Qia

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THE LIBRARY

OF

THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

Is War

N ow I 111 possible ?

Pdblisher's Announcement : The Russian Library Edited by W. T. Stead Vol. I.

REFLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN STATESMAN. By K. P. Pobye- DONOSTsoFF. Translated from the Russian by R. C. Long. With a Preface by Olga Novikoff. Crown 8vo, 6s.

PATRIOTISM AND EMPIRE. By John M. Robertson.

Crown 8vo, 5s.

GRANT RICHARDS, LONDON, W.C.

The Russian Ltibrary II

Is War

Now Impossible?

Being an Abridgment of "The War of the

Future in its Technical, Economic

and I^'l!tic.ll Relations"

By I. S. Bloch

Wiih a Prcftitory Conversation with the Author by

W. 1 . Stead

Translated from the Russian lyith Maps and lUuHrationt

London

Grant Richards

1899

Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson d-» Co. At the Ballantyne Press

lOSL

CONTENTS

Preface: Conairsations with the Author, by

W. T. Stead vii

Author's Prefaci Ixiii

PART 1

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS

CMAr. '*c«

I. How War will be Waged ox Land 3

II. Plans of Campaign : Possible and Impossible 63

III The Flture or Naval Warfarl . 93

IV. Does Russia Need A Navy? 113

V. What Wars have Cost in the Nineteenth

Century .126

\'I. What they will Cost in thi: Future . 140

VII. The Care OF THE Wounded . . 146

1 V 2t^2:i7

\[ CONTENTS

PART II

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN TIME OF WAR

PAGE C:iAP.

I. In Russia 163

II. In Britain 251

III. In Germany 266

IV. In France ^77

V. Effect OF War ON THE Vital Needs OF Peoples 294

VI. Probable Losses in Future Wars . . 319 VII. Militarism and its Nemesis . . -347

LIST OK MAPS AND DIAGRAMS

PACE

Map of Russian Defensive System . . 74

Map of Paths of Advance of the Austro-German Armies from Points of Concentration to the Vistula-Bug-Narev Theatre

of War 77

Map of Paths of Advance of the German and Austrian Armies on the Vistula-Bug-N'arcv Theatre of War, from Pierron and

Brailmont 78

Plan of Invasion by Russia of Prussian Territory So

Diagram of Expenditure on the Crimean War 129

Diagram of Expjenditure on the War of 1859 130

Diagram of Expenditure by Russia on the War of 1S77-78 . 131

Diagram of Expenditure of Europe on War in the second half

of the Nineteenth Century 132

Diagram of Increase per cent, of Military Expenditure between

"1874 and 1896 134

Diagrams of Probable Daily Expenditure on a Future War 142-144 Diagram of Percentage Distribution of the Revenues . 145

Diagram of Result of Firing from an ii-mil Rifle 149-150

Plate showing effect of a Bullet fired from a distance of 3500

metres on the Human Tibia, and on the Bone of an Ox . 153 Diagram showing Depreciation of Russian Securities at the Out- break of War i63

Plan showing Expenditure by Russia, per Inhabitant, on Army

and Navy

Diagram of Russian Exports and Imports (1889-94) . , . 17J Diagram of Percentage of Russian Export to Production (1890-94) 1 75

17O .78

Plan of Russian Grain Production per Inhabitant

Diagram of Classification of Russian Imports

Plan of Russian Commercial Undertakings in 1S92, per 100,000 of

the Population i3o

Plan of Russian Expenditure on Posts and Telegraphs per In- habitant 181

Plan of Output of Russian Factories 183

Diagram of Percentage Comparison of Wages in Russia, Great

Britain, and North America . . 1S6

iv LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS

PAGE

Plan of Percentage Growth of Russian Population between 1885

and 1897 189

Plan of Average Number of Houses in a Russian Settlement _ . 191 Plan of Average Value of one Property destroyed by Fire in

Russia, between 1860-87 I94

Plan of Average Losses by Fire in Russia per 100 Inhabitants

(1860-68) 195

Plan of Number of Large Cattle in Russia, per 1000 desaytins

(1888) 199

Plan of Comparative Yields of Ag-icultural Countries of Europe 200 Plan of Comparative Number of Large Cattle in Agricultural

Countries of Europe 201

Diagram of Russian Harvest in 1893 205

Diagram of Growth of the Orthodox Population in Russia, and

the General Population of other Countries, per 1000 . . 207 Diagram of the Number of Marriages, per 1000, of the Population

of the Countries of Europe 208

Diagram of the Number of Births, per 1000, of the Population

of the Countries of Europe 208

Diagram of the Mortality, per 1000, of the Population of the

Countries of Europe 209

Diagram of Percentage Mortality of Children under one year, in

the Countries of Europe 210

Diagram of the Number of Survivors out of 1000 Children born

at all ages up to 75 212

^Diagram of the Value of Human Life at Various Ages . .214

Plan of Outlay on Instruction in Russia in 18S7, per Inhabitant . 215 Diagram of Percentage of Illiterates accepted for Military Ser- vice in chief European Countries . . . . . .217

Diagrams showing Number of Students in Higher and Interme- diate Russian Educational Institutions, per 100,000 of the

Population 218-219

Diagram of Number of Doctors in European Countries, per

100,000 of the Population ....... 220

Diagram of Number of Quadratic Kilometres for every Doctor . 221 Plan of Outlay on Medicine in Russia, per Inhabitant . 222

Plan of Number of Deaths from Typhus in Russia, per 1000 Cases 224 Diagram of Number of Illegitimates in 1000 Births, in chief

European Countries ........ 225

Diagram of Number of Suicides per 100,000 of the Population,

in chief European Countries 226

Diagram of Consumption of Spirits per 100 of the Population,

in chief European Countries, in 1868 and 1888 . . . 229 Diagram of Number of Deaths from Drunkenness per Million of

the Population, in chief European Countries . . . 230

Diagram of Average Number of Convictions per 200,000 of the

Population of Russia 231

LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS

Diagrams of Numbers of Various Classes condemned for Murder per Million of the corresponding Population in chief Euro- pean Countries .........

Diagrams of Numbers of Various Classes convicted for Theft per Million of the corresponding Population in chief Euro- pean Countries .........

Diagrams of Numbers convicted for Highway Robbery per Mil- lion of the corresponding Population in chief European Countries ..........

Diagrams of Numbers convicted for Swindling per Million of the corresponding Population, in chief European Countries

Diagram of Percentage Relation of Men and Women convicted in chief European Countries .....

Diagram of Percentage Increase in Russia in the Fifteen Chief Forms of Crime

Diagram of Number of Convictions in Great Britain per 100,000 of the Population

Diagram of Comparative Convictions in France and Austria

Diagram of Number of Convictions per 100,000 of Population in Germany .........

Plan of Expenditure on Justice and Prisons in Russia per Inha bitant ..........

Plan of Percentage of Grown Horses in Russia .

Plan of Amount of Production of Iron and Steel in Russia .

Diagram of Number of Native and Imported Cattle in England

Diagram of Classification by Occupation of 1000 of the Popula of Great Britain

Diagram of Distribution of the Income of the Population of Eng land

Diagram of State of Savings in Great Britain in 1895 •

Diagram of Expenditure of England on Armed Forces between 1864 and 1S95

Diagram of Classification of Workers in Germany according to Wages ..........

Diagram of Emigration from Germany to America (1891-1894)

Diagram of Value of Foreign Securities stamped in Germany

Diagram of French Imports and Exports (1860-1894) .

Diagram of French Trade (i860- 1894) . . . •

Diagram of French Trade (1883-1894) ...

Diagram of French Revenue and Expenditure (1S61-1893)

Diagram of French Debt (1852-1895)

Diagram of French Savings (1869-1895)

Diagram of Average Value of Properties, in Francs, passing by Legacy

Diagram of the Distribution of the French Population according

to Occupation in 1SS6 284

232

233

234

235

236

236

237 237

238

239 241

243

256

259

260 261

264

273 274 276 278 279 280, 281 281 2S2 282

283

vi LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS

PAGE

Diagram of Assistance given to the Poor in France in 1889 288

Diagram of Number of Old Men and Children in Percentage

Relation to Population in chief European Countries . . 289 Diagram of Number of Bachelors in Percentage Relation to

Population in chief European Countries .... 290 Diagram of Increase or Decrease of the Population in France

and Germany per 1000 291

Diagram of Number of Population in chief European Countries

in 1788 and 1888 in Millions 292

Diagram of Value by Growth of I'opulation in France and Ger-

''many, from 178S to 1888 293

Diagram showing the Number of Days on which Food would be

Lacking in Time of War in chief European Counties . . 296 Diagram showing the Number of Days on which Oats would be

Lacking in time of War in chief European Countries . 298

Diagram of Superfluity or Deficiency of Meat in chief European

Countries .......... 3^4

Diagram of Superfluity or Deficiency of Salt in chief European

Countries 305

Diagram of Superfluity or Deficiency of Kerosene in chief

European Countries 306

Diagram of Superfluity or Deficiency of Stone Coal in chief

European Countries ........ 306

Chart showing Comparative Development of Socialists and Free- thinkers in Germany according to the Elections of 1891 . 312 Diagram of Percentage of Horses which would be taken for

Military Purposes in chief European Countries . . . 316 Diagram showing Amount of Living Force of a Bullet . . 320 Diagram showing Penetrative Power of the Mauser Bullet on

Numbers of Horses' Carcases 321

Diagram of Rotation and Weight of Bullets of various Rifles . 322 Diagram of Zone of Effective Fire against Infantry by Chassepot

and Mannlicher Rifles respectively 323

Diagram of Breadth of Zone of Effective Fire against Cavalry by

the Chassepot and Mannlicher Rifles respectively . . 324 Diagram of Distance of Useful Fire ...... 325

Diagrams of Percentage of Hits in Fire at One Infantryman by

French and German Soldiers ..... 326-327 Diagram of the Deviation of the Paskevitch Instrument . . 327 Diagram of the Number of Cartridges Carried by One Soldier

with Different Rifles 328

Diagram of Number of Sappers to 100 Infantrymen in Various

European Countries ........ 333

Diagram of Losses in the German Army in the War of 1870 . 336 Diagram showing Influence of the Quality of Firearms on the

Relations of Killed to Wounded 343

PREFACE

CONVERSATIONS WITH M. BLOCH

''The Future of JVar'' is the title of M. de Block's vohiminous cyclopccdia on the art of war, past, present, and to come. But that is a mistake. For M. Bloc lis thesis is that there is no war to come, that war indeed has already beco7ne impossible.

Hence in presenting to the English public a translation of the sixth and concluding volume of his immense book, I have taken the liberty of giving it a title which more accurately corresponds to the subject matter of the contcfits. For M. Block conte7ids in all sober seriousness that war — great war in the ustial acceptation of tke zvord — has already, by tke natural arid 7iormal develop- ment of tke art or science of warfare, become a pkysical impossibility I

Tkat is wkat this book was written to prove.

viii PREFACE

But, before reading the chapters crammed with statistics and entering upon the arguments of the great Polish economist, the reader may find it convenient to glance over, as a preliminary intro- duction to the book, the following free rendering of the conversations which I have had the privi- lege of enjoying with the author at St. Petersburg and in London.

M. Bloch, I may state in a parenthesis, is a well-known banker of Warsaw, who several years ago forsook finance, in which he had achieved no small success, in order to devote himself to the study of political economy, and to examine particu- larly the question of the future of war from a political economical standpoint. Eight years he devoted to the special study of which his work " The Future of War " is the mommmit. He published it in Russian two years ago. This year he has broup'ht out editions in German and in French. When I met him in St. Petersburg last auttwm he gave 7ne permission to publish a trans- lation of his book in English, in whole or in part. I have selected the last part, the sixth volume, in which he summarises the conclusions which he had arrived at in the earlier part of the book.

PREFACE ix

M. Block is a man of benevolent mien, of 7niddle stature, and apparently between fifty and sixty years of age. He paid a flying visit to London in April, and is at the present moment of writing at the Grand Hotel in Paris. His ho7ne address is Warsaw. When he is in St. Petersburg he stays at the Hotel d' Europe.

" Utopians," said M. Bloch ; " and they call us Utopians, idealists, visionaries, because we believe that the end of war is in sight ? But who are the Utopians, I should like to know ? What is a Utopian, using the term as an epithet of opprobrium ? He is a man who lives in a dream of the impossible ; but what I know and am pre- pared to prove is, that the real Utopians who are living in a veritable realm of phantasy are those people who believe in war. War has been possible, no doubt, but it has at last become impossible, and those who are pre- paring for war, and basing all their schemes of life on the expectation of war, are visionaries of the worst kind, for war is no longer possible."

"That is good news, M. Bloch," I replied ; " but is it not somewhat of a paradox ? Only last year we had the Spanish-American war ; the year before, the war between Turkey and Greece. Since when has war become impossible ? "

" Oh," replied M. Bloch, with vivacity, " I do not speak of such wars. It is not to such frontier brawls, or punitive operations such as you in England, for instance, are perpetually engaging in on the frontiers of your

X PREFACE

extended empire, that I refer when I say that war has become impossible. When soldiers and statesmen speak about the War of the Future, they do not refer to such trumpery expeditions against semi-barbarous peoples. The war of the future, the war which has become impos- sible, is the war that has haunted the imagination of mankind for the last thirty years, the war in which great nations armed to the teeth were to fling themselves with all their resources into a struggle for life and death This is the war that every day becomes more and more impossible. Yes, it is in preparations against that im- possible war that these so-called practical men, who are the real Utopians of our time, are wasting the resources of civilisation."

" Pray explain yourself more clearly, M. Bloch." "Well," said he, "I suppose you will admit that war has practically become impossible for the minor States. It is as impossible for Denmark or for Belgium to make war to-day as it would be for you or for me to assert the right of private war, which our forefathers possessed. We cannot do it. At least, we could only try to do it, and then be summarily suppressed and punished for our temerity. That is the position of the minor States. For them war is practically forbidden by their stronger neigh- bours. They are in the position of the descendants of the feudal lords, whose right of levying war has vanished owing to the growth of a strong central power whose interests and authority are incompatible with the exercise of what used to be at one time an almost universal right. For the minor States, therefore, war is impos- sible."

" Admitted," I replied. " Impossible, that is to say, without the leave and licence of the great Powers."

PREFACE xi

" Precisely," said M. Bloch ; " and hence, when we discuss the question of future war, we always deal with it as a war between great Powers. That is to say, primarily, the long talked-of, constantly postponed war between France and Germany for the lost provinces; and, secondly, that other war, the thought of which has gradually replaced that of the single-handed duel between France and Germany, viz., a war between the Triplice and the Franco- Russian Alliance. It is that war which constantly pre- occupies the mind of statesmen and sovereigns of Europe, and it is that war which, I maintain, has become absolutely impossible."

'•But how impossible, M, Bloch? Do you mean morally impossible ?"

" No such thing," he replied. " I am dealing not with moral considerations, which cannot be measured, but with hard, matter-of-fact, material things, which can be esti- mated and measured with some approximation to absolute accuracy. I maintain that war has become impossible alike from a military, economic, and political point of view. The very development that has taken place in the mechanism of war has rendered war an impracticable operation. The dimensions of modern armaments and the organisation of society have rendered its prosecution an economic impossibility, and, finally, if any attempt were made to demonstrate the inaccuracy of my assertions by putting the matter to a test on a great scale, we should find the inevitable result in a catastrophe which would destroy all existing political organisations. Thus, the great war cannot be made, and any attempt to make it would result in suicide. Such, 1 believe, is the simple demonstrable fact."

" But where is the demonstration ? " I asked.

xii PREFACE

M. Bloch turned and pointed to his encyclopaedic work upon " The Future of War," six solid volumes, each con- taining I do not know how many quarto pages, which stood piled one above the other.

" Read that," he said. " In that book you will find the facts upon which my demonstration rests."

'• That is all very well," I said ; " but how can you, M. Bloch, an economist and a banker, set yourself up as an authority upon military matters ? "

" Oh," said M. Bloch, " you have a saying that it is often the outsider that sees most ; and you must remember that the conclusions arrived at by military experts are by no means inaccessible to the general student. In order to form a correct idea as to the changes that have taken place in the mechanism of war, it is quite conceivable that the bystander who is not engaged in the actual carrying out of the evolution now in progress may be better able to see the drift and tendency of things than those who are busily engaged in the actual detail of the operation. I can only say that while at first hand I have no authority whatever, and do not in any way pose as a military or naval expert, I have taken all imaginable pains in order to master the literature of warfare, espe- cially the most recent treatises upon military operations and the handling of armies and fleets, which have been published by the leading military authorities in the modern world. After mastering what they have written, I have had opportunities of discussing personally with many officers in all countries as to the conclusions at which I have arrived, and I am glad to know that in the main there is not much difference of opinion as to the accuracy of my general conclusions as to the nature of future warfare."

PREFACE

XUl

" But do they also agree with you," I sakJ, " that war has become impossible ? "

"No," said M. Bloch, "that would be too much to expect. Otherwise Othello's occupation would be gone. But as they have admitted the facts, we can draw our own conclusions."

" But I see in your book you deal with every branch of the service, armaments of all kinds, manoeuvres, questions of strategy, problems of fortification — everything, in fact, that comes into the consideration of the actual conduct of modern war. Do you mean to tell me that military men generally think you have made no mistakes ? "

"That would be saying too much. The book was referred by the Emperor of Russia at my request to the Minister of War, with a request that it should be sub- jected to examination by a council of experts. The results of that council were subsequently communicated to the Emperor in the shape of a report, which set forth that while in dealing with so very many questions it was impossible to avoid some mistakes, it was their opinion that the book was a very useful one, and that it was most desirable that it should be placed in the hands of all staff officers. They also added an expres- sion of opinion that no book could contribute so much to the success of the Conference or to the information of those who were to take part in its deliberations.

"The one question upon which strong difference of opinion existed was that concerning the use of the bayonet. I have arrived at the conclusion, based upon a very careful examination of various authorities, that the day of the bayonet is over. In the Franco-German war the total mortality of the Germans from cold steel amounted to only one per cent. The proportion on the

xiv PREFACE

French side was higher, but I think it can be mathe- matically demonstrated that, in future, war will be decided at ranges which will render the use of the bayonet impos- sible. General Dragomiroff, however, a veteran of the old school, cannot tolerate this slight upon his favourite weapon. In his eyes the bayonet is supreme, and it is cold steel which at the last will always be the deciding factor in the combats of peopies. He therefore strongly condemns that portion of my book ; but it stands on its own merits, and the reader can form his own judgment as to the probability of the bayonet being of any practical use in future war."

"General Dragomirofif's devotion to the bayonet," I remarked, " reminds me of our admirals' devotion to sails in our navy. Fifteen years ago it was quite obvious that the fighting ship of the future had no need for sails — that, indeed, sails were an encumbrance and a danger ; but all the admirals of the old school attached far more importance to the smartness in furling and unfurling sail than they did to proficiency in gunnery or in any of the deciding factors in naval battles. They clung to masts and yards for years after all the younger officers in the service knew that they might as well have clung to bows and arrows ; and I suppose you will find the same thing in regard to the bayonet."

"Yes," said M. Bloch, " the bayonet seems to me alto- gether out of date. No doubt it is a deadly enough weapon, if you can get within a yard of your enemy ; but the problem that 1 have been asking myself is whether in future combatants will ever be able to get within one hundred yards of one another, let alone one yard."

