of Belgium commenced during the night of August 3-4, according to some statements as early as midnight. Can anybody reasonably maintain that during these few intervening hours the Belgian government could have received official information of the existence of a state of war between Germany and France and taken the necessary steps to remove any French officers who might happen to be sojourning on Belgian soil ! Besides, to make the German allegation a quite consistent cause of war, it would be requisite not only that Belgium failed within these few intervening hours to expel the French officers, after learning of the declaration of war, but that tidings of this negligence should have been brought to the Ger- man government, so that in cognizance of it they ordered their forces to commence the invasion of Belgium.
We have thus far been unable to discover any evidence to justify the violation of Belgium's neutrality on the basis of international law or respectable standards of conduct. But let us go further and ask ourselves whether the Ger- man professions regarding Belgium will bear the test of consistency; whether they are coherent.
The German government declared that it possessed evidence which left no doubt that France intended to march through Belgium to attack Germany in the lower Rhine territory, presumably a vital spot, so that it was a matter of life and death for Germany to forestall her enemy by marching herself into Belgian territory, this being, in the circumstances, really a defensive measure. The Germans assert, moreover, that they offered the means whereby Belgium could have avoided all the misery that has befallen her by proposing friendly neutrality on
Moral Factors in Belgium, France, Italy 95
condition of a free passage for their forces through Bel- gian territory.
If the French preparations for a movement across Bel- gium to attack the lower Rhine territory of Germany had been on the point of realization, making it a question of life or death for the Germans to anticipate them by moving across Belgium themselves, the German army would have directly encountered the French forces on Belgian soil, and unhappy Belgium would have furnished the battlefields. Far from guaranteeing Belgium against the ravages of war, the German plan would, in this case, have brought destruction upon the devoted country from both sides. But if the French army was not ready to penetrate Belgium at once, the German penetration of Belgium is shorn altogether of its alleged justification as a vital necessity.
The Germans are confronted, therefore, by this fatal alternative: either their march into Belgium would have brought inevitable ruin upon the country, or else it loses the only alleged defense worthy of consideration, the argu- ment of necessity. It follows, therefore, that the German professions, as mentioned above, are neither logical nor consistent.
As for the argument of necessity, the fact that nearly three weeks elapsed, after the declaration of hostilities, before the French were prepared to offer any serious resistance on their own northern frontier is a convincing refutation of the charge that they were prepared to launch an attack across Belgium.
We may briefly recapitulate some of the more salient aspects of the Belgian situation.
By an international agreement, sanctioned and guaran- teed by the Great Powers in the most formal manner, Belgium was excluded from the arena of international
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contention; her soil was declared inviolable; she was dedi- cated to perpetual neutrality and peace. This covenant was still binding on the signatory powers in 1914. None of the fundamental conditions had changed since the rati- fication of the compact, except that the source of danger to Belgium had shifted from her southern to her eastern neighbor. Trusting in the validity of this solemn com- pact, France left her northern frontier almost undefended, while Germany, who in general relies upon prompt offen- sive strategy in place of forts, had likewise neglected to fortify her Belgian frontier. The strategic advantage of traversing Belgium in spite of the agreement was doubly attractive to both Germany and France because their common stretch of frontier is difficult to cross.
The French government declared that France would abide by her agreement; Germany yielded to temptation and violated her obligation.
The Germans claim that their invasion of Belgium was justified by the intrigues of the Belgians, evidence for which they discovered several weeks after their invasion began. The posteriority of the discovery destroys its effi- cacy as proof of the justice of Germany's intentions, while the evidence itself is trivial and unconvincing.
The German government claimed that the French in- tended to steal the advantage of a march through Belgium; but this assertion has never been substantiated. Germans have endeavored to extenuate their own transgression by declaring that Great Britain also broke her obligation, in spirit if not in fact. They assert that she would not have been disposed to fulfil her stipulation under the treaty by intervening to protect Belgian neutrality in all circum- stances. They forget that there is an essential distinction between a direct violation of Belgian neutrality and a failure to defend that neutrality if assailed by another power. No
Forts on the Franco-German frontier. The French since iSji have expended large sums in carrying out the plans of their engineers