" But then," I rejoined, " if that be so, wars will be much less deadly than they were before."

PREFACE XV

"Yes and no," said M. Bloch ; "they will become less deadly because they have become more deadly. There is no kind of warfare so destructive of human life as that in which you have bodies of men face to face wnth each other, with nothing but cold steel to settle the issue. The slaughter which took place in the old wars between barbarians, or between the Romans and the barbarian tribes on their frontiers, was simply appalling. There is nothing like it in modern warfare, and this diminution of the mortality in battle has been, paradoxically enough, produced by the improved dcadliness of the weapons with which men fight. They are, indeed, becoming so deadly that before long you will see they will never fight at all."

"That," I replied, "was the faith of Rudyard Kipling, who wrote me a few months ago saying that he relied for the extinction of war upon the invention of a machine which would infallibly slay fifty per cent, of the com- batants whenever battle was waged. ' Then,' he said, 'war would cease of itself.' The same idea was expressed by Lord Lytton in his novel of 'The Coming Race,' in which he attributed the final disappearance of war from the planet to the discovery of vril, a destructive so deadly that an army could be annihilated by the touch of a button by the finger of a child."

"Yes," said M. Bloch; "that is so; but until mankind has made experience of the dcadliness of its weapons there will be terrible bloodshed. For instance, at Omdur- man the destruction inflicted upon the forces of the Khalifa came very near the fifty per cent, standard of Rudyard Kipling. That one experience was probably sufficient even for the Dervishes. They will never again face the fire of modern rifles. The experience which they have learned is rapidly becoming generalised throughout

XVI

PREFACE

the armies of Christendom, and although there may be some frightful scenes of wholesale slaughter, one or two experiences of that kind will rid our military authorities of any desire to come to close quarters with their adversaries."

'• What a paradox it is ! " I replied. "We shall end by killing nobody, because if we fought at all we should kill everybody. Then you do not anticipate increased slaughter as the result of the increased precision in weapons ? "

"You mistake me," said M. Bloch. "At first there will be increased slaughter — increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push the battle to a decisive issue. They will try to, thinking that they are fighting under the old conditions, and they will learn such a lesson that they will abandon the attempt for ever. Then, instead of a war fought out to the bitter end in a series of decisive battles, we shall have as a substitute a long period of continually increasing strain upon the resources of the combatants. The war, instead of being a hand-to-hand contest in which the combatants measure their physical and moral superiority, will become a kind of stalemate, in which neither army being able to get at the other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to each other, threatening each other, but never being able to deliver a final and decisive attack. It will be simply the natural evolution of the armed peace, on an aggravated scale."

" Yes," said M. Bloch, " accompanied by entire disloca- tion of all industry and severing of all the sources of supply by which alone the community is enabled to bear the crushing burden of that armed peace. It will be a multi- plication of expenditure simultaneously accompanied by a

PREFACE xvu

diminution of the sources by which that expenditure can be met. That is the future of war— not fighting, but famine, not the slaying of men, but the bankruptcy of nations and the break-up of the whole social organisation." " Now I begin to perceive how it is that we have as a prophet of the end of war a poUtical economist, and not

a soldier."

"Yes," said M. Bloch, " it is as a pohtical economist that I discovered the open secret which he who runs may read. The soldier by natural evolution has so perfected the mechanism of slaughter that he has practically secured his own extinction. He has made himself so costly that mankind can no longer afford to pay for his maintenance, and he has therefore transferred the sceptre of the world from those who govern its camps to those who control its

markets."

" But now, M. Bloch, will you condescend to particulars, and explain to me how this great evolution has been brought about ? "

" It is very simple," said M. Bloch. " The outward and visible sign of the end of war was the introduction of the magazine rifle. For several hundred years after the dis- covery of gunpowder the construction of firearms made little progress. The cannon with which you fought at Trafalgar differed comparatively little from those which you used against the Armada. For two centuries you were content to clap some powder behind a round ball in an iron tube, and fire it at your enemy.

" The introduction of the needle gun and of breech- loading cannon may be said to mark the dawn of the new era, which, however, was not definitely established amongst us until the invention of the magazine rifle of very small calibre. The magazine gun may also be mentioned as an

b

xviii PREFACE

illustration of the improved deadliness of firearms ; but, as your experience at Obdurman showed, the deciding factor was not the Maxim, but the magazine rifle."

"Yes," I said; "as Lord Wolseley said, it was the magazine rifle which played like a deadly hose spouting leaden bullets upon the advancing enemy."

" Yes," said M. Bloch, " and the possibility of firing half a dozen bullets without having to stop to reload has transformed the conditions of modern war."

" Do you not exaggerate the importance of mere rapidity of fire ? " I asked.

" No," said M. Bloch ; " rapidity of fire does not stand alone. The modern rifle is not only a much more rapid firer than its predecessors, but it has also an immensely wider range and far greater precision of fire. To these three qualities must be added yet a fourth, which completes the revolutionary nature of the new firearm, and that is the introduction of smokeless powder."

" The Spanish-American campaign," I said, " illustrated the importance of smokeless powder; but how do you think the smokelessness of the new explosives will affect warfare in the future ?"

" In the first case," said M. Bloch, " it demolishes the screen behind which for the last 400 years human beings have fought and died. All the last great battles have been fought more or less in the dark. After the battle is joined, friends and foes have been more or less lost to sight in the clouds of dense smoke which hung heavy over the whole battlefield. Now armies will no longer fight in the dark. Every soldier in the fighting line will see with frightful distinctness the havoc which is being made in the ranks by the shot and shell of the enemy. The veil which gun- powder spread over the worst horrors of the battlefield has

PREFACE

XIX

been withdrawn for ever. But that is not the only change. It is difficult to over-estimate the increased strain upon the nerve and morale of an army under action by the fact that men will fall killed and wounded without any visible or audible cause. In the old days the soldier saw the puff of smoke, heard the roar of the gun, and when the shell or shot ploughed its way through the ranks, he associated cause and effect, and was to a certain extent prepared for it. In the warfare of the future men will simply fall and die without either seeing or hearing anything." "Without hearing anything, M. Bloch ? " " Without hearing anything, for although the smokeless powder is not noiseless, experience has proved that the report of a rifle will not carry more than nine hundred yards, and volley-firing cannot be heard beyond a mile. But that brings us to the question of the increased range of the new projectiles. An army on march will suddenly become aware of the comparative proximity of the foe by seeing men drop killed and wounded, without any visible cause ; and only after some time will they be able to discover that the invisible shafts of death were sped from a line of sharp-shooters lying invisible at a distance of a mile or more. There will be nothing along the whole line of the horizon to show from whence the death- dealing missiles have sped. It will simply be as if the bolt had come from the blue. Can you conceive of anything more trying to human nerves ? "

" But what is the range of the modern rifle ? " " The modern rifle," said M. Bloch, " has a range of 3000 or 4000 metres — that is to say, from two to three miles. Of course, I do not mean to say that it will be used at such great distances. For action at long range, artillery is much more effective. But of that I will speak

XX PREFACE

shortly. But you can fairly say that for one mile or a mile and a half the magazine rifle is safe to kill anything that stands between the muzzle and its mark ; and therein," continued M. Bloch, " lies one of the greatest changes that have been effected in modern firearms. Just look at this diagram" (see page i). "It will explain better than anything I can say the change that has been brought about in the last do^en years.

" In the last great war, if you wished to hit a distant mark, you had to sight your rifle so as to fire high up into the air, and the ball executing a curve descended at the range at which you calculated your target stood. Between the muzzle and the target your bullet did no execution. It was soaring in the air, first rising until it reached the maximum height, and then descending it struck the target or the earth at one definite point some thousand yards distant. Contrast this with the modern weapon. There is now no need for sighting your gun so as to drop your bullet at a particular range. You aim straight at your man, and the bullet goes, as is shown in the diagram, direct to its mark. There is no climbing into the air to fall again. It simply speeds, say, five feet from the earth until it meets its mark. Anything that stands between its object and the muzzle of the rifle it passes through. Hence whereas in the old gun you hit your man only if you could drop your bullet upon the square yard of ground upon which he was standing, you now hit him so long as you train your rifle correctly on every square yard of the thousand or two thousand which may inter- vene between the muzzle of your gun and the end of the course of the shot. That circumstance alone, even without any increase in the rapidity of the fire, must enormously add to the deadliness of the modern firearms."

PREFACE xxi

" Could you give me any exact statistics as to the increased rapidity of fire ? "

"Certainly," said M. Bloch. "That is to say, I can give you particulars up to a comparatively recent time, but the progress of the science of firearms is so rapid that no one can say but that my statistics may be old before you print your report of this talk. The ordinary soldier will fire twelve times as many shots per minute as he was able to do in 1870, and even this is likely to be rapidly improved upon. But you may take it that what with increased rapidity of fire, greater penetrative power, and the greater precision that the gun which the soldier will carry into the battle will possess, the rifle of to-morrow will be forty times as effective as the chassepot was in the Franco-Prussian war. Even the present gun is five times as deadly."

"But do not you think that with this rapid firing a soldier will spend all his ammunition and have none left ? "

" There, again," said M. Bloch, " the improvement in firearms has enormously increased the number of cart- ridges which each man can carry into action. In 1877, when we went to war with Turkey, our soldiers could only carry 84 cartridges into action. When the calibre of the rifle was reduced to 5 mm. the number which each soldier was furnished with rose to 270. With a bullet of 4 mm. he will carry 380, and when we have a rifle of 3 mm. calibre he will be able to take 575 into action, and not have to carry any more weight than that which burdened him when he carried 84, twenty years ago. At present he carries 170 of the 7*62 mm."

" But we are a long way off 3 mm. calibre, are we not, M. Bloch ? "

xxil PREFACE

" Not so far. It is true that very many countries have not yet adopted so small a bore. Your country, for instance, has between 7| and 8 mm. The United States have adopted one with 6 ; Germany is contemplating the adoption of 5 ; but the 3 mm. gun will probably be the gun of the future, for the increased impetus of the small bore and its advantage in lightness will compel its adoption."

" You speak of the increased penetrative power of the bullet. Do you think this will add considerably to the deadliness of rifle-fire ? "

"Oh, immensely," said M. Bloch. "As you contract the calibre of the gun you increase the force of its projectile. For instance, a rifle with a calibre of only 6*5 mm. has 44 per cent, more penetrative power than the shot fired by an 8 mm. rifle. Then, again, in previous wars, if a man could throw himself behind a tree he felt comparatively safe, even although the bullets were hurt- ling all round. To-day the modern bullet will pierce a tree without any difQculty. It also finds no obstacle in earthworks such as would have turned aside the larger bullets. There is therefore less shelter, and not only is there less shelter, but the excessive rapidity with which the missile travels (for it is absurd to call the slender projectile, no thicker than a lead pencil, a ball) will add enormously to the destructive power of the shot. Usually when a bullet struck a man, it found its billet, and generally stopped where it entered ; but with the new bullet this will not be the case. At a near range it will pass through successive files of infantry, but what is more serious is that should it strike a bone, it is apt to fly upwards or sideways, rending and tearing everything through which it passes. The mortality will be much

PREFACE xxiii

greater from this source than it has been in the past."

" But is this not all very much theory ? Have you any facts in support of your beh'ef that the modern bullet will be so much more deadly than its predecessor ? In Eng- land quite the opposite impression prevailed, owing to the experience which we gained in Jameson's raid, when many of the combatants were shot through and seemed none the worse, even although the bullet appeared to have traversed a vital part of the body."

M. Bloch replied : " I do not know about the Jame- son raid. I do know what happened when the soldiers fired recently upon a crowd of riotous miners. It is true that they fired at short range, not more than thirty to eighty paces. The mob also was not advancing in loose formation, but, like most mobs, was densely packed. Only ten shots were fired, but these ten shots killed outright seven of the men and wounded twenty-five, of whom six afterwards died. Others who were slightly wounded concealed their injuries, fearing prosecution. Each shot, therefore, it is fair to estimate, must have hit at least four persons. But ignoring those unreported cases, there were thirty-two persons struck by bullets. Of these, thirteen died, a proportion of nearly 40 per cent., which is at least double the average mortality of persons hit by rifle-bullets in previous wars. It has also been proved by experiments made by firing shots into carcases and corpses, that when the bullet strikes a bone it acts virtually as an explosive bullet, as the point expands and issues in a kind of mushroom shape. Altogether I take a very serious view of the sufferings," continued M. Bloch, " and of the injury that will be inflicted by the new weapons."

xxiv PREFACE

" Is the improvement in the deadliness of weapons con- fined to small-arms ? Does it equally extend to artillery firing ? "

"There," said M. Bloch, "you touch upon a subject which I have dealt with at much length in my book. The fact is that if the rifle has improved, artillery has much more improved. Even before the quick-firing gun was intro- duced into the field batteries an enormous improvement had been made. So, indeed, you can form some estimate of the evolution of the cannon when I say that the French artillery to-day is held by competent authorities to be at least one hundred and sixteen times more deadly than the batteries which went into action in 1870."

" How can that be ? " I asked. " They do not fire one hundred and sixteen times as fast, I presume ? "

" No ; the increased improvement has been obtained in many ways. By the use of range-finders it is possible now to avoid much firing into space which formerly pre- vailed. An instrument weighing about 60 lb. will in three minutes give the range of any distance up to four miles, and even more rapid range-finders are being constructed. Then, remember, higher explosives are used ; the range has been increased, and even before quick-firing guns were introduced it was possible to fire two and a half times as fast as they did previously. The effect of artillery-fire to-day is at least five times as deadly as it was, and being two or three times as fast, you may reckon that a battery of artillery is from twelve to fifteen times as potent an instrument of destruction as it was thirty years ago. Even in 1870 the German artillerists held that one battery was able absolutely to annihilate any force advancing along a line of fire estimated at fifteen paces in breadth for a distance of over four miles.

PREFACE XXV

" If that was so then, you can imagine how much more deadly it is now, when the range is increased and the explosive power of the shell has been enormously developed. It is estimated that if a body of 10,000 men, advancing to the attack, had to traverse a distance of a mile and a half under the fire of a single battery, they would be exposed to 1450 rounds before they crossed the zone of fire, and the bursting of the shells fired by that battery would scatter 275,000 bullets in fragments over the mile and a half across which they would have to march. In 1870 an ordinary shell when it burst broke into from nineteen to thirty pieces. To-day it bursts into 240. Shrapnel fire in 1870 only scattered thirty-seven death- dealing missiles. Now it scatters 340. A bomb weighing about 70 lb. thirty years ago would have burst into forty- two fragments. To-day, when it is charged with peroxi- lene, it breaks up into 1200 pieces, each of which is hurled with much greater velocity than the larger lumps which were scattered by a gunpowder explosion. It is estimated that such a bomb would eiTectively destroy all life within a range of 200 metres of the point of explosion. The artillery also benefits by the smokeless powder, although, as you can easily imagine, it is not without its drawbacks."

" What drawbacks ? "

" The fact that the artillerymen can be much more easily picked off, when they are serving their guns, by sharp-shooters than was possible when they were enveloped in a cloud of smoke of their own creation. It is calculated that one hundred sharp-shooters, who would be quite invisible at a range of five hundred yards, would put a battery out of action in four minutes if they could get within range of one thousand yards. At a mile's

xxvi PREFACE

range it might take one hundred men half an hour's shoot- ing to put a battery out of action. The most effective range for the sharp-shooter is about eight hundred paces. At this range, while concealed behind a bush or improvised earthwork, a good shot could pick off the men of any battery, or the officers, who could not avail themselves of the cover to which their men resort."

" How will your modern brttle begin, M. Bloch ? " " Probably with attempts on outposts made by sharp- shooters to feel and get into touch with each other. Cavalry will not be of much use for that purpose. A mounted man offers too good a mark to a sharp-shooter. Then when the outposts have felt each other sufficiently to give the opposing armies knowledge of the whereabouts of their antagonists, the artillery duel will commence at a range of from four to five miles. As long as the artillery is in action it will be quite sufficient to render the nearer approach of the opposing forces impossible. If they are evenly matched, they will mutually destroy each other, after inflicting immense losses before they are put out of action. Then the turn of the rifle will come. But the power of rifle-fire is so great that it will be absolutely impossible for the combatants to get to close quarters with each other. As for any advance in force, even in the loosest of formations, on a front that is swept by the enemies' fire, that is absolutely out of the question. Flank movements may be attempted, but the increased power which a magazine rifle gives to the defence will render it impossible for such movements to have the success that they formerly had. A small company can hold its own against a superior attacking force long enough to permit of the bringing up of reinforcements. To attack any position successfully, it is estimated that the attack-

PREFACE xxvii

ing force ought to outnumber the assailants at least by 8 to I. It is calculated that lOO men in a trench would be able to put out of action 336 out of 400 who attacked them, while they were crossing a fire-zone only 300 yards wide."

" What do you mean by a fire-zone ? "

" A fire-zone is the space which is swept by the fire of the men in the trench."

"But you assume that they are entrenched, M. Bloch ? "

" Certainly, everybody will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a great war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to a soldier as his rifle. The first thing every man will have to do, if he cares for his life at all, will be to dig a hole in the ground, and throw up as strong an earthen rampart as he can to shield him from the hail of bullets which will fill the air."

"Then," I said, "every battlefield will more or less come to be like Sebastopol, and the front of each army can only be approached by a series of trenches and parallels? "

" Well, that, perhaps, is putting it too strongly," said M. Bloch, " but you have grasped the essential principle, and that is one reason why it will be impossible for the battle of the future to be fought out rapidly. All digging work is slow work, and when you must dig a trench before you can make any advance, your progress is neces- sarily slow. Battles will last for days, and at the end it is very doubtful whether any decisive victory can be gained."

"Always supposing," I said, "that the ammunition does not give out."

" Ammunition will not give out. Of powder and shot there is always plenty."

XXVlll

PREFACE

" I doubt that," I replied. " The weak point of all this argument as to the impossibility of war implies that the modern mechanism of war, which is quite sufficient to prevent armies coming into close contact, also possesses qualities of permanence, or rather of inexhaustibility. What seems much more probable is that with the excessive rapidity of fire, armies will empty their magazines, and the army that fires its last cartridge first will be at the mercy of the other. Then the old veteran Dragomiroff will rejoice, for the bayonet will once more come into play."

M. Bloch shook his head.

" I do not think that armies will run short of ammuni- tion. All my arguments are based upon the assumption that the modern war is to be fought with modern arms. I do not take into account the possibility that there will be a reversion to the primitive weapons of an earlier day."

" Well, supposing that you are right, and that ammu- nition does not run short, what will happen ? "

" I have quoted in my book," said M. Bloch, " the best description that I have ever seen of what may be expected on a modern battlefield. I will read it to you, for it seems to convey, more vividly than anything that I could say, just what we may expect : —

" The distance is 6000 metres from the enemy. The artillery is in position, and the command has been passed along the batteries to ' give fire.' The enemy's artillery replies. Shells tear up the soil and burst ; in a short time the crew of every gun has ascertained the distance of the enemy. Then every projectile discharged bursts in the air over the heads of the enemy, raining down hundreds

PREFACE xxix

of fragments and bullets on his position. Men and horses are overwhelmed by this rain of lead and iron. Guns destroy one another, batteries are mutually annihilated, ammunition cases are emptied. Success will be with those whose fire does not slacken. In the midst of this fire the battalions will advance.

" Now they are but 2000 metres away. Already the rifle-bullets whistle round and kill, each not only finding a victim, but penetrating files, ricocheting, and striking again. Volley succeeds volley, bullets in great handfuls, constant as hail and swift as lightning, deluge the field of battle.

" The artillery having silenced the enemy is now free to deal with the enemy's battalions. On his infantry, however loosely it may be formed, the guns direct thick iron rain, and soon in the position of the enemy the earth is reddened with blood.

"The firing lines will advance one after the other, battalions will march after battalions ; finally the reserves will follow. Yet with all this movement in the two armies there will be a belt a thousand paces wide, separating them as by neutral territory, swept by the fire of both sides, a belt which no living being can stand for a moment. The ammunition will be almost exhausted, millions of cartridges, thousands of shells will cover the soil. But the fire will continue until the empty ammunition cases are replaced with full.

" Melinite bombs will turn to dust farmhouses, villages, and hamlets, destroying everything that might be used as cover, obstacle, or refuge.

" The moment will approach when half the combatants will be mowed down, dead and wounded will lie in parallel rows, separated one from the other by that belt of a

XXX PREFACE

thousand paces which will be swept by a cross fire of shells which no living being can pass.

" The battle will continue with ferocity. But still that thousand paces unchangingly separate the foes.

"Who shall have gained the victory ? Neither.

" This picture serves to illustrate a thought which, since the perfection of weapons, has occupied the minds of all thinking people. What will take place in a future war ? Such are constrained to admit that between the combatants will always be an impassable zone of fire deadly in an equal degree to both the foes.

" With such conditions, in its application to the battles of the future, the saying of Napoleon seems very question- able : ' The fate of battle is the result of one minute, of one thought, the enemies approach with different plans, the battle becomes furious ; the decisive moment arrives, and a happy thought sudden as lightning decides the con- test, the most insignificant reserve sometimes being the instrument of a splendid victory.'

" It is much more probable that in the future both sides will claim the victory."

" Pleasant pictures, certainly ; and if that authority is right, you are indeed justified in believing that there will be no decisive battles in the war of the future."

" There will be no war in the future," said M. Bloch ; *' for it has become impossible, now that it is clear that war means suicide."

" But is not everything that you are saying an assump- tion that people will make war, and that therefore war itself t's possible ? "

" No doubt," said M. Bloch ; " the nations may endeavour to prove that I am wrong, but you will see what will

PREFACE xxxi

happen. Nothing will be demonstrated by the next war if it is made, in spite of warnings, but the impossibility of making war, except, of course, for the purpose of self- destruction. I do not for a moment deny that it is possi- ble for nations to plunge themselves and their neighbours into a frightful series of catastrophes which would probably result in the overturn of all civilised and ordered govern- ment. That is, of course, possible ; but when we say that war is impossible we mean that it is impossible for the modern State to carry on war under the modern conditions with any prospect of being able to carry that war to a conclusion by defeating its adversary by force of arms on the battlefield. No decisive war is possible. Neither is any war possible, as I proceed to show, that will not entail, even upon the victorious Power, the destruction of its resources and the break-up of society. War therefore has become impossible, except at the price of suicide. That would, perhaps, be a more accurate way of stating the thesis of my book."

" I understand ; but do you think you have proved this ? "

" Certainly," said M. Bloch. " So far 1 have only spoken about the improvements that have been wrought in two branches of the service, viz., in the magazine rifle and the greater efficiency of artillery. Taken by them- selves, they are sufficiently serious to justify grave doubt as to whether or not we have not reached a stage when the mechanism of slaughter has been so perfected as to render a decisive battle practically impossible ; but these two elements are only two. They are accompanied by others which are still more formidable to those who persist in contemplating war as a practical possibility."

" To what are you referring ? " I asked.

xxxil PREFACE

" Chiefly to the immensity of the modern army. The war of 1870-71 was a contest of giants, but the German armies operating in France did not exceed half a million men, whereas if war were to break out to-day, the Germans would concentrate over a million men on their front, while the French would be no whit behind them in the energy with which they would concentrate all their available fighting men on the frontier. In a war between the Triple and the Dual Alliance there would be ten millions of men under arms."

" How would you make up the total of ten millions which you say would be mobilised in case of a war between the Dual and Triple Alliance ? "

" The figures in millions are briefly : Germany, 2,500,000; Austria, i 3-ioths millions; Italy, i 3-ioths millions, making a total of 5,100,000 for the Triple Alliance. France would mobilise 2| millions, and Russia 2,800,000, making 5,300,000 — 10,400,000. It has yet to be proved that the human brain is capable of directing the movements and providing for the sustenance of such immense masses of human beings. The unwieldiness of the modem army has never been adequately taken into account. Remember that those millions will not be com- posed of veterans accustomed to act together. More than half of the German and French troops which will be con- fronting each other on mobilisation in case of war will be drawn from the reserves. In Russia the proportion of reserves would be only three hundred and sixty, in Italy two hundred and sixty, per thousand ; but even this pro- portion is quite sufficient to indicate how large a mass of men, comparatively untrained, would find their place in the fighting front."

" But have not great generals in the past commanded

PREFACE xxxiii

armies of millions ? — Xerxes, for instance, and Tamerlane, and Attila at the head of his Huns ? "

"No doubt," said M. Bloch, "that is quite true; but it is one thing to direct a horde of men living in the simplest fashion, marching shoulder to shoulder in great masses, and it is an altogether different thing to manoeuvre and supply the enormously complex machine which we call a modern army. Remember, too, that in the old days men fought in masses, whereas the very essence of modern war is that you must advance in loose order and never have too big a clump of soldiers for your enemy to fire at. Hence the battle will be spread over an enormous front, and every mile over which you spread your men increases the difficulties of supply, of mutual co-operation, and of combined effort."

" But has not the training of officers kept pace with the extension and development of modern armaments ? "

"Yes," said M. Bloch, "and no. It is true, no doubt, that an effort has been made to bring up the technical training of officers to the necessary standard ; but this is quite impossible in all cases. A very large proportion of the officers who will be in command in a general mobilisa- tion would be called from the reserve, that is to say, they would be men who are not familiar with the latest develop- ments of modern tactics, and who would find themselves sud- denly called upon to deal with conditions of warfare that were almost as different from those with which they were trained to deal as the legionaries of Caesar would have been if they had been suddenly summoned to face the musketeers of Frederic the Great."

" Is that not an exaggeration, M. Bloch ? Do you think that the art of war has changed so much ? "

" Changed ? " said M. Bloch ; " it has been so thoroughly

c

xxxlv PREFACE

revolutionised in the last thirty years, that if I had a son who was preparing for a military career, I would not let him read a book on tactics or strategy that had not been written in the last fifteen years, and even then he would find that great changes had taken place within that period. It is simply appalling to contemplate the spectacle of millions of men, half of whom have been hurriedly sum- moned from the field, the factory, and the mine, and the whole placed under command of officers not one in a hundred of whom has ever been under fire, and half of whom have been trained in a more or less antiquated school of tactics. But even then that is not the worst. What we have to recognise is the certainty that even if all officers were most efficient when the war began, the war would not last many weeks before the majority of the officers had been killed off."

" But why ? " I said.

"The percentage of officers killed and wounded in action was much greater even in 1870 than the proportion of privates killed and wounded. The Germans, for instance, lost two officers killed and three wounded to each private who was similarly disabled. But that was before the improved weapon came into play. In the Chilian war the proportion of officers killed was 23 per cent, and 75 per cent, wounded, whereas among the men only 13 per cent, were killed and 60 per cent, wounded."

"To what do you attribute this?" I asked.

" The cause is very simple. The officers are compelled to expose themselves much more than the men under their orders. They have to be up and about and moving, while the men are lying in the shelter of the trenches. This is so well recognised that every Continental army pays special attention to the training of sharp-shooters,

PREFACE XXXV

whose word of command is that they should never waste a shot upon any one but an officer. Hence the general conviction on the part of the officers abroad that if the great war broke out they would never survive to see the conclusion of peace."

" When I was in Paris, M. Bloch, that conviction did not seem to be very general on the part of the French officers."

" It is different in Germany," said M. Bloch, " and in Austria-Hungary, and the French would not be long in finding it out. Again and again officers have said to me that while they would of course do their duty if they were ordered to the front, they would take their place at the head of their men knowing that they would never return. So general is this conviction that you will find very little trace of any war party among the officers in Germany. They know too well what war would mean to them. But I am not thinking so much of the fate of the individuals as the result which will inevitably follow when this massed million of men found themselves deprived of their commanders.

"An army is a very highly specialised organisa- tion. Without competent officers, accustomed to com- mand, it degenerates into a mere mob, and of all things in the world nothing is so helpless as a mob. It can neither march, fight, manoeuvre, nor feed itself. An army without leaders is not only a mob, but it is apt to degenerate into a very cowardly mob. Remember that every man is not naturally brave. It was said long ago that a very good fighting army consisted of three sorts of soldiers : only one-third of the men in the ranks were naturally brave, another third were naturally cowards, while the last third was capable of being brave under

xxxvi PREFACE

circumstances when it was well led and kept up to its work. Take away the officers, and this middle third naturally gravitate to the cowardly contingent, with results which have been seen on many a stricken field. Hence, under modern conditions of warfare every army will tend inevitably to degenerate into such a mob. It is for those practical military men who persist in regard- ing war as a possibility tv-* explain how they hope to overcome the difficulty created by the very magnitude and unwieldiness of the machine which they have created."

" But do not you think, M. Bloch, that if the nations discover that their armies are too big to be used, they will only fight with such manageable armies as they can bring to the front, manoeuvre, feed, and supply with the munitions of war ? "

M. Bloch shook his head. " The whole drift and tendency of modern tactics," he said, " is to bring up the maximum number of men to the front in the shortest possible loss of time and to hurl them in the largest possible numbers upon the enemy's position. It is abso- lutely necessary, if you take the offensive, to have a superior force. It is from a military point of view an impossibility to attack a superior force with an inferior, and the effect of the improvement in modern weapons has been to still further enhance the necessity for superiority of force in attacking. There will, therefore, be no question of fighting with small armies. The largest possible force will be brought to the front, and this effort will inevitably result in the breakdown of the whole machine.

" You must have the maximum ready to hand at the beginning. Remember the fighting force of an army

PREFACE xxxvii

weakens with every mile that it advances from its base. Napoleon entered Russia with 400,000 men ; but although he had only fought one battle, he had only 130,000 men with him when he entered Moscow. The Germans, when they were in France, employed one-sixth of their infantry in covering their communications and defending their rear. This proportion is likely to be much increased in future wars. The opportunity for harassing the line of communications in the rear of an invading army has been enormously multiplied by the invention of smokeless powder. The franc tireur in the Franco-German war took his life in his hand, for the range of his gun was not very great in the first place, and in the second his where- abouts was promptly detected by the puff of smoke which showed his hiding-place. Now the whole line of com- munications will be exposed to dropping shots from marks- men who, from the security of thicket or hedge, will deal out sudden death without any tell-tale smoke to guide their exasperated and harassed enemy to the hiding- place.

" I have now dealt," said M. Bloch, " with the difficulties in the way of modern war, arising first from the immense improvement that has been wrought in the mechanism of slaughter, and secondly with the unmanageability of the immense masses of men who will be mobilised at the out- break of war. Let us now proceed to the third, and what to my mind constitutes far the most serious obstacle in the way of modern war — viz., the economic impossibility of waging war upon the scale on which it must be waged if it is waged at all.

" The first thing to be borne in mind is that the next war will be a long war. It was the declared opinion of Moltke that the altered conditions of warfare

xxxvili PREFACE

rendered it impossible to hope that any decisive result could be arrived at before two years at the least. The Franco-German war lasted seven months, but there is no hope of any similar war being terminated so rapidly. Of course this is assuming that war is to be terminated by fighting. In reality the war of the future, if ever it takes place, will not be fighting ; it will be terminated by famine."

" Why should wars be so excessively prolonged ? " "Because all wars will of necessity partake of the character of siege operations. When we invaded Turkey in 1877 we were detained for months behind the impro- vised earthworks of Plevna. If war were to break out in Europe to-day, each combatant would find itself con- fronted, not by an isolated and improvised Plevna, but by carefully prepared and elaborately fortified networks of Plevnas. It is so on all frontiers. The system of defence has been elaborated with infinite skill and abso- lute disregard of financial considerations. Whether it will be a German army endeavouring to make its way into Moscow and St. Petersburg, or a Russian army striking at Berlin or at Vienna, or a German army invading France — in every case the invading army would find itself confronted by lines upon lines of fortresses and fortified camps, behind which would stand arrayed forces equal or superior in number to those which it could bring into the field against them. These fortresses would have to be taken or masked.

" Now it is calculated that to take a modern fortress adequately defended, even by superior forces, is an opera- tion which cannot be put through in less than one hundred and twenty days — that is, supposing that everything goes well with the assailants. Any reverse or any interruption

PREFACE xxxlx

of the siege operations would, of course, prolong this period. But it is not merely that each fortress would have to be reduced, but every field would more or less become an improvised fortified camp. Even when an army was defeated it would retreat slowly, throwing up earthworks, behind which it would maintain a harassing fire upon its pursuers ; and the long line of invisible sharp-shooters, whose presence would not be revealed even by the tell-tale puff of smoke, would inevitably retard any rapid advance on the part of the victors. It is indeed maintained by many competent authorities that there is no prospect of the victorious army being able to drive the defeated forces from the field of battle so com- pletely as to establish itself in possession of the spoils of war. The advantage is always with the defending force, and every mile that the assailants advance from their base would increase their difficulties and strengthen their opponents. Long and harassing siege operations in a war of blockade would wear out the patience and exhaust the resources of armies."

"But armies have stood long sieges before now," I objected.

"Yes," said M. Bloch, "in the past; but we are talking of the future. Do not forget that the wear and tear would be terrible, and the modern man is much less capable of bearing it than were his ancestors. The majority of the population tends more and more to gravitate to cities, and the city dweller is by no means so capable of lying out at nights in damp and exposed posi- tions as the peasant. Even in comparatively rapid cam- paigns sickness and exhaustion slay many more than either cold steel or rifle-bullets. It is inevitable that this should be the case. In two weeks' time after the French

xl PREFACE

army is mobilised, it is the expectation of the best authori- ties that they would have 100,000 men in hospital, even if never a shot had been fired."

"That I can well understand. I remember when reading Zola's ' La Debacle ' feeling that if the Germans had kept out of the way altogether and had simply made the French march after them hither and thither, the whole Napoleonic army would have gone to pieces before they ever came within firing distance of their foes."

"Yes," said M. Bloch. "The strain of marching is very heavy. Remember that it is not mere marching, but marching under heavy loads. No infantry soldier should carry more than one-third of his own weight ; but instead of the average burden of the fully accoutred private being 52 lb. it is nearer 80 lb., with the result that the mere carrying of weight probably kills more than fall in battle. The proportion of those who die from disease and those who lose their lives as the consequence of wounds received in fighting is usually two or three to one. In the Franco- German war there were four times as many died from sickness and exhaustion as those who lost their lives in battle. In the Russo-Turkish war the proportion was as 16 to 44. In the recent Spanish war in Cuba the propor- tion was still greater. There were ten who died from disease for one who fell in action. The average mortality from sickness tends to increase with the prolongation of the campaign. Men can stand a short campaign, but when it is long it demoralises them, destroys the spirit of self-sacrifice which sustained them at the first in the opening weeks, and produces a thoroughly bad spirit which reacts upon their physical health. At present there is some regard paid to humanity, if only by the provision

PREFACE xli

of ambulances, and the presence of hospital attendants, nurses, and doctors. But in the war of the future these humanities will go the wall."

" What ! " I said, " do you think there will be no care for the wounded ? "

" There will be practically no care for the wounded," said M. Bloch, " for it will be impossible to find adequate shelter for the Red Cross hospital tent or for the hospital orderlies. It will be impossible to take wounded men out of the zone of fire without exposing the Red Cross men to certain death. The consequence is they will be left to lie where they fall, and they may lie for days. Happy they will be if they are killed outright. Why, even in the last great war the provision for attendance on the wounded was shamefully inadequate. After Gravelotte there were for some time only four doctors to attend to 10,000 wounded men, and the state of things after Sadowa was horrible in the extreme. It is all very well to inveigh against this as inhumanity, but what are you to do when in the opinion of such a distinguished army physician as Dr. Billroth it would be necessary to have as many hos- pital attendants as there are soldiers in the fighting line ? What is much more likely to be done is that the dying and the dead will be utilised as ramparts to strengthen the shelter trenches. This was actually done at the battle of Worth, where Dr. Forth, chief military physician of the Bavarian army, reported that he found in some places in the battlefield veritable ramparts built up of soldiers who had fallen by the side of their comrades, and in order to get them out of the way they had piled them one upon the top of the other, and had taken shelter behind their bodies. Some of these unfortunates built into this terrible rampart were only wounded, but the

xHi PREFACE

pressure of the superincumbent mass soon relieved them

from their sufferings."

" What a horrible story ! "

" Yes," said M. Bloch ; " but I believe that war will be decided not by these things— not even by fighting-men at all, but by the factors of which they at present take far too little account."

" And what may those factors be ? " I asked.

"Primarily, the quality of toughness or capacity of endurance, of patience under privation, of stubbornness under reverse and disappointment. That element in the civil population will be, more than anything else, the deciding factor in modern war. The men at the front will very speedily be brought to a deadlock. Then will come the question as to how long the people at home will be able to keep on providing the men at the front with the necessaries of life. That is the first factor. The second factor, which perhaps might take precedence of the moral qualities, is whether or not it is physically possible for the population left behind to supply the armies in front with what they need to carry on the campaign."

" But have they not always done it in the past ? "

M. Bloch shook his head impatiently. " What is the use of talking about the past when you are dealing with an altogether new set of considerations ? Consider for one moment what nations were a hundred years ago and what they are to-day. In those days before railways, telegraphs, steamships, &c., were invented, each nation was more or less a homogeneous, self-contained, self- sufficing unit. Europe was built in a series of water-tight compartments. Each country sufficed for its own needs, grew its own wheat, fattened its own cattle, supplied itself for its own needs within its own frontiers. All that is

PREFACE xliii

changed ; with the exception of Russia and Austria there is not one country in Europe which is not absolutely dependent for its beef and its bread supplies from beyond the frontiers. You, of course, in England are absolutely dependent upon supplies from over sea. But you are only one degree worse off than Germany in that respect. In 1895, if the Germans had been unable to obtain any wheat except that which was grown in the Fatherland, they would have lacked bread for one hundred and two days out of the three hundred and sixty-five. Every year the interdependence of nations upon each other for the necessaries of life is greater than it ever was before. Germany at present is dependent upon Russia for two and a half months' supply of wheat in every year. That supply would, of course, be immediately cut off if Russia and Germany went to war ; and a similar state of things prevails between other nations in relation to other com- modities. Hence the first thing that war would do would be to deprive the Powers that made it of all opportunity of benefiting by the products of the nations against whom they were fighting."

"Yes," I objected, "but the world is wide, and would it not be possible to obtain food and to spare from neutral nations ? "

" That assumes," said M. Bloch, " first that the machinery of supply and distribution remains unaffected by war. Secondly, that the capacity for paying for supplies remains unimpaired. Neither of those things is true. For you, of course, it is an absolute necessity that you should be able to bring in food from beyond the seas ; and possibly with the aid of your fleet you may be able to do it, although I fear the rate of war premium will materially enhance the cost of the cargoes. The

xliv PREFACE

other nations are not so fortunate. It was proposed some time ago, I know, in Germany, that in case of war they should endeavour to replace the loss of Russian wheat by importing Indian wheat through the Suez Canal — an operation which in the face of the French and Russian cruisers might not be very easy of execution. But even supposing that it was possible to import food, who is to pay for it? And that is the final crux of the whole question."

" But," again I objected, " has the lack of money ever prevented nations going to war ? I remember well when Lord Derby, in 1876, was quite confident that Russia would never go to war on behalf of Bulgaria because of the state of the Russian finances ; but the Russo-Turkish war took place all the same, and there have been many great wars waged by nations which were bankrupt, and victories won by conquerors who had not a coin in their treasury."

"You are always appealing to precedents which do not apply. Modern society, which is organised on a credit basis, and modern war, which cannot be waged excepting at a ruinous expenditure, offer no points of analogy compared with those times of which you speak. Have you calculated for one moment what it costs to maintain a soldier as an efficient fighting man in the field of battle ? The estimate of the best authorities is that you cannot feed him and keep him going under ten francs a day — say, eight shillings a day. Supposing that the Triple and Dual Alliance mobilise their armies, we should have at once confronting us an expenditure for the mere mainten- ance of troops under arms of ;^4,ooo,ooo a day falling upon the five nations. That is to say, that in one year of war under modern conditions the Powers would spend

PREFACE xlv

;^i,46o,cxx>,ooo sterling merely in feeding their soldiers, without reckoning all the other expenses that must be incurred in the course of the campaign. This figure is interesting as enabling us to compare the cost of modern wars with the cost of previous wars. Take all the wars that have been waged in Europe from the battle of Waterloo down to the end of the Russo-Turkish war, and the total expenditure docs not amount to more than ;^ 1, 2 50,000,000 sterling, a colossal burden no doubt, but one which is nearly ;{; 200,000,000 less than that which would be entailed by the mere victualling of the armies that would be set on foot in the war which we are supposed to be discussing. Could any of the five nations, even the richest, stand that strain ? "

" But could they not borrow and issue pap)er money ? "

"Very well," said M. Bloch, " they would try to do so, no doubt, but the immediate consequence of war would be to send securities all round down from 25 to 50 per cent., and in such a tumbling market it would be diflicult to float loans. Recourse would therefore have to be had to forced loans and unconvertible paper money. We should be back to the days of the assignats, a temporary expedient whicli would aggravate the difficulties with which we have to deal. Prices, for instance, would go up enormously, and so the cost, 8s. a day, would be nearer 20s. if all food had to be paid for in depreciated currency. But, apart from the question of paying for the necessary supplies, it is a grave question whether such supplies could be produced, and if they could be produced, whether they could be distributed."

" What do you mean by ' distributed ' ? " I asked.

" Distributed ? " said M. Bloch. " Why, how are you to get the food into the mouths of the people who want it

xlvi PREFACE

if you had (as you would have at the beginning of the war) taken over all the railways for military purposes ? Even within the limits of Germany or of Russia there would be considerable difficulty in securing the transit of food-stuffs in war time, not merely to the camps, but to the great industrial centres. You do not seem to realise the extent to which the world has been changed by the modern industrial system. Down to the end of the last century the enormous majority of the population lived in their own fields, grew their own food, and each farm was a little granary. It was with individuals as it was with nations, and each homestead was a self-contained, self- providing unit. But nowadays all is changed. You have great industrial centres which produce absolutely nothing which human beings can eat. How much, for instance, do you grow in the metropolitan area for the feeding of London ? Everything has to be brought by rail or by water to your markets. So it is more or less all over the Continent, especially in Germany and France. Now it so happens (and in this I am touching upon the political side of the question) that those districts which produce least food yield more Socialists to the acre than any other part of the country. It is those districts, rife with all elements of poHtical discontent, which would be the first to feel the pinch of high prices and of lack of food. But this is a matter on which we will speak later on."

" But do you think," I said, " that the railways would be so monopolised by the military authorities that they could not distribute provisions throughout the country ? "

"No," said M. Bloch. "It is not merely that they would be monopolised by their military authorities, but that they would be disorganised by the mobilisation of troops. You forget that the whole machinery of distribu-

PREFACE xIvH

tion and of production would be thrown out of gear by mobilisation ; and this brings me to the second point upon which I insist — viz., the impossibility of producing the food. At the present moment Germany, for instance, just manages to produce sufficient food to feed her own population, with the aid of imports from abroad, for which she is able to pay by the proceeds of her own industry. But in the case of war with Russia she would not be able to buy two and a half months' supply of wheat from Russia, and therefore would have to pay much more for a similar supply of food in the neutral markets, providing she could obtain it. But she would have to buy much more than two and a half months' from Russia, because the nine months' corn which she pro- duces at present is the product of the whole labour of all her able-bodied agricultural population ; and how they work you in England do not quite realise. Do you know, for instance, that after the * Biisstag,' or day of penitence and prayer, at the beginning of what we call the farmers' year or summer season, the whole German agricultural population in some districts work unremittingly fifteen hours a day seven days a week, without any cessation, without Sundays or holidays, until the harvest is gathered in ; and even with all that unremitting toil they are only able to produce nine months' supply of grain. When you have mobilised the whole German army, you will diminish at least by half the strong hands available for labour in the field. In Russia we should not, of course, be in any such difficulty, and in the scrupulous observance of Sunday we have a reser\-e which would enable us to recoup ourselves for the loss of agricultural labour. We should lose, for instance, 17 per cent, of our peasants; but if those who were left worked on Sunday, in addition

xlviii PREFACE

to weekdays, we should just be able to make up for the loss of the men who were taken to war. Germany has no such reserves, nor France ; and hence it is that, speak- ing as a political economist, I feel extremely doubtful as to whether it would be possible for either Germany or France to feed their own population, to say nothing of their own soldiers, when once the whole machine of agricultural production had been broken up by the mobilisation en masse of the whole population."

" But has this point never been considered by the sovereigns and statesmen of Europe ? " I inquired.

" You know," replied M. Bloch, " how it is with human beings. We shall all die, but how few care to think of death ? It is one of the things inevitable which no one can alter by taking thought. So it is with this question. War once being regarded as unavoidable, the rulers shut their eyes to its consequences. Only once in recent history do I remember any attempt on the part of a European Government gravely to calculate the economic consequences of war under modern conditions. It was when M. Burdeau was in the French Ministry. He appointed a committee of economists for the purpose of ascertaining how the social organism would continue to function in a time of war, how from day to day their bread would be given to the French population. But no sooner had he begun his investigation than a strong objection was raised by the military authorities, and out of deference to their protests the inquiry was indefinitely suspended. Hence we are going forward blindfold, pre- paring all the while for a war without recognising the fact that the very fundamental first condition of being able to wage it does not exist. You might as well prepare for a naval war without being sure that you have a sea in

PREFACE xlix

which your ships can float as to continue to make pre- parations for a land war unless you have secured in advance the means by which your population shall live. Every great State would in time of war be in the position of a besieged city, and the factor which always decides sieges is the factor which will decide the modern war. Your soldiers may fight as they please; the ultimate decision is in the hands oi famine ^

" Well, it is an old saying that ' armies always march upon their bellies,' " said I. " ' Hunger is more terrible than iron, and the want of food destroys more armies than battles,' was a saying of the first Napoleon, which holds good to-day."

" But," interrupted M. Bloch, " I am not speaking so much of the armies, I am speaking of the population that is behind the armies, which far outnumbers the armies and which is apt to control the policy of which the armies are but the executive instrument. How long do you think the populations of Paris or of Berlin or of the great manufac- turing districts in Germany would stand the doubling of the price of their food, accompanied, as it would be, by a great stagnation of industry and all the feverish uncer- tainty and excitement of war ?

" What is the one characteristic of modern Europe ? Is it not the growth of nervousness and a lack of phlegmatic endurance, of stoical apathy ? The modern European feels more keenly and is much more excitable and impres- sionable than his forefathers. Upon this highly excitable, sensitive population you are going to inflict the miseries of hunger and all the horrors of war. At the same time you will enormously increase their taxes, and at the same time also you will expose your governing and directing classes to more than decimation at the hands of the enemy's sharp- er

I PREFACE

shooters. How long do you think your social fabric will remain stable under such circumstances ? Believe me, the more the ultimate political and social consequences of the modern war are calmly contemplated, the more clearly will it be evident that if war is possible it is only possible, as I said before, at the price of suicide."

"From which, therefore, it follows, in your opinion, M. Bloch, that the Peace Conference has not so much to discuss the question of peace as to inquire into whether or not war is possible ? "

" A committee of experts, chosen from the ablest repre- sentatives of the Powers sent to the Hague," replied M. Bloch, "would have very Httle difficulty in coming to a conclusion upon the facts which I have just set forth in my book. Those experts might be soldiers and political economists, or the inquiry might be divided into two heads, and the two questions relegated to different committees of specialists. I am quite sure that, as the result of such a dispassionate international investigation into the altered conditions of the problem, they could only arrive at one conclusion — viz., that the day when nations could hope to settle their disputes by appealing to the arbitrament of war has gone by : first, because from that tribunal no definite decision can speedily be secured ; and secondly, the costs of the process are ruinous to both the suitors."

" It is rather a happy idea, that of yours, M. Bloch," said I, " that of the last Court of Appeal of nations having broken down by the elaboration of its own procedure, the excessive costliness of the trial, and, what is much more serious than anything else, the impossibility of securing a definite verdict. Hitherto the great argument in favour of war is that it has been a tribunal capable of giving un- mistakably a decision from which there was no appeal."

PREFACE li

*' Whereas, according to my contention," said M. Bloch, " war has become a tribunal which by the very perfection of its own processes and the costliness of its methods can no longer render a decision of any kind. It may ruin the suitors, but the verdict is liable to be indefinitely postponed.

"Therefore the ultimate Court of Appeal having broken down," I said, " it is necessary to constitute another, whose proceedings would not be absolutely inconsistent with economic necessity or with the urgent need for prompt and definite decision. But if this be admitted, what immense world-wide consequences would flow from such a decision."

" Yes," said M. Bloch, " the nations would no longer go on wasting ;^2 50,000,000 sterling every year in preparing to wage a war which can only be waged at the price of suicide, that is to say, which cannot be waged at all, for no nation willingly commits suicide. Then we may hope for some active effort to be made in the direction of ameliorating the condition of the people. The fund liberated from the war-chest of the world could work mai-vels if it were utilised in the education of the people. At present, as you will see from the tables which I have compiled in my book, the proportion of money spent on education compared with that spent on war is very small. In Russia, for instance, we have an immense deal to do in that direction. In some provinces no fewer than 90 per cent, of the recruits are illiterate. In fact, as you will see from what I have written, I have been as much at- tracted to this subject from the desire to improve the con- dition of the people as from any other source. Hence my book took in part the shape of an investigation of the moral, social, and material conditions in which the masses

lii PREFACE

of the Russian peasants pass their lives. It is a painful picture, and one that cannot fail profoundly to touch the hearts of all those who have followed the results of my investigation. The condition of the mass of the people in every country leaves much to be desired, but especially is this the case in my own country, where the resources of civilisation have hardly been drawn upon for the improve- ment of the condition of the peasants."

'• Yet, M. Bloch, I think I gather from you that Russia was better able to support a war than more highly organised nations."

'* You are quite right," said M. Bloch. " It is true that Russia can, perhaps better than all other countries, con- template the dangers or impossibilities of modern war; but that is precisely because she is not so highly organised and so advanced or developed in civilisation as her neigh- bours. Russia is the only country in Europe which pro- duces sufficient food for her own people. She is not only able to produce enough grain to feed her own people, but she exports at present four millions of tons every year. A war which stopped the export trade would simply place this immense mass of food at the disposal of our own people, who would be more in danger of suffering from a plethora of food than from a scarcity. But nevertheless, although this is the case, the very backwardness of Russia renders it more important that she should avoid exposing her nascent civilisation to the tremendous strain of a great war. Practically we may be invulnerable, but if, when having beaten back our invaders, we were to endeavour in turn to carry the war across our frontiers, we should find ourselves confronted by the same difificulties which make offensive war increasingly difficult, not to say impossible. Neither is there any conceivable territorial or political

PREFACE liii

result attainable by force of arms here or in Asia which would be any adequate compensation for the sacrifices which even a victorious war would entail."

"All this may be true, but nations do not always count the cost before going to war."

" No," said M. Bloch ; " if they did, they would very seldom go to war. Take, for instance, the civil war in the United States of America. According to some calcu- lations it would have cost the United States four milliards of francs, that is to say ;{; 160,000,000 sterling, to have bought up all their slaves at ;i^200 a head, and emancipated them. Instead of taking that method of solving a danger- ous and delicate problem, they appealed to the sword, with the result that it is estimated that the war occasioned the country losses of one kind and another amounting to twenty-five milliards of francs, or ;^ 1, 000,000,000 sterling, to say nothing of all the bloodshed and misery entailed by that war. The cost of emancipation thus ciphered out at ;^i200 a head per slave instead of ;^200 per head, at which the bargain could easily have been arranged. The economic condition of our peasants in many of our pro- vinces," continued M. Bloch, " is heartrending. Their ignorance, their innocence, their simplicity, render them an easy prey to money-lenders, who have in many cases succeeded in establishing a veritable system of slave labour."

"How could that be?" I asked. "The serfs were emancipated in 1861."

"Yes," said M. Bloch, " they were emancipated, but their emancipation without education left them an easy prey to the Kulaks, who advance money upon their labour. A peasant, for instance, has to pay his taxes, say, in winter time, and the Kulak will advance the twenty or thirty

liv PREFACE

roubles which he may have to pay in return for what is called his 'summer labour.' The price of labour in Russia in summer is twice or thrice as much as it is in winter. The Kulak buys the summer labour at the winter rates, and then having purchased in advance the summer labour of the unfortunate peasant, he collects his chattels in droves and farms them out wherever he can dispose of them. It is veritable slavery. But even this is less terri- ble than that which can be witnessed in some provinces, where parents sell their children to speculators, who buy them up and send them to St. Petersburg and Moscow as calves are sent to market, where they are sold out for a term of years as apprentices to those who have no scruples against securing cheap labour on those terms.

" No one who has seen anything of the squalor and

wretchedness, the struggle with fever and famine, in the

rural districts of Russia, especially when there has been a

failure of harvest, can be other than passionate to divert

for the benefit of the people some of the immense volume

of wealth that is spent in preparing for this impossible war.

The children of most Russian peasants come into the

world almost like brute beasts, without any medical or

skilled attendance at childbirth, and they are brought up

hard in a way that fortunately you know little of in wealthy

England. Can you imagine, for instance," said M. Bloch,

speaking with great fervour and feeling, " the way in

which infants are left inside the home of most Russian

peasants, whose mothers have to leave them to labour in

the fields ? The child is left alone to roll about the earthen

floor of the hut, and as it will cry for hunger, poultices of

chewed black bread are tied round its hands and feet, so

that the little creature may have something to suck at until

its mother comes back from the fields. At every stage in

PREFACE Iv

life you find the same deplorable lack of what more prosperous nations regard as indispensable to human existence. In some provinces we have only thirty-seven doctors per million inhabitants, and as for nurses, school- masters, and other agents of civilisation, there are whole vast tracts in which they are absolutely unknown. All this makes our population hardy, no doubt — those who survive ; but the infant mortality is frightful, and the life which the survivors lead is very hard and sometimes very terrible."

" The contrasts between the vital statistics of Russia and of France are, I suppose, about as wide as could be imagined."

" Yes," said M. Bloch. " But although the French

system of limiting the family and keeping infant mortality

down to a minimum has some great advantages, it has

great disadvantages. In a limited family much greater

pains are taken to preserve the life of the sickly children.

Hence, instead of allowing them to be eliminated by

natural process, whereby the race would be preserved from

deterioration, they are sedulously kept alive, and the

vitality of the nation is thereby diminished. In other

respects our Russian people are very different from what

you imagine. For instance, it may surprise you, but it is

undoubtedly true, that the amount of spirit consumed by

our people is very much less per head than that which is

drunk in England, and also that the number of illegitimate

births in Russia is lower per thousand than in an other

country in Europe. This is due to the prevalence of early

marriages, for our people marry so early that when our

young men are taken for the army from 30 to 60 per cent.

are married before they enter the ranks. You may smile,"

said M. Bloch, " at me for thinking that those questions

Ivi PREFACE

must be considered in a discussion of the future war ; but it is the moral stamina of a population which will ultimately decide its survival, and I therefore could not exclude the discussion of all the elements which contribute to the well- being of a population in endeavouring to forecast the future of war."

" Now, M, Bloch, let us turn to another subject. We have talked hitherto about armies, and only about armies. What is your idea about navies ? "

" My idea about a navy," said M. Bloch, " is that unless you have a supreme navy, it is not worth while having one at all, and that a navy that is not supreme is only a hostage in the hands of the Power whose fleet is supreme. Hence, it seems to me that for Russia to spend millions in the endeavour to create a deep-sea fleet of sea-going battleships is a great mistake. The money had much better be used for other purposes."

" What ! " said I, " then, do you not think that Russia needs a navy ? "

"A navy, yes," said M. Bloch, "a navy for coast defence, perhaps, and also cruisers, but a fighting fleet of battleships, no. It is a folly to attempt to create such a navy, and the sooner that is recognised the better."

"But," I persisted, "do you not agree with Captain Mahan in thinking that sea-power is the dominant factor in the destiny of nations ? "

" Do not let us theorise ; let us look at facts," said M. Bloch. " What I see very plainly is that the navy may be almost ignored as a vital factor in a war to the death between Russia and any of her neighbours. Suppose, for instance, that we had a war with Germany. What would be the good of our fleet? Suppose that it is inferior to that of Germany, it will be either captured, or

PREFACE Ivii

shut up in harbour, unable to go out. If it is superior to that of Germany, what better are we ? Here we have history to guide us. We cannot hope to have such an unquestioned superiority at sea over the Germans as the French had in the war of 1870; but what use was the naval supremacy of France to the French in their death- grapple with the Germans ? Why, so far from finding them useful, they absolutely laid their ironclads up in harbour and sent their crews to Paris to assist in the defence of the capital— and they did riglit. Germany was striking at the heart of France when she struck at Paris, and no amount of superiority over the German fleet on the part of the French could be counted for a moment as a set-off against the loss of their capital. So it will always be."

"But," I objected, "could the German fleet not be utilised for the purpose of landing an expedition on the Russian coast ? "

" No doubt," said M. Bloch, " it might. But here again I may quote Count Moltke. When, in 1870, we were discussing the possibility of a French expedition to the shores of the Baltic, Moltke declared that, so far from regarding such an expedition with alarm, he would rather welcome it, because any diversion of French forces from the point where the decisive blow must be delivered would increase the German chances of success. Hence, if the Germans were to send an expeditionary force to Russian v^aters, it would only represent the subtraction of so many fighting men from the seat of war, where the real issue of the campaign would be decided. No; Russia would have no reason to fear any serious attack from the sea. That being so, what is the use of wasting all our resources upon ironclads which we could not use ?

Ivili PREFACE

It would have been much better to have gone on piling up expenditure on our army much more rapidly than we have upon our fleet. In 1876 we spent twenty-seven million roubles on the navy, and twenty years later we were spending sixty-seven millions, so that the naval expenditure had more than doubled, while the expenditure on the army had only increased fifty per cent."

" Do you not think that a German, British, or Japanese fleet might seriously injure Russia by bombarding the coast towns ? "

" No," said M. Bloch. " Such coast towns as we have, and they are not many, are for the most part well defended, too well defended to be seriously attacked by an enemy's fleet. The experience of Crete does not increase our dread of the bombarding ironclad as a method likely to affect the issues of a campaign. Why, is it not true that the international fleet on one occasion fired 70 shells and only killed three men and wounded 15?"

"And what about the protection of your commerce, M. Bloch ? "

" The protection of our commerce would have to be undertaken (if undertaken at all) by cruisers and not by battleships. Besides, there should be some regard paid to the value of the thing protected, and the insurance which you pay for it. At this moment our oversea mercantile marine is small, so small compared with that of England that, although you are spending twice as much on your navy as we do, your naval insurance rate (if we may so call it) only amounts to 16 francs per ton of merchant shipping, whereas with us the rate is as high as 1 30 francs ; or if it is reckoned by a percentage upon the trade, our naval expenditure is twice as high as yours. And to what purpose ? "

PREFACE lix

" But, M. Bloch, supposing that our fleet is inferior in strength to the German fleet, and that it is wiped off the face of the sea. What then ? "

" What then ? " said M. Bloch. "Why, we shall just be in the position that the Italians were in when they lost their fleet at Lissa to the Austrians. But what eflect had that decisive naval victory upon the fortunes of the campaign ? The fate of Austria was sealed by the battle of Sadowa, and all naval losses which we might incur would naturally be charged for in the indemnity which we should impose upon our defeated enemy if we came off victorious, and if we were beaten on land our defeat at sea would not be a material aggravation of our position."

"But, M. Bloch, do not you think that you need a strong fleet in order to keep your channels of trade

? "

open

" 1 do not believe," said M. Bloch, " that you can keep your channels of trade open, even with the strongest fleet. I grant that if you have a supreme fleet, you may at least have a chance of keeping the trade routes open, but if you have not a supreme fleet (and for Russia this is out of the question) you can do nothing, and Russia, fortunately being self-contained and self-supporting, could manage to subsist better, if her oversea trade were cut off, than any other country."

"Then how would you apply your reasoning to England ? "

" England," said M. Bloch, " is in a different category from all the other nations. You only grow enough bread in your own country to feed your people for three months in the year. If you do not command the seas, if you cannot bring to your markets the food of the world, you

Ix PREFACE

are in the position of a huge beleaguered fortress with only three months' rations for the whole people. If you ask my opinion, I tell you frankly that I do not think your position is very enviable, not because of any danger from invasion, for I recognise the superiority of your fleet, but because it seems to me that any nation is in a very precarious position which huS to depend for so much of its food upon countries across the sea. A single cruiser let loose upon one of your great trade routes would send up the price of provisions enormously, and although no one could hope to blockade the English ports, any inter- ruption in the supply of raw material, any interference with the stream of food products which are indispensable for the sustenance of your people, would endanger you far more than the loss of a pitched battle.

" It is true that you are prosperous ; but there are many elements in your population the material condition of which leaves much to be desired, and with the stress and strain of industrial stagnation, caused by the closing of markets abroad and the rise in the price of food which would be inevitable under any circumstances, you might have as considerable internal difficulties as any of those which threaten your neighbours. But, there again, if (which God forbid) England should find herself at war, the factor which will decide the issue will not be the decisive battle ; it will be pressure of want, the lack of food, in short, the economic results which must inevitably follow any great war in the present complex state of human civilisation.

" In short," said M. Bloch, " I regard the economic factor as the dominant and decisive element in the matter. You cannot fight unless you can eat, and at the present moment you cannot feed your people and wage a great

PREFACE Ixi

war. To a certain extent this is already recognised, so much so that there are a few general principles that it is worth while mentioning. First, you may take it for granted that the great war, if it ever breaks out, will not take place until after the harvest has been gathered. To mobilise in spring, or in early summer, would bring starvation too closely home to the population for any statesman to think of it. Secondly, whenever there is a bad harvest you may be sure there will be no war. Even with a full granary it will be very difficult for any nation to feed its troops, to say nothing of its home population. With a bad harvest it would be impossible. Hence, if ever you should see a rapid buying-up of bread-stuffs on the part of any nation, you may feel sure that there is danger ahead ; but so long as there is no attempt made to secure reserve supplies of grain, you may regard with comparative equanimity the menaces of war."

" Then, on the whole, you are hopeful concerning the future, M. Bloch ? "

" Yes," said he ; *' hopeful with the hope that is born not of fantasy or of Utopian dreaming, but from the painstaking examination of hard, disagreeable facts. The soldier is going down and the economist is going up. There is no doubt of it. Humanity has progressed beyond the stage in which war can any longer be regarded as a possible Court of Appeal. Even military service has lost much of its fascination. At one time war appealed to the imagination of man, and the poets and painters found no theme so tempting as depicting the heroism of the individual warrior, whose courage and might often turned the tide of battle and decided the destiny of nations. All that has long gone by the board. War has become more and more a matter of mechanical arrangement. Modern

Ixii PREFACE

battles will be decided, so far as they can be decided at all, by men lying in improvised ditches which they have scooped out to protect themselves from the fire of a distant and invisible enemy. All the pomp and circum- stance of glorious war disappeared when smokeless powder was invented. As a profession militarism is becoming less and less attractive. There is neither booty to be gained, nor promotion, with an ever increasing certainty of a disagreeable death, should war ever take

place."

" The old toast in the British Army used to be," I said, " * Bloody war and quick promotion.' "

"Yes," said M. Bloch, "as long as bloody war only killed out a certain percentage it meant more rapid promotion for the rest, but if it kills out too many the attraction fails, for there is no promotion to a dead man. Side by side with the drying up of the attractiveness of a military career there has gone on an increasing agitation against the whole system, an agitation which finds its most extreme exponents among the Socialists, whose chief stock-in-trade is to dwell upon the waste of industrial resources caused by the present organisation of society on a competitive basis, which they maintain naturally and necessarily results in the excessive burdens of our armed peace. What the Governments will all come to see soon more or less clearly is that if they persist in squandering the resources of their people in order to prepare for a war which has already become impossible without suicide, they will only be preparing the triumph of the socialist revolution."

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Natural philosophers declare that the atmosphere reveals at times the presence of a certain so-called cosmic dust. It influences the change of colours in the sky, it colours the sunlight with a bloody line, it penetrates our dwellings and our lungs, acts injuriously upon living organisms, and, falling even upon the summits of hills, leaves its traces upon their mantles of virgin snow.

In the public and private life of modern Europe somethine of the same kind reveals itself. A presentiment is felt that the present incessant growth of armaments must either call forth a war, ruinous both for conqueror and for conquered, and ending perhaps in general anarchy, or reduce the people to the most lamentable condition.

Is this unquiet state of mind the consequence of a mistaken or sickly condition of the nervous system of the modern man ? Or is it justified by possible contingencies ?

Ixiv AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Such questions cannot be answered categori- cally. All would desire that the dangers caused by armaments were but a symptom which time will destroy. But even an unanimous desire cannot have the power to change the great con- catenation of circumstances which are the cause of armaments, until the time shall come when, in the words of Von Thunen, the interests of nations and the interests of humanity shall cease to contend with one another, and culture shall have awakened a sense of the solidarity of the interests of all.

Such a state of affairs is unhappily still distant. It is true that the ruinousness of war under modern conditions is apparent to all. But this gives no sufficient guarantee that war will not break forth suddenly, even in opposition to the wishes of those who take part in it. Involuntarily we call to mind the words of the great Bacon, that " in the vanity of the world a greater field of action is open for folly than for reason, and frivolity always enjoys more influence than judg- ment." To-day these words are even more apposite than in the past. For Reason itself it is harder than before to find a path in the field of circumstances which change for ever. The speed with which relations chancre is a character- istic feature of our time. In modern times a few

AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixv

years see greater changes in the material and moral condition of masses than formerly took place in the course of centuries. This greater mobility of contemporary life is the consequence of better education, the activity of parliaments, of associations, and of the press, and the influence of improved communications. Under such influences the peoples of the world live lives not only their own, but the lives of others also ; intellectual triumphs, economic progress, materialised among one people, react at once on the condition of others ; the intellectual outlook widens as we ascend, as the seascape widens from a hill, and, like the sea, the whole world of culture drifts and fluctuates eternally.

Every change in conditions or disposition Is affirmed only after a struggle of elements. An analysis of the history of mankind shows that from the year 1496 b.c. to the year 1861 of our era, that Is, in a cycle of 3357 years, were but 227 years of peace and 3 1 30 years of war : In other words, were thirteen years of war for every year of peace. Considered thus, the history of the lives of peoples presents a picture of uninterrupted struggle. War, It would appear, is a normal attribute to human life.

The position now has changed In much, but still the new continues to contend with the

Ixvl AUTHOR'S PREFACE

remnants of the old. The old order has changed and given place to the new. Sieyes compared the old order of things with a pyramid standing upon its apex, declaring that it must be given a more natural position and placed upon its base. This demand has been fulfilled in this sense, that the edifice of state has been placed upon founda- tions incomparably wider than before, affirmed on the rights and wills of millions of men, the so- named middle order of society.

It is natural that the greater the number of voices influencing the course of affairs the more complex is the sum of interests to be considered. The economic revolution caused by the applica- tion of steam has been the cause of entirely new and unexpected conditions between the different countries of the world and between the classes inhabiting them, enriching and strengthening some, impoverishing and weakening others, in measure as the new conditions permitted to each participation in the new distribution of revenues, capital, and influence.

With the innumerable voices which are now bound up in our public opinion, and the many different representatives of its interests, naturally appear very different views on militarism and its object, war. The propertied classes, in particular those whose importance and condition was

AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixvii

established during the former distribution of power and former methods of acquisition, precisely those classes whom we call Conservatives, are inclined to confuse even the intellectual move- ment against militarism with aspirations for the subversion of social order. In this is sometimes given, they attribute, too great an importance to single and transitory phenomena, while no sufficient attention is turned on the dangerous fermentation of minds awakened by the present and constantly growing burdens of militarism.

On the other hand, agitators, seeking influence on the minds of the masses, having deduced from the new conditions with recklessness and even intentional misrepresentation the most extreme conclusions, deny all existing rights, and promise to the masses more than the most perfect institu- tions could give them. In striving to arouse the masses against militarism such agitators un- ceremoniously ascribe to every thinker who does not share their views selfish impulses, although in reality he may be following sincere convictions.

And althouofh the masses are slow to surrender themselves to abstract reasoning, and act usually only under the influence of passion or disaster, there can be no doubt that this agitation, cease- lessly carried on in parliaments, on platforms, and in the press, penetrates more and more deeply

Ixviii AUTHOR'S PREFACE

the people, and awakens in it those feelings which in the midst of the disasters called forth by war might easily lead them to action. The evil of militarism serves to-day as the chief instrument of the activity of agitators, and a tangible object for attack, while in reality these agitators strive not only for the suppression of militarism, but for the destruction of the whole social order.

With such a position of affairs — that is, on the one hand, the ruinous competition in constantly increasing armaments, and, on the other, the social danger for all which grows under a general burden — it is necessary that influential and educated men should seriously attempt to give themselves a clear account of the effect of war under modern conditions ; whether it will be possible to realise the aims of war, and whether the extermination of millions of men will not be wholly without result.

If, after consideration of all circumstances, we answer ourselves, " War with such conditions is impossible ; armies could not sustain those cata- clysms which a future war would call forth ; the civil population could not bear the famine and interruption of industry," then we might ask the general question : " Why do the peoples more and more exhaust their strength in accumulating means of destruction which are valueless even to

AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixix

accomplish the ends for which they are pre- pared?"

It is very natural, that even a long time ago, in many Western European countries, in all ranks of society, many attempts have been made, partly theoretical and partly practical, to eliminate war from the future history of humanity. Philoso- phers and philanthropists, statesmen and revolu- tionaries, poets and artists, parliaments and congresses, more strongly and strongly every day insist upon the necessity of avoiding the blood- shed and disasters of war.

A time was when it seemed protests against war were assuming practical importance. But the desire for revenge awakened by the events of 1870 turned the disposition of peoples in another direction. Nevertheless the idea remains and continues to operate on minds. The voices of scholars and the efforts of philanthropists directed against war naturally found an echo among the lower orders of populations. In the twilight of imperfect knowledge fantastic visions appeared, of which agitators took advantage. This agita- tion increased every year.

In recent times war has become even more terrible than before in consequence of perfected weapons of destruction and systems of equipment and training utterly unknown in the past. What

Ixx AUTHOR'S PREFACE

is graver still, the immensity of armies and the traininor of soldiers in entrenchment must call forth difficulties in provisioning and defence from climatic conditions.

It is true that certain military authors think that the bloodshed of the battlefield will be decreased in consequence of the greater distance between the combatants, that attacks by cavalry and with the bayonet are improbable in the present conditions of firearms, while retreat will be facilitated for a defeated army. But, even admitting this, which is by no means proved, there can be no doubt that with modern firearms the impression which battle makes on armies will be incomparably greater than before, while smokeless powder will change even the nature of these impressions. Infantry and artillery fire will have unprecedented force, while aid to the wounded will be made more difficult by the great range both of small-arms and of artillery. Smoke will no longer conceal from the survivors the terrible consequences of the battle, and every advance will be made with full appreciation of the probabilities of extermination. From this, and from the fact that the mass of soldiers will have but recently been called from the field, the factory, and the workshop, it will appear that even the psychical conditions of war have changed. Thus

AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixxi

in the armies of Western states the agitation against war may extend even so far as the materialisation of sociaHstic theories subverting the bases of monarchies.

The thought of those convulsions which will be called forth by a war, and of the terrible means prepared for it, will hinder military enterprise, notwithstanding the passionate relations of the people to some of the questions in dispute among them. But, on the other hand, the present con- ditions cannot continue to exist for ever. The peoples groan under the burdens of militarism. Europe is ever confronted with the necessity of drawing from the productive forces of the peoples new and new millions for military purposes. Hardly was the small-calibre rifle adopted when invention made a new advance, and there can be no doubt that soon the Great Powers will be com- pelled to adopt a weapon of still smaller calibre with double the present energy, allowing soldiers to carry a greater number of cartridges. At the same time we see in France and Germany pre- paration of new artillery to turn to the best advantage the new smokeless powder. Millions are expended on the construction of new batde- ships and cruisers. But every year brings such radical improvements in guns, in speed, and in coal-carrying capacity that vessels hardly launched

Ixxii AUTHOR'S PREFACE

are obsolete, and others must be built to replace them. In view of what we see in Germany, Italy, and Austria, we are compelled to ask, Can the present incessant demands for money from Parliament for armaments continue for ever without social outbreaks? And will not the present difficulty of carrying on war at last be replaced by an absolute impossibility, at least in those countries where high culture has increased the value of the life of every citizen ? Thus, in the war of the future will appear not only quanti- tative differences in the number of armies but also qualitative differences which may have im- mense importance.

But what is still graver are the economic and social convulsions which war will call forth in consequence of the summons under the flag of almost the whole male population, the interrup- tion of maritime communications, the stagnation in industry and trade, the increase in the price of the necessaries of life, and the destruction of credit. Will these convulsions not be so great that governments will find it impossible in the course of time indicated by military specialists as the probable duration of war to acquire means for maintaining their armies, satisfy the requirements of budgets, and at the same time feed the desti- tute remainder of the civil population ?

AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixxiii

Within the last twenty-five years such changes have taken place in the very nature of military operations that the future war will in no way be like its predecessors. In consequence of the adoption of improved artillery, explosive shells, and small-arms which allow the soldier to carry an immense number of cartridges, in consequence of the absence of concealing smoke, in conse- quence of the immense proportions which military operations must take as a result of the vastness of armies, such unquestioned authorities on military^ affairs as Moltke and Leer and many other eminent military writers declare that a future war will last many years.

But with modern political, social, and economic conditions it would be strange if there did not arise in England, Italy, Austria, Russia, Germany, and France — in one country from one reason, in another from another — factors which will dis- arrange the apparatus of war and prevent its continuance before the ends desired shall have been attained. This is a question of the first gravity, yet military writers entirely ignore it, attending only to the technical side of war.

In consequence of alliances concluded, all plans of activity are founded on the combined opera- tions of allied armies. What will happen to combinations founded on united action when one

Ixxiv AUTHOR'S PREFACE

or another of the allies Is compelled to cease operations through insufficient means for resisting the social influences of war ?

Thus we find that military questions are bound up with questions of economy. But military writers look on the future war only from the point of view of attaining certain objects by destroying the armies of the enemy ; the economic and social consequences of war, if they are con- sidered at all, are considered only as secondary objects. Even economists, in consequence of the difficulty of such a question, have made no single investigation resulting in a complete picture of the consequences of war. But this is in no way surprising.

Without acquaintance with the technicalities of warfare it is impossible to understand what will be its precise conditions, or to define the limits where the operation of defined laws will cease and accidental phenomena appear. A result could only be obtained by careful study of the very nature of war in all its phenomena. Twenty years ago such a task would have been compara- tively easy. But the last two decades have witnessed immense changes equal to revolutions. First of all a fundamental change has taken place in the very elements which take part in war and from which its course depends. In a future war

AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixxv

on the field of battle, instead of professional soldiers, will appear whole peoples with all their peculiar virtues and failings.

A full appreciation of the conditions of a future war is all the more difficult since on the one hand new methods of attack and defence, as yet in- sufficiendy tested, will be employed, and, on the other hand, because former wars were carried on by means of long-service professional soldiers. But not only will a future war take the character of a strue2:le of whole nations living a wide and complex life, with military problems correspond- ing in complexity, but the arms and apparatus of destruction are the very finest result of the inventiveness and creative activity of mankind.

The elements contending in a future war will be all the moral and intellectual resources of nations, all the forces of modern civilisation, all technical improvements, feelings, characters, minds and wills — the combined fruit of the culture of the civilized world. It is thus that this question demands the attention of all society. In Western states, especially from the adoption of conscription, interest in military affairs has spread through all ranks of society.

Reasoning on the basis of future wars, military writers declare that the chief elements of warfare, although only in their general character, must be

Ixxvi AUTHOR'S PREFACE

made known to the population, which in the event of war constitutes the army, and from whose activity depends the issue of campaigns. It is not enough that officers and soldiers actually on service know what they are to meet in a future war. In the ranks of armies in time of war will appear an immense proportion of officers and men from the reserves, who for many years have taken no part in military exercises. As a consequence of this, in every state appear popular compositions with the object of informing the public of the technique of modern war, all, almost without exception, neglecting the economic side of the question. Some prejudge a future war from the example of history. Such neglect, as a rule, the improvement of weapons and the in- creased complexity of strategy and tactics. Others, well informed as to the improvement of weapons, but neglecting inevitable conclusions, assume that war will last but a short time, and therefore pay no attention to the financial and economic perturbation which it will cause or its effects on the moral condition of the people.

The late General Fadeleff very justly pointed out the danger arising from such a state of affairs. " The opinion of the people of their strength has immense influence on the course of politics ; this opinion is often frivolous and unfounded, though

AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixxvii

from it may depend the destiny of nations. Yet it is generally agreed that even the elements of military affairs constitute a speciality which must remain unknown by the public. But when the moment comes to express its opinion on war and peace, to balance the chances of success, it may be assumed that of ten military specialists whose authority is accepted nine will adopt the opinions of the social medium in which they live. Thus a public, entirely ignorant of military questions, often becomes the deciding factor in decision. To free oneself from the influence of public opinion in such matters is impossible." It was with the object of making accessible in some degree information accumulated on all matters directly or indirectly connected with war that the present work was undertaken, of which this volume is but an abridgment.

It is but a slight service to diagnose an illness and pronounce it incurable. The position of the European world, the organic strength of which is wasted, on the one hand, in the sacrifice of millions on preparations for war, and, on the other, in a destructive agitation which finds in militarism its apology and a fit instrument for acting on the minds of the people, must be ad- mitted to be abnormal and even sickly. Is it possible that there can be no recovery from this ?

Ixxviii AUTHOR'S PREFACE

We are deeply persuaded that a means of recovery exists if the European states would but set themselves the question — in what will result these armaments and this exhaustion, what will be the nature of a future war, can resource be had to war even now for the decision of questions in dispute, and is it possible to conceive the settlement of such questions by means of the cataclysm which, with modern means of destruc- tion, a war between five Great Powers with ten millions of soldiers would cause ?

Delay in the practical settlement of this ques- tion is impossible. And when a settlement is arrived at it will be shown that for twenty, forty years millions have been wasted yearly on fruit- less armaments which cannot be employed, and by means of which the decision of international disputes is inconceivable. But then it will be too late ; then such immense losses will have been sustained that Europe generally will be in a worse position than Italy to-day. Then, instead of the dangers of international war, other threaten- ing symptoms will have appeared.

That war will become impossible in time — this is indicated by all. Its apparatus grows more rapidly than the productiveness of European states, and preparations will continue to swallow more and more of the income of peoples. Mean-

AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixxix

time the relations of the nations become closer and closer, their interdependence more plain, and their solidarity in any great convulsion will con- stantly grow.

That war will finally become impracticable is apparent. The question is more apposite — when will the recognition of this inevitable truth be spread among European governments and peoples ? When the impossibility of resorting to war for the decision of international quarrels is apparent to all, other means will be devised.

PART I MILITARY AND NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS

CHAPTER I

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND

In former times bullets, for a great part of their course, flew over the heads of the combatants, and were effective only for an insignificant distance. The modern bullet will strike all it meets for a distance of 660 yards, and after the introduction of the more perfect arms now in course of preparation the effective distance will be as great as 1 2 10 yards. And as it is most improbable that on the field of battle it will not meet with a single living being in such a distance, we may conclude that every bullet will find its victim.

The old powder was a mechanical mixture of nitre, sulphur, and charcoal, upon the ignition of which were liberated many elements which did not enter into new combinations. The new powder is a chemical combina- tion which gives scarcely any smoke and produces no empyreuma in the barrel. At the same time the explosive force of the new powder is much greater than that of the old, and its quality of smokelessness or of giving little smoke, in the first place, renders it impossible to judge of the position and forces of an enemy by smoke, and, in the second, frees the marksmen from the clouds of smoke which formerly were an obstacle to aiming. And as in the opinion of many authorities the last word concerning explosives has not yet been said, in the war of the future, especially if it should take place some years from now, explosives of such strength will be employed that the concentration of armies in the open field, or even under the cover of fortifications, will be almost impossible, so

4 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

that the apparatus of war prepared at the present time may prove itself useless.

The improvement of small arms goes forward with incredible speed. By the almost unanimous testimony of competent persons, the changes which took place in the course of five centuries cannot be compared in importance with those which have been made since the wars of 1870 and 1877-78. The well-known specialist, Professor Gebler, made a comparison, expressed in figures, between different modern small arms, taking as his standard of effectiveness at 100 degrees the Mauser rifle, 11 mil., of 1871. On this basis he worked out the effectiveness of modern weapons as follows :

The modern French rifle .... The modern German rifle .... The new rifles in use in Italy and Spain The 6-mil. rifle adopted by the United States The 5-mil. rifle now undergoing test .

433

474

580

1000

Therefore, if in the war of 1870 the German and French armies had been armed with weapons of modern type, speaking theoretically, the losses in that war would have been 4^ to 4I times greater than they actually were. Had they been armed with the 6-mil. rifle used in the United States of America the losses would have been ten times greater.

Nevertheless, specialists declare that the new weapons adopted in European armies, and even the 6 mil. rifle, are already obsolete, and that the future will see a self-loading weapon made out of an alloy of aluminium, from which a series of shots may be fired without taking the rifle from the shoulder or losing time and energy in reloading.

Experiments made in Belgium with the new self- charging rifles and pistols of the Mauser system show that (firing only such a number of cartridges as wifl fit into the magazine) a trained soldier can fire from six to seven times a second ; upon shooting a greater number of cartridges from a gun, which requires reloading, the maximum number of shots with the 6-mil. gun is :

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 5

Without aiming ... 78 per minute. Aiming 60 „

But the eflbrts to improve small arms do not stop there, and governments will continue to strive to lessen calibres, as is maintained by Professor Gebler, General Wille, Professor Pototski, and other authorities, to 4 and, it may be, even to 3 millimetres. It is true that there are great difficulties in the utilisation of such small calibres, but the successes already achieved by technical science may be taken to guarantee that these also will be surmounted.

Such a weapon will excel the present in efficiency even more than the present rifle excels the past. The diminution of the calibre of rifles to 5 mil. makes it possible for a soldier to carry 270 cartridges, instead of the 84 which he ^ carried in 1877; the reduction of the calibre to 4 mil. would enable him to carry 380 cartridges ; while with the reduction of the calibre to 3 mil. the number of cartridges borne would increase to 575. In addition, the levelling of the trajectory of the bullet would give to shooting such dead- liness that it would be practically impossible to strengthen the fighting line with reserves.

Professor Gebler declares that these improved weapons will be forty times more effective than those used in 1870. From this must result the complete re-armament of all armies, if before that time limits be not placed upon the rivalry of the nations in preparation for war. For the re-armament of their infantry, Germany, France, Russia, Austria, and Italy would, by our calculation, be com- pelled to spend the immense sum of ;^ 15 0,800, OCX).

But, apart from future improvements in arms, it is easy to see with existing improvements the following consequences: (i) The opening of battles from much greater distances than formerly ; (2) the necessity of loose formation in attack ; (3) the strengthening of the defence ; (4) the increase in the area of the battlefield ; and (5) the increase in casualties.

It is enough here to cite some statistics as to the action of modern arms as compared with the arms of 1870-71 and 1877-78. Thus, the bullet of the Chassepot, the

6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

Berdan, or the Prussian needle-gun fired from a distance of 1760 yards could not penetrate a human skull, whereas the bullet of modern low-calibre rifles at a distance of 3850 yards will penetrate the hard bones of an ox.

But many military writers declare that the improvement in small arms will be neutralised by the fact that rapidity of fire will deprive the soldier of coolness and capacity to turn to account the superiority of the modern weapon.

Let us admit for the moment that modern long-range rifles, even with their future improvements, will not prove more deadly in battle than their predecessors. Such an improbable and apparently unfounded proposition is directly refuted by the experience of the Chilian war of 1 894. In that war the armies of the Congress were armed, partly with old, partly with modern weapons, and it was proven that each company of soldiers armed with rifles of a modern type put out of action 82 men in the armies of the President-Dictator, while a company of soldiers armed with obsolete weapons, put out of action only 34 men. The absence of smoke alone must increase immensely the deadliness of modern arms. The history of past battles relates that at a distance of sixty paces combatants often could not see one another, and that their fire proved in- effective. And even if long-range rifles do not prove more deadly than their predecessors, it will still be absurd to deny that a certain number of projectiles will disable a certain number of men. And as, in the wars of the present century, the number of shots fired for every disablement has fluctuated between 8h and 164, it is plain that the supply of cartridges now carried by each soldier is suffi- cient to disable at least one opponent ; while the supply of 380 cartridges with the 4-mil. rifle, and of 575 with the 3-mil. rifle, will be more than enough to disable two or three of the enemy. In other words, even supposing the effectiveness of modern arms to be in no way increased, the fire of one rifle may disable two or three of the enemy. From this it is plain that, even with the weapons now adopted, the effectiveness of fire presents the possibility of total mutual annihilation.

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 7

Such is the comparison when regard is had alone to the increase in the supply of cartridges arising from the reduction of the calibre of rifles.

But in addition we must take into account the rapidity with which modern weapons may be fired. In a given time twelve times as many shots may be fired as in 1867, while the chances of missing fire and of injury to the powder by damp have been removed. In addition to this must be borne in mind the long range of modern weapons, the absence of the accumulations in the barrel of the rifle, the adoption by officers of instruments for precisely ascertain- ing distances, the use by under-ofticers of field-glasses, and finally, the substitution of the old powder by smokeless powder. All these conditions will undoubtedly increase the number of losses, and if the operation of each were considered as a factor in multiplying past losses, we should attain almost incredible but technically and mathe- matically trustworthy figures.

To this must be added the improvement, since 1870, in the instruction of soldiers in firing. In the training of soldiers every year an immense quantity of ammunition is expended. In addition, mechanical means are employed to show the direction of the barrel on aiming and firing. These are new conditions entirely, or in a great degree, unknown in the time of the last great wars. If we take into account the fact that 500 cartridges are prepared for every rifle, the expenditure of which, of course, is not stinted, we are confronted with a direct denial of the pos- sibiUty, even for armies of millions of men, in the event of equal strength, to sustain such losses.

In addition to small arms the power of artillery has increased in a measure incomparable with the past.

A glance backward at the development of field artillery shows that from the date of the invention of powder im- provements in arms took place very slowly. In imperfect weapons, it would seem, it would have been much easier to effect improvements. Nevertheless, to within a recent date, the effect of artillery fire remained very inconsiderable. In 1 891 Professor Langlois estimated the increase of

8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

the power of artillery fire since the war of 1870 in the following manner : With an equal number of discharges, modern artillery will be five times more effective than the artillery of 1870. But as modern field guns are capable of discharging in a given time from two to two and a half more projectiles than the old guns, it follows that the power ofartillery fire has multiplied since 1870 no less than from twelve to fifteen times.

The calculations made by Professor Langlois in 1891 are already out of date. In France, in Germany, and in Russia quick-firing guns are being made, and from the testimony of such authoritative writers as General Wille, Professor Pototski, and Captain Moch, we find that the fire of these new guns is at least twice as powerful as that of the gun of 1 891, of which Langlois speaks in the fol- lowing terms : '* We have before us a whole series of improvements of the greatest importance, and must admit that munitions of war are entirely different from those in use in the past." So that in order to form some idea as to the total losses in a future war it is necessary to com- pare the action of the latest perfected arms with the action of the old guns employed up to the present time. Such a comparison only shows that, as in the case of quick-firing rifles, the past can give no precise forecast as to the effect of artillery in future wars.

With the introduction of smokeless powder and the employment of nickel steel on the one hand, and the strengthening by wire of the barrels of guns on the other, arms of tremendous power are being made.

A comparison of the result of the firing of a thousand rifle bullets by soldiers attacking in loose formation with the action of shrapnel, shows that one round of shrapnel is effective over a space double the length of that covered by a thousand rifle bullets, and not less in width. Experi- ment has also shown that the fragments of shrapnel dis- perse themselves over a space 880 yards in length and 440 yards in breadth. Prince Hohenlohe, commander of the German artillery in the war of 1870, in the most emphatic manner declared that •* a battery placed against

HOW WAR WILL BE W^AGED ON LAND 9

a road fifteen paces in width might annihilate a whole mass of infantry on this road for a distance of 7700 yards, so that no one would even think of standing there."

Not less are the successes attained in the improvement of projectiles. The use of steel in their manufacture permitted their being charged with a greater number of bullets. The use of explosives four times more power- ful than were formerly employed gave to each splinter and bullet immense force. The flight of bullets and splinters may be hkcned to the action of a sieve from which drops of water are driven. Imagine such a sieve revolving at great speed, and some idea will be gamed of the manner in which the fragments of shells would be dispersed. .

In the war of the future, shell, which is much less effective than shrapnel, will be employed less than formerly. Shrapnel will be the chief ammunition of artillery, although if we believe French reports, it is proved that all in the vicinity of a bursting Brisant shell will be knocked down by the agitation of the atmosphere and sustain serious internal injuries, while in the case of the shell bursting in a covered space every one there will be killed either by the action o. mechanical forces, or by the poisonous gases liberated by the explosion.

By a comparison of the effect of artillery ammunition with the effect of that employed in 1870, it is shown that, on the average, shells burst into 240 pieces instead 01 19-30 as was the case in 1870. The shrapnel employed in 1870 burst into 37 pieces, now it gives as many as 340^ An iron bomb weighing 82 pounds, which, with the old powder gave 42 fragments, filled with pcroxylene gives 1204 pieces. With the increase in the number of bullets and fragments, and in the forces which disperse them, increases also the area which they affect. Splinters and bullets bring death and destruction not only, as in 1870, to those in the vicinity of the explosion, but at a distance of 220 yards away, and this though fired from a distance of 3300 yards.

With such improved ammunition the destruction pro-

lo IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

duced in the ranks of armies will be immense. From the statistics furnished by the Prussian General Rohne, we have estimated the losses which would be sustained by a body of 10,000 men attacking in loose formation a fortified position. From this estimate it is shown that before the attacking party succeeded in covering 2200 yards in the direction of the defenders' trenches every individual composing it may be struck by bullets and fragments of shells, as the offenders' artillery in that time will have succeeded in firing 1450 rounds, scattering 275,000 bullets and fragments, of which 10,330 will take effect in the attacking lines.

But artillery fire will be directed not only against the attacking troops, which, when within range of the trenches may be destroyed by rifle fire, but also, to a greater extent, against supporting bodies which must follow in closer order, and among which, therefore, the action of artillery fire will be even more deadly.

And as at the same time the quantity of artillery in all armies has considerably increased, we may well ask the question whether the nerves of short-service soldiers will stand the terrible destructiveness of its fire.

The improvement, in all respects, of fire-arms, and the high degree of perfection achieved in artillery and artillery ammunition are by no means all that the mind of man has contrived as weapons of destruc- tion. The whole series of auxiliary instruments which in a future war may have immense importance has, since the last war, been improved. Velocipedes, carrier pigeons, field telegraphs and telephones, appa- ratus for signalling by day and by night, and for illu- minating the field of battle, photographic apparatus for the survey of positions from great distances, means of observing the movements of armies by the use of observa- tion scaffolding, ladders, watch towers and balloons — all in a great degree do away with that insufficiency of in- formation which formerly prevented united and successful operations.

As a necessary consequence of the increase in the

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 1 1

power of fire, we find the more frequent and more ex- tended adoption of defences, and cover for protection in attack and for hampering the enemy. Even in times of peace, positions are prepared for the defence of certain points of the railways and main roads and of water com- munications.

In addition to this in the future war every body of men appointed for defence, and even for attack — if it is not to attack at once — must immediately entrench itself. It must dig, so to speak, in the earth its line of battle, and, if time permit, must raise a whole series of defensive points, taking advantage of natural obstacles, and perfecting them with defensive works. Sheltered behind such works, and in a position to devote all their energy to fire against the enemy, the defenders will sustain losses comparatively slight, only their heads and hands — that is, an eighth part of their height — being exposed, while the attacking bodies will be exposed to the uninterrupted fire of the defenders, and deprived almost of all possibility of replying to their fire. For the construction of such trenches and earth- works, each division of an army is now furnished with the requisite tools.

In the opinion of competent military writers the war of the future vv'll consist primarily of a series of battles for the possession of fortified positions. In addition to field fortifications of different kinds, the attacking army will have to deal with auxiliary obstacles which will be met with in the neighbourhood of fortifications, that is, in the very position where they will be subjected to the greatest danger from the enemy's fire — obstructions formed of beams, networks of wire, and pit-falls. To overcome these obstacles great sacrifices must be made.

The part of cavalry in a future war presents this primary difference with its part in the past. At the very beginning of war, and even before the attacking army has passed the frontier, it will be sent to make irruptions on the territory of the enemy, penetrating the country as far as possible, destroying communications, depots, and telegraphs, seizing government resources, and preventing the concentration of

12 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE?

troops. After this the cavalry which follows as part of the constitution of the regular army will be employed in the making of reconnaisances. In a future war such duties will be undoubtedly more difficult than before, owing to the adoption of smokeless powder. Even after having determined the general position of an enemy, cavalry will hardly be in a condition to acquire any precise information, to determine his strength, and even the distance of his advanced posts. The pickets of the enemy will not stand in the open field, but under cover, behind eminences, groups of trees, and hedges. From a distance of a quarter of a mile the fire from the concealed pickets of the enemy will be very effective, yet the pickets themselves will be invisible. In all probability pickets will open fire at the distance of half a mile, to prevent the closer approach of the reconnoitring party, and as with modern arms horsemen may be picked from the saddle from a great distance, the patrol will be unable to determine the distance of the enemy by the effect of his fire. With modern arms and smokeless powder a single marksman in a sheltered posi- tion may cause serious loss to a body of troops, as witness the case cited in the " Military Album," when in an attack by Bavarians on a French battalion sheltered behind a low wall, a Bavarian soldier climbed into a tree, and picked off the French at will, while no smoke betrayed him, and several volleys failed to kill the daring marksman.

Thus scouting parties will be forced to move with great caution, and will not always be able to collect sufficient information, all the more so because, having come under the fire of insignificant posts, and having been obliged to withdraw, they will naturally not wish to admit that they were engaged with small numbers of the enemy. More precise information may be attained only by means of infantry commands which are more easily sheltered, and which can approach more closely the positions of the enemy. Such a definition of the duties in reconnaissances of cavalry patrols and infantry commands is laid down in the Instructions for Infantry elaborated by the French technical committee : " Cavalry may obtain only general

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 13

approximate information as to the position and strength of the enemy; for the acquiring of detailed and precise information infantry must be employed." And actually, in the French military manoeuvres, cavalry are now kept at some distance, and close reconnaissances are made by infantry. Nevertheless, the reconnoitring importance of cavalry, in the strategical sense, has increased. It must be taken into account that the territory of the enemy will be sown with a multitude of permanent and improvised fortified positions and points, and an army will not attack without having around itself, and more particularly in advance, a network of cavalry detachments split up into small parts and patrols. To a large extent such cavalry will operate independently, as when crossing the frontier in the beginning of war. It must alarm the enemy, destroy or seize provisions, guard the bridges, seize despatches, collect information as to the enemy's movements, and pro- tect the communications of the army in its rear.

The greater the importance played in modern war by railways, telegraphs, and improvised entrenchments, the more essential has become this strategical employment of cavalry. Military writers generally assume that the chief strength of cavalry must be sent forward for investigation, and for the protection of the advanced guards of armies, as Germans expressed by the German saying, "Die Reiterci allzeit voran!" (Horsemen always to the front). In view of the power of modern arms, and the resulting practice of dis- posing troops behind natural and artificial defences, and in view of the great network of defensive points prepared in advance, an attacking army will more than ever find it necessary to feel its way, and to reconnoitre the country into which it is advancing. Thus the capacity of cavalry as the "feelers" of an army has become especially important.

As to the part cavalry should play in actual battle, military writers differ in a remarkable degree. Some, as the French Captain Nigot, believe that the desperate massed attacks of cavalry, which prove so effective in manoeuvres, are impossible, as with the great increase in the power of fire, cavalry will not be able to strike at infantry even when

14 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE?

weakness is observed. From his calculations it appears that a battalion of 800 rifles, with one volley fired at a range of 330 yards, would unhorse 424 troopers, and if a battalion were to open fire at 880 yards, and continue firing, at a distance of 1 10 yards 2656 men would have been put out of action, that is several battalions of cavalry, attacking one after another.

Such is not the view of all military writers. Thus one author, relying on the fact that cavalry will cover a given distance at twice the speed of infantry, contends that although cavalry is subjected to treble the possibility of disablement, yet one factor neutralises the other, and therefore the loss of cavalry will be no greater than the loss of infantry in the same distance.

Of one thing there is not the slightest doubt, that is, that cavalry is threatened with treble probability of being struck. In France it was shown that under equal conditions cavalry losses under fire are from two and a half to three times as great as infantry losses, and that cavalry cannot, therefore, remain immovable under fire. Therefore, in France it is considered proven that in time of battle cavalry must keep at a distance of not less than 3850 yards from the enemy, and may draw nearer only towards the close of the battle. Otherwise it would be swept away by rifle and artillery fire.

The speed at which cavalry may attack is taken by some at 550 yards a minute, but most authorities limit it to 440, even to 374, yards a minute. But even if, not- withstanding inequalities of the battlefield and the close formation which lowers the general speed to the speed of the slowest horses, the speed of attack is taken as half a mile in two minutes — almost racing speed — nevertheless, in the course of these two minutes' exposure to effective fire before it can get to close quarters with infantry, cavalry must suffer immense losses which will force it to disperse or make its attack feeble.

It must be understood that for the consideration of this question we have only the opinions of different military speciaHsts. The German author of the " Militarische

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 15

Essays " says that modern conditions in no way involve the fascination which surrounds cavalry in the traditions of the Seven Years War, and that the German army would enter upon war with from 30,000 to 40,000 super- fluous cavalry, which would only create difficulties in concentration and to the Commissariat. But other authori- ties declare that the smokelessness of the battlefield will be favourable for cavalry attack, since it will be easier seen at what points the enemy's infantry is weak, while it will be more difficult for infantry to await from afar, without the covering of smoke, the impetuous shock of masses of cavalry.

This moment when weakening is observed in the enemy's infantry is relied upon by the advocates of cavalry attack in battle. One even goes so far as to say that upon the clash of cavalry upon infantry " it will matter nothing what may be in the hands of the trembling infantry — magazine rifles, flint-locks, or simply pitch- forks." But, as Von der Goltz observes, weakness may be very plain in the ranks of an army and yet not be seen by the enemy. Such weakness can only be seen from advanced positions, and while the information is being conveyed to the proper quarter and cavalry is being sent to attack, the auspicious moment may have passed. On the other hand, the movement of masses of cavalry is always visible owing to the dust it raises, and all the fire of the enemy may be concentrated on these masses, artillery fire against cavalry being effective from a long range, as the mass presents an immense target.

In comparison with the times of the Seven Years War cavalry has itself made progress. It is furnished with stronger and swifter horses. But this improvement can in no way be compared with the increase in range and rapidity of fire. In addition to this, as the same author observes, in former times it was sufficient to break up thick masses of infantry and their opposition was at an end ; now infantry begins the battle in loose formation, each individual command constitutes a unit fit for battle, and even the solitary soldier will not lose his wits while a

1 6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

cartridge remains upon him. Thus the relations between cavalry and infantry have entirely changed.

It is questionable, indeed, whether in the future cavalry will have that importance which formerly belonged to it, as a force deciding battle and afterwards completing the overthrow of the enemy by pursuit. Even in the wars of 1870 and 1877 this importance of cavalry seemed diminished, although, on the other hand, its importance in the reconnoitring of occupied territory, the protection of armies, and its value in independent action have increased.

In addition to this, a new function for cavalry has been created — immediate irruption into the territory of an enemy, and the destruction of his arrangements for mobilisation, and his communications. To what extent such action of cavalry in the moment of the declaration of war will prove successful is still to be proven by experi- ence. In the event of success such action would cause disorganisation in the enemy's arrangements, and force him to accelerate them. And as operations, considering the immensity of modern armies, may be successfully carried on only by the precise execution of strategical plans elaborated in advance, then the disorganisation caused by sudden cavalry irruptions might have the most important results.

As concerns the role of cavalry in pursuit, it is more important to consider this role in the pursuit of retreating armies to their farthest movement than in the pursuit of armies in their actual retreat from the field of battle. Doubts have been expressed as to the decisiveness of future battles. It is very probable that in the majority of cases the road selected for retreat will be guarded by defences constructed in advance, the retreating army falling back upon the nearest position and offering fresh resistance to the victors, who, on their side, will be weakened by the storming of the first positions. In such case the most important 7vle of cavalry may be to prevent the retreating army drawing reinforcement from other sections of the army which, owing to the vastness of the

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 17

field of battle, may find themselves at considerable distance from the main army.

In any case it will be seen that the duties of cavalry in war remain very important, although the fulfilment or non- fulfilment of some of the tasks appointed for it has still to be shown by experience.

Quite otherwise is the case of artillery.

It is an accepted axiom that without the aid of artillery it is impossible to drive infantry, even infantry considerably weaker in numbers, out of a fortified position ; and as all infantry when acting on the defensive will be entrenched, then armies in future will find themselves mainly dependent upon artillery.

The successful employment of artillery will depend upon the opposition it meets from the artillery fire of the enemy. The artillery of the attacking side will begin by attempt- ing to silence, or at least to weaken the artillery fire of the defenders, which object being accomplished, it will be able to turn its attention to the enemy's infantry. The artillery of the defending army, possessing as it will many advan- tages, will attempt to prevent this. The result of such a duel, if the defenders haveartillery of nearly equal strength and quality, in all probability will be the annihilation of the attacking artillery ; while if the superiority of the attacking artillery be substantial, the result will more pro- bably be mutual annihilation.

The increase in the artillery of all armies, the improve- ment of ammunition, the adoption of smokeless powder and of new explosives, the improvement in tactics, all these must lead to such great losses in the artillery service that their action will be paralysed, or the losses in the armies will become so tremendous that war itself will be impossible.

Such a conclusion may seem risky, but it is founded on the investigations of the most competent artillerists, and in the justice of their conclusions it is difficult not to concur, when we consider the changes which have taken place since the time of the last great war.

As relates to the employment of artillery, it may first of

B

1 8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE?

all be noted that the adoption of new powders has changed for the worse the position of artillerymen. In former times a thick cloud of smoke hampered the aim of the artilleryman. But on the other hand it prevented the enemy's artillery and infantry from taking accurate aim.

As long as ordinary powder was used there was no especial need for increase in accuracy and rapidity of fire, for quick firing produced so much smoke that after a short time it was necessary to slacken fire, except on those occasions when there was a favourable wind ; and accuracy also was not as important as it is at the present day. With smokeless powder it is possible to discharge more shots in a few minutes favourable for fire than were formerly discharged in a day's battle. In this connection the accuracy of modern fire must again be insisted upon. Cannon at a distance of 201 1 yards has placed shot in the same hole four times in succession.*

It must be borne in mind that against the enemy's artillery the defending army will make use also of sharp- shooters. Using the new powder, sharpshooters will have full possibility to approach the batteries of the enemy, and concealing themselves behind inequalities of the field of battle, with no smoke to betray them, may pick off all the enemy's gunners and horses.

Manoeuvres in which smokeless powder has been used confirm the opinion that from a distance of 440 yards it is impossible to discover marksmen hidden behind trees or bushes. But from this distance every shot of a skilful marksman will claim its victim. In addition to this, all armies now possess specially organised bodies of chas- seurs, trained to fire from great distances, and accustomed stealthily to approach their mark. It is plain that for such commands there can be no especial difficulty in stealing up to a battery and picking off the artillerymen. The French, German, and Austrian armies dispose of sufficient numbers of such soldiers. It is well known that Germany, France, Austria, and Switzerland yearly expend considerable sums

'■= Lobell, " Militarische Jahresberichte," 1894.

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 19

on the encouragement of good shooting, and that among the population of those states there is a considerable number of first-rate shots. In the Russian army chasseur commands are also found with the different army divisions. According to the data of the Prussian General Rohne 100 sharpshooters will put a battery out -of action, firing from a distance of —

880 yards in the course of* 2.4 minutes, iioo ,1 ,, ,, 4 >>

1320 „ „ ,, 7.5

1650 „ „ „ 22 „

But even if the destruction of the gunners be not accom- plished by sharpshooters, it is very probable that it will soon be done by the artillery of the enemy.

The quantity and power of artillery in all armies has been multiplied many times. If the figures which repre- sent these increased quantity and increased power be multiplied it will be shown that in comparison with 1870 ihe strength of the French artillery has been multiplied 116 times, and of the German 42 times. But after the introduction of the improved artillery now being accom- plished the strength of artillery will be again redoubled.

If, to form some idea how losses in a future war from the action of artillery alone will exceed the corresponding losses in 1870-71, we multiply the figure of these latter losses by the figures which represent the increased force of modern artillery, the result would De incredible, for it would show that there could not be an army large enough to sustain such losses. But for the purpose of giving an idea as to the power of modern artillery these figures have a theoretical value, resulting as they do from simple arith- metical calculation.

In one sense calculation will not be uninstructive. What number of soldiers will be disabled by the use of that quantity of shots which is found in the ammu- nition cases of the batteries of different countries, 'taking into account the conditions for marksmanship less favour- able in war than in peace ? When we make this calculation,

20 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

on the figures of the Prussian general and well-known military writer Muller, we find that the ammunition carried by the batteries of the French and Russian armies, taken together, would put out of action six millions of soldiers. Continuing our calculations upon the data of the same authority we find that the Franco-Russian artillery, with its ready supply of ammunition, would be capable of with- standing the attack of double that number, or twelve millions of men. The ready supply of ammunition in the united German, Austrian and Italian armies would disable five millions of men, and successfully repulse the attack of ten millions of infantry.

A writer no less authoritative, a professor of the chief artillery school in France, Colonel Langlois, speaking as to the character of future battles, expresses the opinion that for one field-piece up to 500 rounds will be required. If we estimate the quantity of artillery, and the number of fragments produced by explosion, it is shown that these are sufficient for the destruction of forces eight times stronger than the armies opposed to them. It is necessary to mention here that modern projectiles, filled with powerful explosives, will be dangerous not only to the enemy, but also to the army which employs them. The storing, transport, and employment of such explosives under the well-directed fire of an enemy may lead to catastrophes which will still further increase the horrors of war. In France fotigasse shells, containing 4 pounds of melinite, have been adopted. The majority of writers are agreed that in view of the possible premature explosion of melinite shells, foHgasse shells are very dangerous, as in such event, the bursting of the gun seems inevitable. But the danger is not limited to the possible bursting of guns. Against entrenched armies, mortars and siege artillery of great size will be employed. The projectiles of these will be filled with strong explosives, such as peroxylene and melinite. Now these explosives are capable of exploding unexpectedly on certain changes of temperature and from other causes not yet ascertained. The agitation of the air caused by the enemy's shells may also cause explosions.

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 21

It is enough to note that explosions are by no means uncommon during experiments, ahhough these experiments are carried on by trained men under the supervision of picked officers. The very mystery with which not only the experiments but the accidents which arise therefrom are surrounded, proves recognition of the difficulties that arise and the uncertainty of success, England is the only country where circumstantial accounts of accidents in dealing with explosives are published. In the j-early memoranda of inspectors we usually find a long list of accidents in the making or transport of explosive sub- stances, and this, among other things, shows that notwith- standing all measures of precaution, armies are sometimes supplied with dangerously defective ammunition. For the sake of safety in many armies explosive projectiles are painted various colours, and, in order to distinguish them at night, are given a different form. In addition to that they must be transported separately, and the very fitting of the tube into the projectile is done at the time of loading.

It is very natural to find that in time of battle, when armies are in a state of tension, perfect coolness is found only among exceptional natures. During the American Civil War thousands of rifles were found upon the battle-fields doubly and trebly loaded, and sometimes charged to the very muzzle. If in such a simple matter as the loading of a rifle such mistakes are made, what is to be expected in the use of highly explosive ammunition, the safe handling of which demands the greatest precision and caution ?

Even if we were able to assume that cartridges will always be furnished with explosive tubes only when operations begin, or on the very position on which they are to be employed, and that guns will always be loaded with due caution and regularity, even in that case we find the possibility of a new and even greater danger.

Fongasse cartridges consist of a long steel cylinder, of which the smooth interior is filled with melinite, roburite, ecrasite, or some other explosive. All these substances differ from one another by admixtures and mode of pre-

22 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

paration. It is obvious that the thinner the case of the cartridge the greater the quantity .of explosives it will contain.

In the opinion of experts, the direct action of gases on explosion is limited to a comparatively small space — i6h yards — but their explosion develops such force that for" a certain distance it will drag gun, gunners, and horses. It cannot but be observed that if in the manufacture of the ammunition any faults were to escape detection, the very gravest consequences might ensue. In one of the latest English compositions on artillery the following sentences occur : " The founding of ordinary shells demands great care in order to prevent premature explosion in the barrel of the gun. Shells must not have on their internal surface any roughness which might cause explosion."

On the explosion of such a shell in the barrel of a gun the body of the latter was shattered into more than twenty bits, the carriage was completely destroyed, and the wheels turned into a heap of splinters. Indi- vidual fragments of the destroyed weapon weighed 363 pounds, and were flung 99 yards forward and backward from the place on which the gun had stood, and nearly 108 yards on either side. Notwithstanding the distance between guns, a single explosion might embrace several guns with all their ammunition.

Not far from the battery ammunition cases will be placed. If these be not exploded by the concussion of the atmosphere they may very easily be exploded by some of the heavy fragments which fall upon them. Is there any one who can declare that all such accidents will be obviated by perfection of technical construction and, with the present constitution of armies, by the careful selection of those who are to deal with explosives ?

All this leads to the conclusion that even if we do not consider the dangers proceeding from explosions, the artillery and ammunition already prepared is sufficient for the destruction of much larger armies than will be moved on the field of battle. But such destruction may not take place for the very simple reason that the artillery of each

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 23

combatant may in a very short time silence the fire of its adversary. And as the quantity of artillery, their quality, and the training of their crews will, in the opinion of most authorities, be almost equal on both sides, then common sense tells us that in the artillery duel with which battles will commence either the attacking side, having less protection, will be destroyed, or mutual exter- mination will result. Thus the problem might arise for infantry to attack without the support of artillery, and as this, as we shall hereafter show, is impossible without terrible losses, tactics would probably be changed, and with the remnants of its artillery the side having the advantage in the artillery duel must await the attack of the enemy ; conditions which would probably result in a repetition of the events of 1632 at Nuremburg, when Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein entrenched themselves and laid all their hopes of victory on the exhaustion of the enemy.

As concerns the operations of infantry in the future war there is no settled opinion even on the chief question, that is, the deciding influence in battle of an infantry attack. If war were to break out to-morrow all armies in this respect would find themselves under the influence of the contradiction between instructions, manoeuvres, and the views of the more noted military writers, General Skugarevski, M tiller. Von Rohne, Janson, and others. There is no reason to be surprised at this, as the introduction of smokeless powder, improved rifles ten times more eftective than the rifies of the old type, better instruction of soldiers, and their equipment with instru- ments for the construction of earthworks have changed in every respect the conditions of war.

Modern tactics are primarily the result of our experi- ence of the last great war. As long as the progress of military technical science was comparatively slow it was not difficult to rely upon the experience of the past. At the present day the state of affairs is entirely different ; in former times re-armament took place after hundreds of years, then after many decades, now it takes place in a very short time,

24 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

But not only the change in armament will influence the action of infantry. The smokelessness of the battlefield, the perfection of rifles, artillery, and explosives, and at the same time the employment of army hordes consisting largely of short-service soldiers, have created entirely new conditions for the war of the future.

In battle a combatant may from a distance three to four times greater than before inflict serious losses on attack- ing troops. The killing off of the officers and consequent weakening in leadership, will be direct consequences of a smokeless battlefield, and of the precision of modern small arms which makes it possible for marksmen to select their victims at will.

Meantime, the role which will be played by infantry has become more complex. In preliminary operations infantry must take a far larger part than formerly. The close reconnoitring of an enemy's position has become the duty of infantry scouts, who wfll be obliged to advance stealthily in order to obtain the information necessary for any successful attack. Without such service by infantry scouts an immense superiority would remain on the defen- sive side which, having studied the locality in advance, and occupying a commanding position, would simply with the aid of field-glasses direct all its blows successfully.

For the carrying out of such reconnaissances and the collecting of information, not only daring but skilful and sagacious soldiers are required, and with the modern composition of armies it will be very difficult to find such men. The determining of positions by smoke is no longer possible ; while to determine positions by sound is extraordinarily difficult. Experiments carried out on French shooting ranges show that the sound caused by the explosion of smokeless powder does not penetrate as far as that of sulphur powder ; a single rifle shot is heard no farther than 880 yards, and volleys, according to the number of rifles, no farther than from 1320 to 1540 yards. Yet knowledge of the strength and position of an enemy is much more essential than before, as the losses from an unexpected encounter will be very great.

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 25

From modern infantry men much more endurance also will be required. Marches will be made in deep columns in consequence of the growth of armies ; while the number of these marches, as a consequence of the massiveness of modern armies, will increase in comparison with former times, since, owing to considerations of space and commis- sariat, modern armies must be split up and the individual sections must reunite with the main body on drawing near to an enemy superior in numbers.

Thus the conditions surrounding advance to battle and battle itself have become extraordinarily complicated. Yet on mobilisation for every hundred soldiers serving with the colours under present arrangements from 26 men (Italy) to 361 men (Russia) will be drawn from the reserve. The majority of these men will have long for- gotten what they learnt during their period of service, while of their officers only a fraction will be in a high state of efficiency.

With such conditions it would seem necessary that field instructions and regulations must be elaborated in time of peace, giving precise directions as to tactics in all con- tingencies. But in this very respect in every army we find deficiencies of different kinds. Theoretical instructions do not correspond to practical necessities and are consti- tuted from a limited standpoint. Colonel Mignol says that the tactics recommended in the latest French official in- structions in essence differ very little from those introduced after the invention of firearms and the adoption of bayonets, that is, when firearms were about forty times less effective than they are to-day. At that time in the first line of battle marched musketeers who opened the combat, followed by pikemen who carried out the actual assault. Now battle is opened by moving forward lines of riflemen, after which storming columns will advance. But are these two forms of tactics in essence the same ? Is it possible that all the progress in ballistics which has strengthened the defensive power of infantry and increased the mobility and strength of artillery, has not led to a change in the very nature of war ? Is it possible that war remains the

26 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

same as in the time of matchlocks, flintlocks, and ramrods with the mere difference that musketeers have been re- placed by sharpshooters, and pikemen by reserves and the viassc ? The inadequacy of the recommended systems is so obvious that as soon as new instructions appear they are submitted to criticism and changed. In truth, the views concerning the duties of infantry present a labyrinth of irreconcilable contradictions, one incompatible with another.

The reader must not think that these contradictions are apparent only to the layman. General Luset, a very well-informed specialist, speaking of French tactics, asks : " Who has not been astonished by the differences of view found in the text-books of our schools on questions touching the actual condition of tactics ? Can we admit that the teaching of infantry officers in the lower schools agrees with that which they receive in the highest military training institutions ? The teaching of this higher school does not correspond to the courses of the Ecole d' Appli- cation. The ideas insisted upon in the teaching of the higher military school change continually. There is a chaos of contending ideas and principles, and out of the general confusion not a ray of light appears. Is it surprising that officers ask, ' What is the use of study ? ' Let teachers first agree among themselves 1 "

Attentive study of German writers will reveal differences no less great. But for many obvious reasons they are expressed with greater caution. Many German military writers are restrained from a too frank admission of the dangers and difficulties of war under modern conditions by the fear of giving food to the agitation against militarism. Rules hasten after rules, supplementary explanations are constantly added, and in the result of results we find a chaos of inconsistencies. It could not be otherwise. When all units of infantry are furnished with trenching tools in such quantities that in the course of a very short time earthworks may be thrown up, each attacking body is subjected to eight times the danger of their sheltered opponents. But in addition to rifle fire, attacking forces

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 27

will be subjected to fire from the protected artillery of the defenders.

It is not surprising therefore that, concerning the character of the future employment of infantry, the views of different authorities present numberless and grave contradictions.

A considerable number of military writers, judging from the experience of past wars, conclude that the main points in the employment of infantry in battle have not changed. Infantry will be employed in battle as in the past, but in loose formation, and the command of infantry will not be especially difficult not only for experienced officei's, but even for those who have been taken from the reserve. On the other hand, other writers declare that for the com- mand of infantry on the battlefield even more ability will be required than for the command of artillery and cavalry. For 300 officers who are capable of learning to command a battery or a squadron not lOO will be found in any army capable of leading infantry under fire. What, then, shall we expect from the officers of the reserve ? In one thing, however, all are agreed — that whatever be the tactics adopted, their successful execution will require great skill in taking advantage of cover and in overcoming obstacles, knowledge when to seek shelter on the .ground and to advance again at the proper moment. Will the reservists only just summoned to the colours be in a condition to fulfil these duties ? But even suppose that a considerable part will consist of perfectly trained and enduring officers and soldiers, what in such event will be their losses ?

Some say that there is no reason for supposing that in a future war armies will sustain greater losses than in the past. Others, no less authoritative, declare that attacks having with their object, the occupation of an enemy's position in a future- war will be so difficult and bloody that neither side will be in a condition to celebrate the victory. Before the defended position will be formed a belt I TOO yards wide, for both sides equally inaccessible, limited by human bodies over which will fly thousands of bullets and shells, a belt over which no living being

2 8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

will be able to pass to decide the battle with the bayonet.

But another view is expressed. All this, some writers say, would be true in view of the small-calibre rifles and improved artillery now in use if the field of battle were a drill-ground where distances were known and marksmen guaranteed that they would not be struck by the enemy's fire, and if the field of battle were a perfectly level space ; but in nature such positions are rarely met with, and armies will take advantage of the shelter of woods and under- growth, eminences and depressions. Hidden behind the first line of riflemen who will constitute the Ktigclfang the succeeding lines will advance with much less losses.

To this is replied : It will be easy for commanders to follow the approach of the enemy by means of balloons from permanent points of view and from portable obser- vation points, which will be set up by every detachment intending to occupy a position. Therefore with the long range, precision and striking power of modern artil- lery, which make it possible to scatter fragments and bullets to immense distances, it will be possible to shell an enemy out of woods and from behind bushes and inequalities of the ground. There is no foundation for supposing that the enemy will select precisely those positions which will not give him the possibility of taking advantage of long- distance rifles and artillery. In addition to this, and to trenches and earthworks, he may prepare other obstacles for the overcoming of which the attackers from a short distance, in more or less dense masses, and under a con- stant fire will require no little time.

To this is replied that at short range the losses, not- withstanding the unquestioned improvement of the ballistic qualities of modern arms, will not be great. When the enemy is within close range the soldiers will be nervous, they will aim badly or not at all, and modern perfected small-arms will be little better than bows and pitchforks in the hands of barbarians.

Rut the soldier under cover will be subjected to very little danger. Resting his rifle upon the trench, he will

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 29

fire without aiming, holding his rifle horizontally, and the bullet will bring death to whatever lies in its path for a space of 660 yards, while even if fired at too great an elevation it will fall among the reserves. The experience of the Chilian war demonstrates that at a range of from 1 100 to 1320 yards the losses from random shots may be very considerable.

All this is well known to the advocates of war, yet they continue to maintain that soldiers will shoot badly, and that the perfected rifles now in their hands will be no more effective than the weapons they bore in the past. But is there any reason to suppose that with the favourable con- ditions for defence above indicated, soldiers acting on the defensive will aim badly ? Why, then, assume that the attackers will have sufficient courage to advance openly, exposing their whole bodies, when the defenders will be subjected to a danger eight times less ? In reality even this danger will not exist. At very short distances the fire of an enemy approaching at a running pace will be quite ineffec- tive, while his rear ranks will be forced to cease fire.

Even if we were to admit that the defending army will always be of inferior quality, in such case his fire will be so heavy that it must work immense destruction among the attackers. To this also a reply is found. We are told that the stronger the fire the farther the contending armies will remain from one another ; they will rarely see one another ; rivers, woods, and hills will sometimes sepa- rate them ; there will no longer be direct clashes of troops, making of man a bloodthirsty beast, and ending in the ruin of one of the combatants. And since battles will take place at immense distances it will not be difBcult in case of need to retreat from the field. But in such event more or less mutual extermination will have taken place without definite result.

Other writers admit the probability of terrible blood- shed and immense losses, but maintain that not this but the gaining of victory is the important point, whatever the losses may be. The war of 1870 showed that infantry is capable of enduring immense losses. Other

30 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

specialists regard this opinion with suspicion in view of the fact that modern infantry is very different from that which fought in 1870. For many causes they admit that the losses will be incomparably greater.

Modern arms not only increase the direct danger but paralyse the medical service, since it will be impossible to organise ambulance stations in positions exposed even to the random shots of the en'^my, and equally difficult to carry off the wounded. Modern rifles kill at two miles, artillery is effective at more than three and a half miles. And armies no longer consist of professional soldiers, but of peace-loving citizens who have no desire to expose them- selves to danger. The propaganda against war may turn their minds in another direction. It is impossible to rely upon modern armies submitting to sacrifice and depriva- tion to such an extent as is desired by military theorists who lose sight of the tendencies which obtain in western European society.

Such contradictions of opinions are met not only by ques- tions of a general nature, but even by matters of detail. Some declare that the improvement in firearms, and the adoption and application to military purposes of all the latest inventions, have cast into the background mere muscular strength, replacing it by military technique. With immense armies and high mental training of leaders, it will be possible by means of the strategical concentra- tion of marching columns at a certain point to outflank and surround the enemy — all the more possible because the defence will be weakened in consequence of the greater distance of reserves.

To this the reply is : In order to carry out such an operation it will be necessary to know all the movements of the enemy, while against smokeless powder, long- range firearms, and against the precautions taken for guarding the centre of an army, the obtaining of informa- tion and the examination of the inhabitants will be more difficult; the quick construction of light trenches will render. vain attempts at turning flanks and surrounding an enemy ; while the constant arrival on the field of battle

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 31

of fresh forces, which will be frequent owing to the dis- tribution of armies over great areas, will endanger the position of an army which attempts a flanking movement. Thus we find before us a whole series of hopeless con- tradictions. This it seems is inevitable and springs from the very nature of things. A war alone is capable of solving these questions.

In the future war, whatever the combinations may be, one side will stand primarily on the defensive; and if after the repulse of the enemy's attacks it in its turn resorts to attack for the purpose of finally overthrowing him, such operations can only be carried on for a short distance, as the newly attacking army will meet with similar insuperable obstacles. The contending armies in all probability will often exchange their parts.

French statisticians estimate that every attacking body, in order that it shall not be inferior to the defenders, when it has got within 35^ yards (the distance at which it will be possible to rush upon the enemy), for each hundred men of the defenders it must have 6'^'] men ; while if it wishes to reach the actual positions of the defenders not numerically inferior, it must have eight times as many men.

By the statistics of General Skugarevski, a body of troops, double the strength of the defenders, beginning an attack from 800 paces, by the time they have advanced 3(X) paces will have less than half their strength available against the defence. With equal forces the defenders may allow the enemy to approach to within a distance of 220 yards, when they will only need to discharge the six cart- ridges in their magazines in order to annihilate the attacking force.

The celebrated Prussian authority. General Muller, declares that in order to avoid total extermination "soldiers will be compelled, in scattered formation, and as much as possible unobserved by the enemy, to creep forward, hiding behind irregularities in the field, and burying themselves in the earth as moles."

If this is so, is it possible to dream of taking an en- trenched position? Let us suppose that, following the

32 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

advice of General Miiller, attacking troops will begin to form at 225 paces from the enemy, up to that time having suffered no loss. Let us also suppose that at that distance of 225 paces the attacking body numbers 400 men and the defenders in the trenches only 100 men. Now from the statistics of General Skugarevski, after the distance between the combatants has been traversed, only 74 men will be left to the offensive side for the actual attack with the bayonet. To suppose that the defending troops will have a clear field for aiming of less than 225 paces, or that 74 men will be able to wrest an entrenched position from 100 would be absurd.

All this leads to the conclusion that concerning methods of attack there can be no certain knowledge. To rely upon the assistance of artillery at the present day, when the quantity and quality of artillery will be on both sides the same, is impossible. To obtain a superiority of rifle fire over that of the defenders will be equally difficult, even with a considerable preponderance of strength ; so that the defending army in the very moment of attack may find itself in a position of complete security.

The Prussian General Janson expressed the view, to this time uncontroverted, that for attack it will first be necessary to employ artillery upon the enemy's position, and this of course can only be done by the concentration of a more powerful artillery than is at the disposal of the defence. If the rifle-pits and trenches of the defender's position are furnished with internal covering the assistance of siege artillery may be necessary for their destruction.

Only after such preliminary action may the actual attack by infantry begin. But to approach an adversary in a strongly fortified position, in the face of a fire over ground the distances of which have been ascertained beforehand, is a laborious task, and may even require two days to accomplish. In the first day the attacking body will advance to the limit of the line of fire of the enemy's artillery, and upon the approach of darkness must send into the belt of rifle fire small bodies, that is, companies taken from the assaulting army, always according to their

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 33

order in the ranks. The advanced troops will proceed to the points selected, and immediately entrench themselves. These selected points of defence will form a line from which on the following day the storm of the position will be begun, after the opening of a strong rifle fire against the defence, and the advance of the rear echelons into the foremost line.

Now here comes in the chief difficulty in the execution of General Janson's plans. First of all the enemy will take such precautionary measures that it will seldom happen that the echelons advanced into the firing line before dawn will be able to find natural cover ; on the contrary, the greater part of these echelons will remain without protection, and will stand exposed for a long time, while the attacking army, by means of fire, is preparing the position for attack.

General Janson himself is far from persuaded that the system of attack recommended by him will prove suc- cessful, even in the majority of cases. Indeed, as a condition precedent for the success of the attack, he assumes that the defenders will be disorganised and panic-stricken ; at the same time adding that " we have no right to assume concerning the enemy what we would never admit about ourselves." Of course the system of attack he advocates could only prove suc- cessful after immense losses, and not always even after such losses.

To rely simply on the strength of the bayonet in face of modern intensity of fire would be to judge only by the tradition of those times when the bayonet was the last argument in battle. In the Russian army, faith in the bayonet is still sometimes expressed. Among foreign authorities it is no longer met with. The con- ditions have wholly changed. In former times the result of an infantry battle was thus decided : the combatants advanced upon one another without flinching, exchanged a volley or two, and then rushed upon one another. By such an assault the fate of the battle was quickly decided, the weaker side gave way, and escaped without

c

34 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

difficulty if the enemy employed no cavalry. The victors sent two or three volleys after the vanquished, and the battle was over.

The conditions are very different now. Before an attack with the bayonet can be made a zone of murderous fire has first to be passed. Retreat after a repulsed attack upon a fortified position, will be accomplished only after the loss of more than half the attacking force. At such short ranges as will be founa in bayonet attacks, almost every rifle bullet will disable one soldier, and often more than one. On a smokeless battlefield the results of such an overthrow will be visible to all. At such close ranges the present covered bullet will penetrate the cranium ; but in other parts of the body will have a shattering and tearing effect.

If we accept the opinions of the specialists cited that the defending troops by the force of their fire can stop the attack at some hundred yards distance, making further progress impossible, we are bound to admit that the defenders in their turn will not be able to undertake an assault, which would merely result in changing their positions with the enemy.

The attainment of success, as happened in the past, and especially in the war of 1870, by means of manoeuvres and enveloping, will, in the war of the future, also be unlikely. In the first place such operations demand great superiority of force, whereas armies will be almost equal. Further, for the enveloping of an enemy's position reconnaissance under fire is necessary, and this is a very arduous task. A defending army driven from its positions, will begin to retreat by convenient roads, either finding new points of resistance prepared in advance, or again entrenching itself in suitable positions, continuing its opposition to the attacking army, and inflicting upon it new losses until reinforcements arrive.

In view of the conditions of modern war the question inevitably arises : Will leaders be found gifted with suffi- cient talent to decide the problems of war, and overcome

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 2S

difficulties which seem almost insuperable? Year by year the mechanism of war undergoes improvement, and it must continue to become more complex. The fortifica- tion of frontiers continues, the strength of armies grows. Would it not be madness to begin a war when the very methods of attack are the subject of dispute, and the only indisputable fact remains that every mistake, in conse- quence of the immense power of firearms, will be followed by ruinous results ?

In enunciating the more important questions which arise from the new mechanism of war, we naturally meet the question : Is there not a strange contradiction in the preparation of powerful weapons of extermination, and the subjection to military service of almost the whole of the grown population in those states where the spirit of the time is so decidedly opposed to militarism? In order, how- ever, to prepare a basis for a reply to this question we should be compelled to describe the entire action of that mechanism denominated an army of which the constituent parts are here marshalled.

General Count Caprivi declared in Parliament that the people was possessed by a madness for figures. And indeed all European states from the time of the introduc- tion of universal military service have been in a position to call under the colours almost the whole of their able- bodied male population.

But these men are not soldiers. They are worthless save when they are properly armed and instructed. In addition they must be commanded, and without leader- ship the best army in the world would be an inert mob. Only men with commanders can be named soldiers.

Different authorities variously estimate the strength of armies which might be placed in the field on the outbreak of a war. To preserve impartiality we must introduce all such estimates.

But the following figures, which relate to the year 1896, appear to us the most probable.

The military strengths of the Powers are as follows

36 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

Germany 2,550,000

Austria-Hungary .... 1,304,000 Italy 1,281,000

Total . . 5,135,000

France 2,554,000

Russia 2,8oD,ooo

Total . . 5.354.000

To arrive at this result the governments of these coun- tries have lavished milliards. Yet it is a remarkable fact that the relative strength of armies has not changed, not- withstanding the efforts of every State to outdo its neigh- bours.

Conscription, as at present systematised, has one good side — it bears in itself the embryo of the abolition of war. On the mobilisation of the whole working population in the different countries difficulties may easily arise the con- sequences of which it would be difficult to foresee.

Within recent times immense sums have been laid out to ensure the rapid concentration of all possible forces as quickly as may be after the declaration of war, in positions near to the enemy, in order at once to begin a determined attack. Such arrangements in 1870 gave the Germans the most splendid results, and their necessity is now generally acknowledged. But since then the conditions have changed. The superiority which rapid concentration and mobilisation will give may be counterbalanced by the greater order which will result from less haste, and the less grave economic disorganisation which slower mobilisation will cause.

There can be no doubt that the immensity of modern armies and the weight of their equipment enormously in- crease the need for endurance among the rank and file. Infantry soldiers are compelled to carry a weight of from 25 to 35 kilogrammes, or from 70 to Zj pounds. To become inured gradually to this there will not be time ; long marches must be undertaken at once, and not a small pro- portion of the soldiers will break down from exhaustion.

HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 37

The French medical authorities declare that after the first two weeks of marching the hospitals will contain 100,000 men, excluding those disabled by wounds.

To obtain quarters for an immense number of men will be impossible, and armies in the very beginning will be deprived of the most necessary conveniences. It will be difficult to guarantee large masses of men with pro- visions, with the same speed with which those men are mobilised. The local stores at the chief points of move- ment will be exhausted, and the transport of provisions from the central organisation will require time. Of the consequences of mobilisation we may judge, although imperfectly, by the experience of manoeuvres. In France the manoeuvres have already revealed imperfect training of officers, and unsatisfactory fulfilment by the reservists of their military duties. At every obstacle these men broke up into formless mobs ; they fired badly, so badly, indeed, that it was admitted that in the event of war three or four weeks' training would be required before they could be sent to the front, especially upon offensive operations.

It is improbable that in other countries similar in- efficiency has not been observed ; and that this inefficiency is not spoken of so openly may be due to greater restraint or to insufficient means of publicity.

It may, indeed, be said that universal military service for short periods presents conditions in which lie con- cealed the germs of the impossibility of war itself This impossibility lies mainly in the difficulty of providing for immense masses, as a consequence of the diminution in productiveness, the possibility of economic crises, and popular commotions, and, finally, in the extreme difficulty of directing armies consisting of millions of men.

With the growth of populations armies will continue to grow, and since even now the immensity of armies and the condition of armaments and tactics make the appara- tus of war so complex that the directing, feeding, and forcing of armies into battle has become very difficult, in a not very distant future it will be more than questionable.

The more complex the apparatus the greater intelli-

38 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ?

gence will be required for its management, both in those who command and those who obey. As the methods of extermination grow more powerful the more essential will it be to act at the psychical moment. In the network of opinions, conditions, needs, and dangers which wjll_ arise at almost every point of a struggle, in the opinion of General Dragomiroff only a powerfully developed intelli- gence will be in a position to act. The immensity of armies will cause great complexity in the whole apparatus of war ; but, at the same time, side by side with the in- crease in the size of armies, grows the power of weapons of destruction. The power of the rifle has been increased fourteen times and that of artillery forty times.

In the past, success in war depended upon the ability of the commander and the courage of his army. In the future, success will depend more on the ability of the commanders of individual bodies of troops, on the initiative and energy of all officers, on the personal example which they set to their men, and finally even on the condition of the soldiers themselves.

For the just direction of all this gigantic mechanism much experience will be required. But where will experi- enced commanders be found in the future, when experience even of the present conditions is lacking ?

The conditions of modern war are such that of necessity the directing power must pass from the hands of the older commanders, not to speak of generals — from the hands of colonels and even commanders of battalions — into the hands of captains. Yet the French Professor Coumes, in his work, ** La Tactique de Demain," declares that for the command of infantry on the